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DIVINE GOODNESS, DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE
AND THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL:
A DISCUSSION OF AUGUSTINE'S *ENCHIRIDION*, 24-26,
FROM ANSELM OF LAON TO STEPHEN LANGTON[*]

1. Introduction

For a long time, all that medievalists knew on the twelfth-century "School of Laon" was due to the pioneering studies conducted by pupils and colleagues of Martin Grabmann (1875–1949), such as Franz Bliemetzrieder (1867–1935), Heinrich Weisweiler (1893–1964) and Odon Lottin (1880–1965). These scholars' interest focused primarily on sentence-collections produced in Laon — for they were inclined to think of such collections as the first step of a long path developing into Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, and eventually leading to thirteenth-century *summae*.[1]

Following this pattern, the model of which lay chiefly in Grabmann's *History Of The Scholastic Method* (Grabmann 1909–1911) these scholars were keen to highlight the systematic order present in the Laon sentence collections — proceeding logically from God to creation, and then from man's fall to redemption through Christ's incarnation and through the sacraments.[2] Moreover, this idea of a linear

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[1] Cf. Bliemetzrieder 1919. The same pattern is also found in much later works, such as Smalley 1952, 75–76; D'Onofrio, ed. 1996, vol. II, 18–39; Southern, 36–48. Wider information, together with a critical evaluation on the subject is now found in Giraud 2010, 11–28; 40–51.

[2] Cf. Grabmann 1909–1911, II, 157–168 (tr. it. 194–206).

development of theology in the 12th and 13th centuries found a strong argument in its favour in the assumption that Anselm of Laon, during his youth, had been a pupil of Anselm of Bec (*i.e.*, Anselm of Canterbury). For, according to Grabmann's scheme, Anselm of Bec was "the father of scholasticism",[3] and the masters in Laon, and above all Anselm of Laon, were "theologians following the steps of Anselm of Bec" (Theologen auf den Bahnen Anselms von Canterbury).[4]

More recent studies, however, have challenged both these assumptions. On the one side, there is no sufficient evidence of any relationship between Anselm of Canterbury and Anselm of Laon;[5] on the other side, the systematic order which is shown by some collections of sentences is in fact not an original feature at all, but rather the work of later scribes, or even of modern editors.[6]

Odon Lottin did a great work to extract from such collections of sentences or anthologies Anselm of Laon's own sentences, or his brother Raoul's, or William of Champeaux's, as well as anonymous sentences connected to masters in Laon. Nonetheless, detailed research and descriptions of these collections for themselves are still lacking.[7] The one exception is Cédric Giraud's recent work on the *Liber pancrisis*, one of the oldest collections of sentences.[8] Giraud has shown that, when we talk about these sentence collections, we shouldn't really think of a single work diffused through different manuscript copies, but we should rather keep in mind that every single manuscript is a piece of work in itself, where it is often difficult to understand the exact point a particular collection finishes.

2. Augustine and the school of Laon

2.1. Anselm of Laon and Rupert of Liège

Nowadays, scholars do not study the school of Laon looking for the spark that set off the literary genre of theological *summae* any more. Differently, they tend to think that the school attained its most remarkable achievement in biblical exegesis

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[3] Grabmann 1909–1911, I, 258–338.

[4] Grabmann 1909–1911, II, 128.

[5] Cf. Wilmart 1936, 410, n. 58; Flint 1976, 90–91. For some scholars (Gourdel 1953, 705 et Merlette 1975, 43), on the contrary, it seems more probable that Anselm got his theological training in Reims, maybe as a pupil of Bruno, who was 'scholasticus' in this town, or in Laon itself, according to the hypothesis newly advanced by Cédric Giraud (Giraud 2011, 49–51). I have also tried to evaluate the different hypothesis in Quinto forthcoming.

[6] Cf. Lottin 1959a, 1–17; 445; Colish 1986, 10.

[7] One can anyway read with much fruit the very detailed data collected in Grabmann 1909–1911, II, 136–168.

[8] Giraud/Mews 2006, 145–167. A detailed study of the Sentences collections traditionally linked with Anselm of Laon, their origin and their influence is now found in Giraud 2011, 339–492.

— and especially in a number of initiatives that finally produced the Biblical Gloss. This is a tool for biblical exegesis,[9] and undoubtedly reveals Anselm of Laon's great reverence towards the Church Fathers, whom he considered the basis for any education in theology.

Now, the same fidelity towards the Church Fathers, and especially towards Augustine, led to a most remarkable debate I would like to consider in my paper. The main protagonists of this dialogue at distance, sometimes interpreted as an example of the difference between "scholastic" and "monastic" theology,[10] were Anselm of Laon on the one hand and, on the other, Rupert, a monk of the St-Laurent-Abbey in Liège who would later become the abbot of Deutz.

Let us start with the facts.[11] In 1113 two young monks come back to the monastery of St. Laurent in Liège, after spending a period studying theology in Laon. They refer — perhaps with a hint of naivety — to a new doctrine they had been taught at Laon, which distinguishes between *voluntas approbans* on the one hand and *voluntas permittens* on the other. Such a distinction — in the account of it given by Rupert — would lead somebody to affirm that «God wants the evil to be done, and that Adam's sin belonged to God's will».[12] Rupert is very badly impressed by such a way of tackling theological problems. He thinks that the method of using dialectical distinctions in theology leads to unacceptable consequences on the level of content and makes the theologian incapable of grasping God's infinite mercy. He feels he has to do something against that, and writes two short treatises — which also are our sources for the knowledge of facts. They are Rupert's *De voluntate dei* (dating to 1114) and *De omnipotentia dei* (dating to 1116), two works which attack both Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux.

Anselm gets very upset at Rupert's critiques. He does not write a proper answer to Rupert but, at the end of 1116 or beginning of 1117,[13] he writes a brief letter

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[9] I take the freedom to remind the reader that one cannot anymore think of the Gloss as of an impressive ensemble of glossed Biblical books following one another as we can see it in the *editio princeps*, but rather as single volumes on single books, for some of which we have evidence that they were written in Laon: cf. Gibson 1992, xi ; Froehlich 1992; Stirnemann 1994; Dahan 1996, 208.

[10] On the fate of the historiographical cathegory 'monastic theology' it is important to read Leonardi 2004; I may also refer to the bibliography assembled in Quinto 2001, 24 and 380, note 142, now renewed by Giraud 2011, 13–15.

[11] A vivid evocation of this historical episode is found, among other, in Southern, vol. II, 14–24; a detailed and still valid study of the theological implications of the confrontation between Rupert and Anselme is Magrassi 1959, 179–218. The topic is studied again by Giraud 2010, 162–177.

[12] Cf. Rupert, *De vol. Dei*, PL 170, 437: "Haec idcirco nunc ad vos dicere incipimus, o magistri [...] quia de vestris scolis hoc se quidam nostrorum accepisse fatetur, ut diceret: *Quia Deus malum fieri vult, et quia voluntatis Dei fuit quod Adam praevaricatus est*".

[13] When publishing the letter, Odon Lottin thought it should be dated at an earlier period (cf. Lottin 1959a, 177–178); he anyway changed soon his mind, and acknowledged that this text id to

to Heribrand, the abbot of St. Laurent. In the letter, he defends both his method in theology and the results it leads to. The text is short and effective. To Anselm's eyes, the whole question arises out of lack of understanding of his teaching — and he who doesn't understand their contents moves to quarrel about words. Such a person, Anselm writes, is like a child and does not even deserve a proper refutation. For he has first to learn respect for masters who are using distinctions — besides other tools of analysis — just in order to solve every difficulty raising from the Sacred Texts; namely, those difficulties that usually scandalize inexperienced people.[14]

Not surprisingly, Rupert is very hurt by this not very diplomatic message, not only because he is compared to a child dealing with adults — *i. e.*, to more experienced theologians — but also because, he thinks, Anselm is attacking the whole way monks are reading and interpreting the Bible. So, Rupert leaves St. Laurent's on a donkey, directed to Laon, to go and talk to Anselm face to face. When he finally gets there, however, in Spring 1117, he finds Anselm very ill and close to his death — which will come on July, 15th of that same year. As a consequence, Rupert will not be able to see and to talk to him.

All this, inasmuch as facts are concerned.

2.2. Divine will

Let us now consider the topic of the dispute. Divine will was certainly a subject of particular interest in Laon. Apart from Anselm's letter to Heribrand, which is a reasonably long text, seven fragments and sentences dealing with this subject-matter have come down to us. They testify of a consistent teaching.[15]

Anselm's letter to Heribrand is made up of two parts. The first one tackles methodological issues; the second one deals with the contents of the dispute, *i.e.*, divine will.

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be dated close to the end of Anselm's life, and probably is his last writing (cf. LOTTIN 1959b). The Letter was also published earlier in PL 162, 1687–1692.

[14] Cf. ANSELM, *Letter to Heribrand*, 176: "Videndum est, Domine, ne illa questio, que apud uos sic agitatur, non in sententia, sed in pugnis uerborum sit. Rectos sensus discutere uirorum est, de uerbulis litigare puerorum est, qui non nisi tenuiter intelligunt que dicunt, uel audiunt ... Sententie quidem omnium catholicorum diuerse, sed non aduerse, in unam concurrunt conuenientiam, in uerbis uero sonant quedam quasi contrarietates et pugne, in quibus scandalizantur pusilli, exercentur strenui, contendunt superbi, excluduntur probati qui aliis languentibus expedite dissonantia consonare ostendunt".

[15] ANSELM, *Sent.*, 152–153 (LOTTIN 1959a, 116–117; attribution to Anselm is given as probable); *Sent.*, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295 (LOTTIN 1959a, 234–240, considered to be "sentences de l'école"). The longer sentences are those attributed by Lottin generically to "the school" (so, not posed under the direct Anselm's authorship), but the very reaction of Rupert clearly shows that this doctrine concerning God's will was maintained at Laon during Anselm's lifetime. It is even possible that the dispute prompted the master's pupils to study the theme with greater attention.

As far as method is concerned, Anselm claims that the assertions of "catholic doctors" can indeed *seem* to be different in the way they are expressed, but cannot truly *be* in contradiction. For Sacred Scripture is a *corpus* with no contradictions; and if somebody believes they have found a clash of opinions in it, it is the master's task and ability to show them, in a simple way («expedite ostendere»), the actual and fundamental consonance lying underneath.[16]

And this is exactly what Anselm is doing, albeit very briefly, in the second part of his letter. It seems there is a contradiction within divine will — a contradiction which, according to Anselm's description of it, can be formalized as follow:

(i) God wills each thing which happens <in the world> («uult omnia que fiunt»);

(ii) Evil is among things which happen <in the world> («inter que etiam sunt mala»)

[from (i) and (ii) follows]

(iii) God wills evil too

but, on the other hand,

(iv) God does not will evil («non uult dominus malum»);

(iii) is hence in contradiction with (iv)

At first sight, we have here a clear contradiction. For either God wills all that happens in the world (i), and therefore he wills the evil, too (iii), or God does not will evil (iv), but then, since evil indeed exists, (i) is false: in fact, it seems necessary that God does not will everything happening in the world.

In other terms, if all that happens is God's will, then he must be held responsible for evil too (for evil, too, happens); however, God cannot will any evil, for he is absolutely good; so, the evil exists despite God's not willing it — which seems to entail that God cannot prevent the evil from happening, *i.e.*, that God is not omnipotent.

It is well-known that the same problem arises in Augustine's texts.[17] In his letter to Heribrand, Anselm quotes a passage from Augustine's *De gratia et libero arbitrio*;[18] and in the sentence *De uoluntate dei* (which bears n. 291 in dom Odon

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[16] See the text quoted in footnote 14 above.

[17] Augustine's works will be quoted according to the abbreviation established for the *Augustinus Lexikon* (those quoted will anyway be included in the bibliography at the end of this paper).

[18] Anselm, *Letter to Heribrand*, 176: "Manifestum est Deum operari in animis hominum inclinando uoluntates eorum quocumque uoluerit, siue ad bonum pro sua misericordia, siue ad malum iudicio suo, aliquando occulto, semper autem iusto"; cf. Augustine, *Gr. et lib. arb.*, prol. (PL 44, 881) and 21, 43 (PL 44, 909): "… manifestatur (*prol.*: ostendit) operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum uoluntates quocumque uoluerit, siue ad bona pro sua misericordia, siue ad malum pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper tamen iusto" (the reminiscence has not been pointed to in Lottin's edition).

Lottin's edition[19]) he refers especially to Augustine's *Enchiridion*, or *Treatise On Faith, Hope And Charity*.

Augustine's *Enchiridion*, written around 421,[20] is divided into three main sections — the first one on faith, the second one on hope and the third one on charity. In the first section on faith, Augustine starts by dealing with creation, and then moves on to man's fall, Christ's incarnation and sacrifice, the establishment of the Church and of the sacraments (which arise from Redemption), and finally the last things (resurrection and the heavenly condition of the blessed). As an epilogue to this exposition of the most important mysteries of faith, Augustine adds a long section on predestination (24,94–26,102),[21] a theme towards which his thought seems to tend in an irresistible way. In fact, as Augustine writes in the *Enchiridion*, part of the blessed' beatitude will consist of the understanding, in a much fuller way than the one we can now have through faith, of how God's justice is perfectly compatible with the fact that some people will be glorified through a merciful act they do not deserve, and others will be damned thorough an act of justice they do deserve.[22] The blessed will be saved by God only, whilst the damned will be lost by themselves. And God is not responsible for their damnation, nor does the latter go against God's will. God does not will man's damnation; nonetheless, man's will, while choosing the evil, does not hinder the realization of God's will. «Nothing happens without the Omnipotent willing it»[23] — but God wills it in two different

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[19] Lottin 1959a, 236–238.

[20] Augustine's *Enchiridion* was diffused by a large manuscript tradition (ca 190 witnesses are preserved) and it was widely known by the medieval theologians; studies of its diffusion and reception in the Middle Ages anyway, are still lacking, and the major source of information remains the edition of the *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*, published in 1947, which is based on the text established by the Maurists Fathers, republished also in PL. The *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* ed. adds a French translation and "notes complémentaires" by Jean Rivière; subsequently was published the critic edition by E. Evans (CCSL 46, 49–114), and the translation of the *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* was republished with an updating by Goulven Madec and Jean-Paul Bouhot (see in particular Augustine, *Ench.*, [BA 9], 440).

[21] Augustine, *Ench.*, CCSL 46, 99–104; BA 9, 268–289.

[22] Augustine, *Ench.*, 24, 94: "Tunc rebus ipsis euidentius apparebit quod in psalmo [100, 1] scriptum est: *Misericordiam et iudicium cantabo tibi domine*, quia nisi per indebitam misericordiam nemo liberatur, et nisi per debitum iudicium nemo damnatur" (CCSL 46, 99; BA 9, 268). A passage of Anselm's letter to Heribrand seems indeed to be some kind of commentary of this text: "Cum enim *uniuerse uie Domini sint misericordia et ueritas* (*Ps.* xxiv), sicut uult quod est misericordie, nihilominus uult etiam quod est iustitie. Vult ergo per misericordiam consentientem adiuuare, uult etiam per iustitiam renuentem relinquere" (Anselm, *Letter to Heribrand*, 176; punctuation has been slightly changed).

[23] Augustine, *Ench.*, 24, 95: CCSL 46, 99; BA 9, 271: "Tunc in clarissima sapientiae luce uidebitur, quod nunc piorum fides habet ante quam manifesta cognitione uideatur, quam certa et immutabilis et efficacissima sit uoluntas dei: quam multa possit et non uelit, nihil autem uelit quod non possit; quamque sit uerum quod in psalmo [113, 11] canitur: *Deus autem noster in caelo sursum, in*

ways, either letting it be done or doing it himself: «Nothing, therefore, happens but by the will of the Omnipotent, He either permitting it to be done, or Himself doing it».

Augustine's solution is picked up by the masters in Laon. They employ the one and same words that Augustine used, though they strip them from all rhetoric and consider them from the point of view of pure logic and metaphysics. First of all, they take care to specify what *uoluntas dei* means.

Voluntas dei has two different meanings. According to the first, strict, meaning, God's will (*uoluntas dei*) is nothing but God's essence:

> Nam voluntas Dei vere ac proprie dicitur que in ipso est et ipsius essentia est.[24]

God's will (in this sense) is — according to the teaching of the masters in Laon — always fulfilled. It is to this meaning of God's will that many passages from the Holy Scripture refer, such as «Omnia quecumque uoluit Dominus fecit» (Ps 113, 3) or «Voluntati eius quis resistit?» (Rm 9, 19). God's will in this strict sense can be called *uoluntas beneplaciti*, an expression echoing St. Paul's verse «ut probetis que sit uoluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta» (Rm 12, 2). Also, it might be called *dispositio*, so to signify that it's identical with the way the world is ordered.[25]

Next to this meaning of *uoluntas dei*, however, there is a second, looser or more figurative meaning.[26] According to this second meaning, one speaks of *uoluntas dei* when one refers to God words which, when referred to man, do not mean the will

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caelo et in terra omnia quaecumque uoluit fecit. Quod utique non est uerum si aliqua uoluit et non fecit, et quod est indignius, ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret quod uolebat omnipotens, uoluntas hominis impediuit. Non ergo fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri uelit, uel sinendo ut fiat uel ipse faciendo".

[24] ANSELM, *Sent.*, 291 (ed. LOTTIN 1959a, 237).

[25] ANSELM, *Sent.*, 291 (LOTTIN 1959a, 237): "Nam voluntas Dei vere ac proprie dicitur que in ipso est et ipsius essentia est; et hec una est nec mulptiplicitatem recipit nec mutabilitatem que inexpleta esse non potest. De qua propheta ait: *omnia quecumque uoluit Dominus fecit* [*Ps.* 113, 3]; et Apostolus: *uoluntati eius quis resistit* [*Rom.* 9, 19]? Et alibi: *ut probetis que sit uoluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta* [*Rom.* 12, 2]. Et hec uoluntas recte appellatur beneplacens, appellatur beneplacitum Dei siue dispositio". One could observe that the *dispositio,* as "plan of the world", is not the same thing as God's essence, but it is indeed the Laon sentence which maintains identity between the two. At the end of the century, Stephen Langton will observe: "Est voluntas volens et voluntas volita" (LANGTON, *Comm. Sent.*, 64). According to Langton, the will-essence is the so-called *voluntas volens* (which is the same thing as God); the *dispositio*, or "plan of the world", is the same as the *voluntas volita*, or *voluntas beneplaciti*. It is this which is meant when the *signa voluntatis beneplaciti* are evoked by theologians, starting with Anselm of Laon (see the following footote). For Langton (*ibid.*) "Preceptum, prohibitio, consilium et permissio sunt signa voluntatis volite et non volentis". For the use of *dispositio*, please see the Additional Note at the end of the paper (p. 46).

[26] ANSELM, *Sent.*, 291, ed. LOTTIN 1959a, 237 (following of the text quoted in the last footnote above): "Aliquando uero secundum quandam dicendi figuram uoluntas Dei uocatur que secundum proprietatem non est uoluntas eius, ut preceptio, prohibitio, consilium necnon permissio et operatio; ideoque pluraliter aliquando scriptura uoluntates Dei pronuntiat".

itself, but just its *expression*. A sentence from Laon lists five examples of such words, due to remain classical up to Aquinas and later: «preceptio, prohibitio, consilium, permissio et operatio».[27]

To the eyes of its proponents, the distinction between the first meaning of divine will, i.e. the *uoluntas beneplaciti*, and the second meaning of divine will, which can be called *uoluntas quae est signum beneplaciti*, yields to two different results. First, it can explain the fundamental agreement between those passages from Holy Scripture that mention God's several "wills" (ex. «Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius», Ps 110, 2) and other passages affirming but one divine will, identical to God's own essence. For one can make sense of that by saying that there is but one *voluntas beneplaciti*, though many signs of such a will (*voluntas quae est signum beneplaciti*).[28] As a second point, thanks to such a distinction one can affirm that, since God's will coincides with the world's plan, is always fulfilled, even if some of God's commandments are not accomplished (for instance, when men act against God's orders or prohibitions). Commandments, suggestions or prohibitions, in fact, *are not*, strictly speaking, God's will (*voluntas beneplaciti*), but only signs of his will (*voluntas quae est signum beneplaciti*), which *can be said to be* God's will only in a looser sense.[29] And, in fact, one can act against God's commandments, but one cannot act against God's will (in the strictest sense).[30]

2.3. God's will and the evil.

Some problems, however, still remain. What, in Anselm's teaching, had struck Rupert as wrong and offensive was not simply the use of dialectical distinctions when talking about God's will. He was struck by the conception that God might have any actual link with the evil. As a matter of fact, in the Laon sentence the evil is certainly not said to be the object of God's will — or, in other words, God does not approve the evil, and hence does not "want" it — but still evil seems to be thought of as somehow included within the *voluntas beneplaciti*.

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[27] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 11, *corpus* (p. 249).

[28] Anselm, *Sent.*, 291 (Lottin 1959a, 237): "Unde propheta: *magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius* [*Ps.* 110, 2], cum non sit nisi una uoluntas Dei, que ipse est, pluraliter tamen dicit uoluntates, quia uoluntas Dei uariis modis ac pro diuersis accipitur, ut dictum est".

[29] Anselm, *Sent.*, 291 (Lottin 1959a, 236–237): "Hoc non est pretereundum nobis quod sacra scriptura de uoluntate Dei uariis modis loqui consueuit. Et non est Dei uoluntas diuersa, sed locutio diversa est de uoluntate, quia nomen uoluntatis diuerse accipitur".

[30] Anselme *Sent.*, 291 (Lottin 1959a, 237): "Pro precepto Dei atque consilio potest accipi uoluntas Dei ... Et contra hanc uoluntatem multa fiunt. ... Et sicut illa tria [*scil.* preceptum, prohibitio, consilium] dicuntur Dei uoluntas ideo quia signa sunt diuine uoluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum Deum omne illud fieri uelle quod cuicumque precepit uel non fieri quod prohibuit; precepit enim Abrahe immolare filium, nec tamen uoluit, nec ideo precepit ut id fieret sed ut Abrahe probaretur fides".

Now, the masters in Laon where certainly very careful and sympathetic readers of Augustine's works. As a consequence, the problem that vexed Rupert so dramatically was not so tough to their eyes. For, according to Augustine, if God lets the evil happen, it is because, in a mysterious way we cannot fully grasp, it is good that evil too is there, next to good, even if evil is surely not good in itself. To put it in Augustine's words:[31]

> Quamuis ergo ea quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt non sint bona, tamen ut non sola bona sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est.

According to Augustine, man must firmly believe that God is good. The existence of evil does not mean that God is not good, nor that evil is good — it only means that, even if we cannot understand how that can be, it is good that evil, too, exists. And the reason why this is good is that God wills it, for God, being good, cannot will but the good.[32]

As a matter of fact, the masters in Laon even tried to go beyond what Augustine actually said. They tried to *explain* the mystery Augustine had simply pointed at, and to look for a likely reason which should explain why the evil existing next to the good is indeed something good. In one of the oldest sentences from the school, likely to record Anselm's own words, one reads:[33]

> No human being and no angel would be good, were there no evil being within the same kind. For good creatures would become arrogant because of their goodness, unless they can learn to humble themselves from the fall of their own nature. And this, in the sin of men and angels, seems to be very useful indeed to those who stand [i.e., those who do not fall into sin].

What this text is saying is not merely that there must be a reason for the evil to exist in the world; it also tries to point at *which* reason this one might be. In fact,

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[31] Anselm, *Sent.*, 291 (Lottin 1959a, 237–238) = Augustine, *Ench.*, 24, 96: CCSL 46, 99–100; BA 9, 272–273.

[32] That evil is included within God's mysterious plan seems actually to be the central enigma of *Enchiridion* : already in ch. 8, 27 Augustine had depicted the miserable state of humanity after the original sin in tragic terms. The *massa damnata*, i. e. humanity existing beside the fallen angels, continues to procreate, driven to this only by the *indomita concupiscentia* ; new men are born *de propagine uitiata damnataque* just to be new sinners. And God permits all this to go on, sinners with their sins. More, He continues to create new souls for the newborns, and he continues to provide them with what can sustain their bodies. And why, all this? "Melius enim iudicauit de malis bene facere quam mala nulla esse permittere" (Augustine, *Ench.*, 8, 27: CCSL 46, 64; BA 9, 152).

[33] Anselm, *Sent.*, 40, extracted from the *Liber pancrisis* (éd. Lottin, 37; ponctuation modified): "Nullus uel homo uel angelus bonus esset, si nullus eiusdem generis malus esset; bona enim creatura de bono suo superbiret, nisi per casum nature sue humiliari disceret, quod, in casu hominis et angeli, stantibus utilissimum apparet". It seems that this sentence refers Anselm's own words: ms. Troyes, BM 425, f. 111v[b] attributes it to him *nominatim* and, unlike many other texts of the "Loan school", it seems not to be a quotation from the Church's Fathers.

it claims that the existence and punishment of evil creatures are useful, and indeed necessary, to good creatures' perseverance in goodness.

So, the Augustinianism of the masters in Laon, and particularly of Anselm of Laon, seem to push Augustine's thought to its extreme boundaries and sometimes even beyond Augustine's own text. This kind of Augustinianism, however, was not accepted by everyone else, and alternative interpretations of his texts were put forward.

3. Rupert of Liège

A first alternative was Rupert's one. Instead of Anselm's strict interpretation of Augustine, Rupert suggested a more nuanced one. In Rupert's opinion, saying that «uolens mala sunt, et uolens bona operatur»[34] is equivalent to saying that «Deo uolente mala sunt» and thus to saying «Deum malum uelle».[35] According to Rupert, this is exactly the interpretation his adversaries submit for Augustine's text, an interpretation which he wants to address.

First of all, in chapter 20 of his *De omnipotentia Dei*, Rupert aims at showing that his adversaries' position cannot claim to be following Augustine's thought. For Augustine, Rupert says, never said that God wills the evil; had he said that, he would surely have corrected the statement in his *Retractationes*, where he corrected many sentences of his which could shock his readers' religious feelings.[36] According to Rupert, the right interpretation of Augustine's words (as we read it in chapter 21 of Rupert's *De omnipotentia Dei*) requires the participle *uolens* to refer not to the infinitive sentence «malum esse uel fieri», but rather to the verb *sinere* ("to permit").

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[34] Cf. Anselm, *Sent.*, 291 (ed. Lottin, 283), which is a commentary on Augustine's *Enchiridion*: "Ecce manifeste hic habes Dei uoluntatem appellari operationem eius uel permissionem: cum dicit 'non fieri aliquid nisi opus fieri uelit', <ibi> includit et bona et mala omnia que fiunt; ideoque aperte distinguit quomodo Deum uelle dixerit, ne eadem ratione intelligeretur uelle bona et mala, subdens: 'uel sinendo ut fiat', hoc quantum ad mala dicit, 'uel ipso faciente', hoc quantum ad bona. Mala autem sinit fieri, sed non facit; bona uero ipse facit; ideoque dixit eum uelle, quia uolens mala sunt, et uolens bona operatur; et ob hoc permissio et operatio 'uoluntas' dicuntur".

[35] Rupert, *De omn. Dei*, xix (PL 170, 469 a): "... tamquam simplices et rustici judicamur, qui non possimus comprehendere subtilitatem sententiae, qua verissime, ut aiunt, dictum, et firmissime tenendum sit, quia vult Deus malum".

[36] Rupert, *De omn. Dei*, xx (PL 170, 470 a–b): "... ecce inspicientes sollicite, primum illud nos advertisse gaudeamus, quia sicut nusquam alias, ita nec istic audita est ipsa quam detestamur horrisona enuntiatio, vult Deus malum. Quod si ab eo dictum fuisset, merito seipsum et justius reprehenderet, quam ubi pro minuscula dictione retractando reprehendens semetipsum, vitanda, inquit, erat hic offensio aurium religiosarum"; cf. Augustinus, *Retr.*, I, 4 (CCSL 57, 14–15): "uitanda ergo erat haec offensio aurium religiosarum, quamuis alia sit illa uniuersalis uia, aliae autem uiae de quibus et in psalmo canimus: uias tuas, domine, notas fac mihi, et semitas tuas doce me".

God does not will the evil, nor does he will the evil to exist, either; he simply wills *to permit* the evil to exist:[37]

> cum dicitur *sinit fieri, et non nolens, sed volens sinit* … non volens fieri, sed volens sinere sinit, quod perspicuum est scienti vel recogitanti …

The path Rupert takes for his exposition is a rather complicated one, and it would be too long, albeit very interesting from a theological point of view, to follow it in detail.[38] Nonetheless, we can point at the success of Rupert's solution. Despite the great influence of the "school of Laon" on scholastic theology in general — as it is recognized by scholars of medieval philosophy –, still most scholastic theologians up until Aquinas[39] prefer to follow Rupert on this point, and not Anselm. The great Anselm, who had been described by Guibert of Nogent as «a light for the whole France or, rather, for the whole Latin world»,[40] while Rupert himself could not but admit that his faith and learning, with their great reputation, in his days give more fruit to the Church than those of anybody else.[41]

4. Peter Lombard

To sum up, we were able to identify two aspects of the debate between the school of Laon and Rupert of Liège.

First, we have pointed at the distinction between *uoluntas beneplaciti* on the one hand and *uoluntas quae est signum beneplaciti* on the other. Such a distinction was elaborated by the masters in Laon, and Rupert himself accepted it. Second, there is the question of whether God can be said to will the evil, in the sense that he wills the evil to happen.

Let us now consider both aspects' treatment in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, *i.e.* the distinction of the two meanings of *uoluntas dei*, Peter Lombard follows the Laon solution, and indeed is responsible

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[37] Rupert, *De omn. Dei*, xxi (PL 170, 471 b).

[38] One can however fruitfully read Magrassi 1959, 202–211.

[39] Cf. Magrassi 1959, 216–218. In reality Thomas somehow tried to reconcile Rupert's position ("God does not want evil to be") with Anselm's distinction between *voluntas approbans* and *voluntas permittens*, developed by Peter Lombard and his followers by means of the distinction of the two meanings of *non uolo*: cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theol.*, i, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3um: "Dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri: sed vult permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum" (p. 247).

[40] "… vir totius Franciae, immo latini orbis lumen in liberalibus disciplinis": Guibert, *Autobiographie*, iii, 4 (éd. Labande, 284). An evaluation of Guibert's appraisal of Anselm is found in Giraud 2011, 158–162.

[41] Rupert, *De omn. Dei*, xxvi (PL 170, 475) "Fides et scientia prae caeteris bono hactenus cum odore in Christi Ecclesia fructificat".

for passing it to later theologians. Thus, divine will's signs come to a fixed list of five: *praeceptio*, *prohibitio*, *consilium*, *permissio*, *operatio*. Here, Peter relies very closely on Anselm's sentence 291, which Peter cites literally and almost entirely in chapters 6 and 7 of distinction 45, Book I of his *Sententiae*.[42]

However, inasmuch as the second aspect is concerned, *i.e.* the relation between God's will and the evil, Peter is much more independent from the Laon masters. In distinction 46 of the same book, in fact, he affirms that the question of whether the evil is included in God's will or not is still an open one. In long chapter 3 of this distinction (reaching eleven paragraphs in the Grottaferrata edition) Peter clearly states the problem and says that both the yes- and the no-solutions can claim to have authorities and reasons supporting them. He then lists three arguments by those who say that the evil is included in God's will, and three by those who say it is not. Finally, Peter gives the following solution:[43]

And so evil things are not done with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subjected to God's will that an evil be done or not done, but that he allows it to be done, because it is good to allow evil things do be done; and he allows it entirely willingly, not willing evil things, but willing to allow that they be done, because evil things are not good, nor is it good for them to be or be done.[44]

Overall, this is Rupert's solution — the object of God's will is the act of permitting, not the evil which is being permitted. However, there is a feature which distinguishes Peter's solution from Rupert's. I mean, the treatment of the words *uelle* and *nolle*. The passage we have just read starts off with the words:[45]

Non ergo deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala.

Peter Lombard is here suggesting a different exegesis of Augustine's texts than the one advanced in Laon. According to the school of Laon, God's will is related to the good and the evil in this way:[46]

... *volens* mala sinit, et *volens* bona operatur; et ob hoc permissio et operatio 'voluntas Dei' dicitur.

According to Peter's distinction 46 of the first book of his *Sententiae*, there are a higher number of possible cases:

(i) What God wills (*vult*), i.e. the good, is infallibly accomplished.

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[42] Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, I, d. 45, cc. 6–7 (vol. I, 310–312) = Anselm, *Sent.*, 291 (Lottin 1959a, 237–238).

[43] Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, I, d. 46, c. 3, n. 11 (vol. I, 316; my italics): "Non ergo deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia *non subest Dei voluntati ut malum fiat vel non fiat, set ut fieri sinat*, quia bonum est sinere mala fieri; et utique volens sinit, non volens mala, sed volens sinere ut ipsa fiant, quia nec mala sunt bona, nec ea fieri vel esse bonum est".

[44] Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, as footnote 43, tr. Silano, 250.

[45] Cf. footnote 43 above.

[46] Cf. footnote 35 above.

(ii) What God does-not-will (*non vult* as the third person of the verb *nolo*), will certainly not be turned into reality.

(iii) But the evil is neither willed nor non-willed (from *nolo*) by God. In this case, God «malum non vult», *i.e*, God *does not* will the evil, where the negation *non* is simply placed in front of the third person of *volo*.

Let us now consider how Peter's solution was used and developed by the last author we are going to take into account, Stephen Langton.

5. Stephen Langton

Stephen Langton tackles the issue of divine will on different occasions. First, in his very selective Commentary on Peter Lombard, he chooses to linger on distinctions 45 and 46 of the *Sententiae*'s first book.[47] Second, we have three different versions of a *quaestio De voluntate Dei* (CAMB017). And this is followed by another *quaestio*, *Vtrum homo licite possit uelle contrarium eius quod scit deum uelle* (CAMB018) addressing the same problem that Peter the Lombard faces in distinction 47 of the first book of the *Sententiae*. Both *quaestiones* are now edited, and will be published in the first volume of Langton's *Quaestiones theologiae*.[48]

Let us now consider Stephen's commentary on distinction 45 of the *Sentences*, Book 1. Stephen already realizes that Peter's distinction 45, where the Lombard simply follows the Laon texts on divine will, will not be compatible with the solution Peter himself advances in distinction 46 — *i.e.*, the difference between *nolo* and *non volo*. Since Stephen's Commentary is very concise, we have to read the Lombard's passage to which Stephen is referring first:[49]

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[47] LANGTON, *Comm. Sent.*, 62–68.

[48] Also a *quaestio De ymolatione Isaac et precepto Abrahe* (CAMB102) arises from a problem discussed by Peter Lombard in d. 45 of the 1st Book of the *Sentences* (*Sent*. I, d. 45, c. 7, n. 1, vol. I, 311: "Etsi illa tria [*scil.* praeceptio, prohibitio et consilium] dicantur Dei voluntas ideo quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum Deum omne illud fieri velle quod cuicumque praecepit, vel non fieri quod prohibuit. Praecepit enim Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit; nec ideo praecepit ut id fieret, sed ut Abrahae probaretur fides"). This *quaestio* CAMB102 is published by Paolo Maggioni in a recent issue of "Medioevo": cf. BIENIAK/MAGGIONI/QUINTO 2010a, 191–217 (introduction), 237–255 (edition).

[49] PETER LOMBARD, *Sent.*, I, d. 45, c. 7, n. 2 (vol. I, 311) = Anselm, *Sent*. 291 (éd. LOTTIN, 237[45]–238[54]; I have put the bold character in the text). SILANO's translation (p. 245): "God's permission and operation are also called God's will; Augustine shows how in the *Enchiridion* saying: 'Nothing happens, unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen, or by doing it himself. And it is not to doubt that God does well even when allowing to be done whatever is done evilly: for he does not allow this without a just judgement, and assuredly all that is just is good'. –See, here you have manifestly that God's operation or permission is called his will, when he says 'Nothing happens, unless the Almighty wills it to happen', where he includes all things, both good and evil, which are done".

Permissio quoque Dei et operatio voluntas Dei appellantur, qualiter accipit Augustinus in *Enchiridion*, dicens:[50] "Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri **velit**, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri quaecumque fiunt male: non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est". — Ecce manifeste hic habes Dei voluntatem appellari ipsius operationem vel permissionem, cum dicit 'non fieri aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri **velit**', ubi **includit** et bona et mala omnia quae fiunt.

Langton links his Commentary only to the word *velit*, which is printed in bold above here. Let's look at Langton's commentary:[51]

«**Velit**». Non, secundum quod accipitur 'vult' pro beneplacito. Hoc non valet: "Deus non vult hoc; ergo vult eius contrarium". Secundum quod sunt due dictiones: 'non' 'vult', quia non vult istum esse malum. Tamen hec falsa: "vult istum esse bonum". Sit, quod reprobus sit. Set secundum quod <'non vult'> est una dictio huius verbi 'nolo' tertia persona, acsi dicatur 'nult', bene sequitur.

The Laon masters, and Peter Lombard following their steps in this passage, were interpreting Augustine in such a way, that God's will would include both good and evil things. According to Langton, however, this is by no means necessary. From the fact that someone is evil one can draw the conclusion that God doesn't will him/her to be good (*i.e.*, that God doesn't will him/her not to be evil), but this doesn't imply its contrary, *i.e.*, it doesn't imply that God wills an evil person to be evil.

Supposing that somebody (here named A) is wicked, we can ask the question:
Does God will A to be good? (*Vultne deus istum esse bonum*?)
and to this question, we have to answer:
No, he doesn't (= *Non vult*).
However, to the question:
Does God will A to be evil? (*Vultne deus istum esse malum*?)
we also can answer:
No, he doesn't (= *Non vult*).
In other words, according to Langton the following two sentences:

1. God wills A to be evil,
   and
2. God wills A not to be evil (*i.e.*, to be good)

are not contradictory.

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[50] Augustine, *Ench.*, 24, 95–96: CCSL 46, 103–104; BA 9, 282–289.
[51] Langton, *Comm. Sent.*, 63 (spelling according to Landgraf's edition; quotation marks and integration are mine).

For, of two contradictory sentences, one must be true, and the other one must be false. In this case, however, *both* propositions can be false at the same time. These ones, instead, are the contradictory sentences of each of them:

(a) God wills A to be evil.   (non-a) God doesn't will A to be evil.
(b) God wills A to be good.   (non-b) God doesn't will A to be good.

So, if (a) and (b) are both false, then (non-a) and (non-b) must both be true (for they are their contradictory). But if God doesn't will A to be good (non-b), it doesn't follow that he wills A to be evil (a) and — even more importantly — if God doesn't will A to be evil (non-a), he doesn't necessarily will him/her to be good (b).

If A sins, there is no necessity for God to say

i. *Volo istum peccare*

nor to say

ii. *Nolo istum peccare* (= *Volo istum non peccare*)

for he could simply say

iii. *Non volo istum peccare*.

Of these three statements, (iii) is always true, whether A sins or whether A does not. So, God never wills the evil; and the existence of the evil does not limit God's omnipotence or goodness in any way. This would be the case only if the contradictory sentence to *Volo istum peccare* (i) were *Nolo istum peccare* or *Volo istum non peccare* (ii). But — luckily enough for God — they are not. The contradictory sentence to *Volo istum peccare* (i) is *Non volo istum peccare* (iii).

Langton so challenges the argument of those who, from the fact that the evil exists, infer that God wills the evil, or at least that he wills the evil to be. Peter Lombard's words, Stephen is commenting upon on this point, are:[52]

Si enim, inquiunt, mala non esse vel fieri vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent.

Langton commentary:[53] «Hoc verum est». No doubts about this: If God willed the evil not to exist, and so if he said «Nolo malum fieri», the evil wouldn't exist. However, God (unfortunately, perhaps) doesn't say that; he simply says *Non volo*

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[52] Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, I, d. 46, c. 3, n. 4 (vol. I, 315): "Si enim, inquiunt, mala non esse vel fieri vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent. Quia si vult ea non esse vel fieri, et non potest id efficere, scilicet ut non sint vel fiant, voluntati eius et potentiae aliquid resistit. Et non est omnipotens, quia non potest omne quod vult; sed impotens, sicuti et nos sumus, qui quod volumus, quandoque non valemus. Sed quia omnipotens est et in nullo impotens, certum est non posse fieri mala vel esse nisi eo volente. Quomodo enim, eo invito et nolente, posset ab aliquo malum fieri, cum scriptum sit: *Voluntati eius quis resistet* ?"

[53] Langton, *Comm. Sent.*, 65–66 (Landgraf's spelling, my quotation marks). It is interesting to observe that Peter Lombard's words are: *Si enim mala non esse vel fieri vellet*. Now, either the manuscrit which Langton was working on had a varian reading, or (what is more probable), Langton submitted the text to a transformation. If so, we need to have no regret about this: the transformation is correct: "*mala non esse vel fieri velle*" is indeed "*mala esse uel fieri nolle*".

malum fieri. In relation to the evil, God doesn't have a "positive" will, but only a non-will. In this way, God's omnipotence and God's goodness are saved. And man's free will is as well.

6. Conclusion

Let us now draw some conclusions from what we have been saying so far.

1. First of all, the set of patristic texts selected in Laon seem to have had a re-markable importance. The Laon masters had first-hand acquaintance with Au-gustine's works. They knew the *Enchiridion*,[54] and other works, well and were interpreting them in an Augustinian attitude — or rather, in the attitude of a certain, very consistent, Augustinianism which we might call "Augustinian scholasticism". The set of Scriptural texts, patristic passages and various exam-ples connected to a certain problem that was prepared in Laon will mark the theological discussion for no less than a century.

2. A second aspect is that the set of authorities prepared in Laon is not a neu-tral one. In fact, it aims at supporting a well-defined interpretation, marked by a certain unilateralism. This is even clearer when one compares the Laon dossier with that which, on the same topic, was gathered by Abelard in chap-ter 31 of his *Sic et non* (*Quod Deus malorum quoque causa vel auctor sit vel non*). For, next to the *Enchiridion* passages, Abelard collects other texts — culled from other works by Augustine, too — which cannot be said to blatantly con-tradict the *Enchiridion*, but certainly put it in a very different and more broad perspective.[55]

3. Third, the masters of Laon's readers did not feel obliged to accept the Laon interpretation without questioning it at all. In fact, when Rupert of Liège de-nies that Augustine might have supported the thesis that God wills the evil, he is trying to strip Augustine from the Laon narrow interpretation. To put it in Rupert's words: *Augustini patrocinio perperam sese defendere, qui Deum malum*

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[54] This assumption about the knowledge of Augustine's works in Laon is confirmed by Giraud 2011, 495.

[55] See, e.g., a passage from *De diversis quaestionibus*, q. 21 (Augustine, *Diu. qu.*, 21, CCSL 44A, 26), which is found in Abelard, *Sic et non*, 31 (ed. Boyer–McKeon, 178): "Utrum Deus mali auctor sit. Quisquis omnium quae sunt auctor est, et ad cuius bonitatem id tantum pertinet ut sit omne quod est, non esse ad eum pertinere nullo pacto potest. Omne autem quod deficit, ab eo quod est esse deficit et tendit ad non esse. Esse autem et in nullo deficere bonum est, et malum deficere. At ille ad quem non esse non pertinet non est causa deficiendi, id est tendendi ad non esse, quia, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est; boni igitur tantummodo causa est et propterea ipse summum bonum est. Quocirca mali auctor non est, quia omnium quae sunt auctor est, quia in tantum sunt, in quantum bona sunt".

velle astruunt.[56] Peter the Lombard, on his side, did accept Augustine's authority on this point («Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo»), but he refused to admit this authority to be represented by the formula: «Deo volente mala fiunt».[57]

4. Stephen Langton, then, went even further in his refusal of the Laon solution, when he said that even Augustine's word *velit* is unacceptable, for one cannot express any relation between God and the evil by using the verb "to will". When relating to the evil, the only possible words that God can say are: *Non volo*.[58]

5. In addition, Langton's refusal of the Laon solution on divine will did not lead any other authority into account, neither taken from Augustine nor from other Church Fathers. Had he wanted to, Langton could have easily found such authorities[59] — but this simply doesn't seem to have been his issue. Indeed, facing the corpus of Christian tradition — composed by the Bible, the Gloss, even Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* — he felt free to accept only those interpretations that he thought to be consistent, leaving the others aside. Acquaintance with logic and semantics seem to him enough to show consistency within theology.

6. Finally, the tiny example we have considered should make us more suspicious towards too simplistic, binary historiographical models, such as, for example, the one proposed by Franz Ehrle.[60] The scholar claims that thirteenth-century philosophy and theology are equally divided into an innovative Aristotelianism (the Dominicans'), and a traditional Augustinianism (the Franciscans' and previous secular masters'). However, it is not at all true that all what doesn't fall under Aristotelianism is traditional Augustinianism. In fact, let it even be true that the Dominican and the Franciscan schools of the 13th century were differentiated as such, it is certainly abusive to extend back this presupposition for the twelfth-century. For this was not a period of an ancient and fixed theology, some kind of theological counterpart of the "sleeping beauty" of the tale, waiting for Aristotle's kiss to wake her up. Real progress was made in theology during the twelfth century, and people tried to think on their own and

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[56] RUPERT, *De omn. Dei*, title of ch. xx (PL 170, 469).

[57] PETER LOMBARD, *Sent.*, I, 46, 3, 11 (vol. I, 316; see note 44 above).

[58] I have asked myself whether it were possible to read Langton's position as a 'charitable' interpretation of Augustine, rather than as a direct opposition to his thesis; after examination of the texts, I think there is here objective opposition (if not, certainly, a subjective intention to contrast the Church Father). Augustine (*Ench.*, 26, 100: CCSL 46, 103–104; BA 9, 284–285) wrote: "… magna opera domini exquisita sunt in omnes uoluntates eius [Ps 110, 2], ut miro et ineffabili modo *non fiat praeter eius uoluntatem* quod etiam contra eius fit uoluntatem…" (my italics), but Langton maintains: "*preter voluntatem* <illius> *est*, quod malum sit" (LANGTON, *Comm. Sent.*, 66), what seems to me to contrast directly Augustine's conclusion.

[59] See point 2 here above.

[60] Cf. EHRLE 1925.

to tackle problems left unanswered by previous theologians and even by the Church Fathers. Already Peter Lombard is not somebody merely repeating what the Fathers said, and both more established and recent research shows how free Langton could be in face of Peter Lombard, whom he nevertheless considered his master.[61] So, the second half of the twelfth century will witness an always more open dialogue, even with the most prestigious authorities — now subjected to the analysis of very strict logic and semantics, a philosophical competence that not necessarily transforms these theologians into the adherents of an "Aristotelian" sect. Instead of imagining the development of culture as a battlefield splitted in two by a narrow boundary dividing it between traditionalists and innovators, it is perhaps enough to recognize, once again, that in the twelfth century the dwarfs sitting on the giants' shoulders[62] were clever men, able to think with their heads, and keen on taking advantage from their high position.

Additional note (*dispositio*)

This *voluntas beneplaciti* is called *dispositio* by Anselm (cf. footnote 25 above). I think this term is used here as it is used in rhetoric. In this case *dispositio* is the way the different parts of a speech are ordered in the mind of he who has planned the speech: in this way, God's will as *dispositio* is not identical to the order of the world as it is, but rather, it corresponds to how the world should be ordered according to how, from the beginning, God intended it to be ordered, for it to be as perfect as possible.

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[61] Cf. Landgraf 1939, 120–127; Quinto 2010, 72–74.

[62] Cf. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, III, 4 (CCCM 98), 116, reporting a statement of Bernard of Chartres, which is also found, without attribution, in Alexander Neckam's *Nat. rer.* 78 (ed. Wright, 123).

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Abbreviations

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CCSL — *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*, Turnolti 1954 sqq.
PL — *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina*, 221 vols, ed. J.-P. Migne, Parisiis 1878–1890.

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BOŻA DOBROĆ, BOŻA WSZECHMOC I ISTNIENIE ZŁA. DYSKUSJA WOKÓŁ *ENCHIRYDIONU*, 24–26, AUGUSTYNA, OD ANZELMA Z LAON DO STEFANA LANGTONA

S t r e s z c z e n i e

W *Enchirydionie* (24.96) Augustyn przedstawia zagadnienie woli Bożej i jej stosunku do istnienia zła. Stoi na stanowisku, że nawet jeśli zło nie jest dobre, to jednak fakt, iż zło istnieje obok dobra, jest dobry. Skoro bowiem Bóg nie przeszkadza istnieniu zła, to można mniemać, że jego istnienie zawiera się w pewien sposób w woli Bożej. Tę doktrynę przyjął Anzelm z Laon († 1117), który nauczał jej swoich studentów, lecz stanowczo sprzeciwił się jej Rupert z St.-Laurent (jednego z klasztorów w Liège) w dziełach *De voluntate Dei* i *De omnipotentia Dei*. Według niego, kiedy Bóg „dozwala na zło”, nie znaczy to, że „chce zła”, ale że jedynie dozwala, aby zło istniało. Dla Ruperta jest to jedyna droga, aby zdać sprawę z Bożej dobroci i miłosierdzia, a także bardziej poprawny sposób zrozumienia nauczania Augustyna, w porównaniu do scholastycznego podziału na *voluntas permittens* i *voluntas approbans* wprowadzonego przez Anzelma. Oba stanowiska, Anzelma i Ruperta, wpłyną na późniejszych teologów, jak Piotr Lombard czy wreszcie Stefan Langton († 1228). Dla tego ostatniego fakt, że Bóg nie powstrzymuje zła, nie znaczy, że go chce. Jest wręcz przeciwnie. Aby to udowodnić, Langton wskazuje na dwie możliwości rozumienia zdania, że Bóg 'nie chce' (*non vult*) zła. Użyty w tym zdaniu czasownik można traktować albo jako trzecią osobę czasownika *nolo*, albo jako zaprzeczenie trzeciej osoby czasownika *volo*. Według Langtona Bóg 'nie chce' zła właśnie w drugim znaczeniu. Znaczy to tyle, że Bóg nie rozważa pomiędzy pragnieniem, aby ludzie czynili zło, a pragnieniem, aby go nie czynili, gdyż po prostu nie chce, aby je czynili (*non vult*, jako zaprzeczeniu *velle*), nawet jeśli ich od tego nie zachowuje (co byłoby konieczne, gdyby rozumieć *non vult* jako trzecią osobę od *nolo*).

Na przykładzie pytania o Bożą wolę artykuł stara się ukazać rosnący wpływ badań nad językiem (w tym przypadku logicznej i semantycznej analizy twierdzeń teologicznych) na dyskusję teologiczną w XII w. Myśl Stefana Langtona jest tego znakomitym przykładem.

DIVINE GOODNESS, DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE
AND THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL:
A DISCUSSIONOF AUGUSTINE'S *ENCHIRIDION*, 24–26,
FROM ANSELM OF LAON TO STEPHEN LANGTON

S u m m a r y

Augustine gives in *Enchiridion* 24.96 an account of God's will and of its rela-
tionship to the existence of evil: for him, though evil is not good, it is nevertheless
good that evil exists alongside the good. The reason for this is that, since God does
not prevent evil from existing, the existence of evil is somehow contained within
God's will. This doctrine is accepted by Anselm of Laon († 1117), who teaches
it to his pupils, but it is fiercely opposed by Rupert of St.-Laurent (a monastery
in Liège) in his works *De voluntate Dei* and *De omnipotentia Dei*. For him, when
God "permits evil", this does not mean that He "wants evil", but that He just
wants *to permit* evil to be. For Rupert, this is the only way to account for God's
goodness and mercy, and is also a more correct way to understand Augustine's
teaching, compared with Anselm's 'scholastic' distinction between *voluntas per-
mittens* and *voluntas approbans*. Both Anselm's and Rupert's positions influence
later theologians, among whom are Peter Lombard and his followers, including
Stephen Langton († 1228). For Langton, the fact that God does not prevent evil
does not mean that He wills it. The reverse is in fact the case. In order to maintain
this, Langton distinguishes between two different meanings of the claim that God
'does not want' (*non vult*) evil. This phrase can either be interpreted as the third
person of the Latin verb *nolo*, or as the negation of the third person of the Latin
verb *volo*. On Langton's account, God 'does not want' evil to be in the second
sense. That is to say, God does not deliberate between desiring that people sin or
not sin, for he simply does not want them to sin (*non vult*, as negation of *velle*),
even though he does not prevent them from sinning (which would be necessary if
non vult were understood as the third person of *nolo*). The article aims at showing
how a theological problem (like that of God's will) was discussed throughout the
12th century with increasing recourse to the arts of language (in this case, logical
and semantic analysis of the theological statements), and that Stephen Langton is
a particularly good example of this trend.