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DOES MERIT DEPEND ON THE FUTURE?  
A CRITICAL EDITION  
OF STEPHEN LANGTON'S  
QUAESTIO 134\*

Scholars interested in issues such as the truth-value of statements about future, divine foreknowledge, prophecies, and necessity of the past — especially in connection to the puzzle of logical determinism — may find some unexpected insights in Stephen Langton's (d. 1228) theological question *Vtrum si aliquis meruit, necessarium sit illum meruisse* (number 134 in Riccardo Quinto's catalogue<sup>1</sup>). Placed by an anonymous medieval compiler within Book III of what we now call Langton's *Quaestiones Theologiae*,<sup>2</sup> q. 134 asks whether the moral value of actions or mental "movements" (*motus*) is immediately decided and remains fixed once they have been performed. The potential problem lies in the relevant future events, which might be regarded as an *ex post* threat to that value. Could an outcome that is not up to us compromise our merits? Or are they guaranteed by the inherent divine grace or *caritas*? Perhaps the most puzzling case concerns faith. Suppose that Abraham's belief that Christ would be born was meritorious. Given the necessity of the past, the merit is necessary. But if so, his belief must have been true, and thus Christ's birth was predetermined. Yet it seems that back then it was still possible that Christ would never be born. Langton's answers to such dilemmas are, as usual, sophisticated and nuanced (albeit seldom satisfactorily explicit), and their appeal lies chiefly in the firm and reliable way in which he defends the intuitive views against too comfortable simplifications and apparent contradictions.

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\* This work was supported by National Science Centre, Poland, under grant agreement No. 2015/18/E/HS1/00153. I would like to thank Dr Magdalena Bieniak for invaluable comments and advice, Dr Włodzimierz Zega for the meticulous revision, and Dr Zbigniew Pajda for introducing me to the basics of typesetting.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Quinto, *DN*, 204–210.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. esp. "Introduction" in *SLQT I*.

Q. 134 — *Vtrum si aliquis meruit, necessarium sit illum meruisse:*

## PHILOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

## I. THE MANUSCRIPTS

Q. 134 has come down to us in a single version, preserved in four manuscripts:

- family  $\alpha$ : L 77<sup>va</sup>–78<sup>ra</sup>, V 245<sup>va</sup>–246<sup>ra</sup>;
- Ce 343<sup>va</sup>–344<sup>ra</sup>;
- K 127<sup>va</sup>–128<sup>rb</sup>.

## 2. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MANUSCRIPTS

2.1.  $\alpha$  and  $pCe$  form a family ( $\zeta$ )

The Cambridge manuscript (Ce) and the codices belonging to the already established family  $\alpha$  (LV)<sup>3</sup> share a considerable number of erroneous readings, which can be easily detected, without the need of conjecture, thanks to the independent and reliable Chartres manuscript (K) and the anonymous corrector of Ce.<sup>4</sup> The following list includes just the most significant mistakes. In particular, I set aside three omissions caused by *homoeoteleuton*, which may have occurred independently, although their number increases the probability that at least some were already present in the hypothetical manuscript  $\zeta$ .<sup>5</sup> The fifth example listed below represents seven cases in which  $\alpha$  and Ce read *discernendum* or *discernendi* instead of *discredendum* or *discredendi* (even if a single occurrence might be regarded as a polygenetic error, the repetition suggests otherwise; I give the remaining references in the footnote):

- l. 17: crediderit  $sCe$  ] meruerit et preuiderit  $\alpha$  preuiderit  $pCe$  ediderit K
- l. 33: possibile  $sCe$  ] impossibile  $\alpha pCe$  (*deest* K)
- l. 35: hoc<sup>2</sup>  $sCeK$  ] *om.*  $\alpha pCe$
- l. 63: fuisse *supplevi* ] *om.*  $\alpha Ce$  *spat. vac. vi vel vii litteris* K

<sup>3</sup> Cf. “Introduction” in *SLQTI*, 56–62.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. section 2.2 below. The original state of Ce is labelled  $pCe$ , while  $sCe$  refers to the revised text. Subarchetype  $\alpha$  did not copy from  $pCe$ : such a scenario is ruled out by individual errors of Ce (cf. e.g. l. 112).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. ll. 7–8, 16, 114–116. More on the last omission in section 2.2. As a rule, I also disregard errors which, no matter how bizarre, have a remote chance of being traced back to the archetype.

- l. 86: discredendum *sCeK*] discernendum  $\alpha pCe$ <sup>6</sup>
- l. 138: dicendum *sCeK* ] *spat. vac. pCeL om. V*

The reading *preuiderit* in l. 17, although superficially acceptable, on closer inspection turns out to be an error. The form *crediderit* is required for the validity of the opponent's argument, since the assumption in l. 19 states that Abraham had a meritorious belief that Christ would be born, and so the preceding premise should be about an act of faith, not about mere prediction.<sup>7</sup> Foreseeing is indifferent with respect to merit, what counts is *motus fidei*. Furthermore, the proper reading *crediderit* is confirmed not only by the knowledgeable corrector of *Ce* (cf. section 2.2 of this introduction) but also by the Chartres manuscript: *K*'s variant *ediderit* seems to be a simple corruption of *crediderit* due to overlooking the abbreviation for *cre-* (or its absence in the archetype) and/or the idiomatic, commonplace character of the phrase *edidit Christum*. The shared error of  $\alpha$  and *pCe* is not polygenetic, although it might have been prompted, at least in part, by the occurrence of *preuidere* in the preceding sentences, which also use an Abraham example.

The mistake in l. 33, reading *impossibile* instead of *possibile*, might be considered polygenetic, but only if it were a *conscious* intervention on the part of both *pCe* and  $\alpha$ . Which seems unlikely given that there is no straightforward contextual trigger for such a modification. On the contrary, it is rather absurd to insist that Christ could have said “some other impossibility” (since it is absurd to imply that he said *any* impossibility). It would also go against the train of thought of the “other dialectician” invoked in the text. Of course, both  $\alpha$  and *pCe* might have assumed that the intention of the author was to ridicule the dialectician by ascribing to him a bizarre opinion. Even then, it is far more likely that such an idea occurred to the copyist of a single hypothetical subarchetype  $\zeta$ . The correctness of *possibile* is corroborated both by the logic of the argumentation and by the sources adduced in the historical apparatus. This point, however, deserves a long discussion which goes beyond the scope of this introduction. In brief, the “other dialectician” claims that the very utterance of Christ (e.g. “Thou shalt deny me thrice”, Mt. 26, 34) is necessary due to the necessity of the past, but its content is *not*: either because Christ could have referred to a different event by using the same physical words,<sup>8</sup> or because the event to which the utterance actually referred is intrinsically contingent and could, at least in principle, fail to take place.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. ll. 85, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101.

<sup>7</sup> The conclusion is that Abraham's belief would have been meritorious even if it turned out that Christ was never born, and so it is necessary that this particular belief was meritorious.

<sup>8</sup> This is either due to linguistic ambiguity or by virtue of generality.

The *hoc* in l. 35 is clearly required by the line of reasoning which stresses that the same *particular* act of faith could lead, or be directed at, something different (by analogy to the same particular utterance, *hec enuntiatio*, saying something different). It is hardly possible that both  $\alpha$  and  $pCe$  omitted this crucial demonstrative independently.

Given that all the empty spaces left by K, at least in q. 134, seem to signal an expression present but illegible in K's source (which might well be the archetype), we are in a position to assume that the archetype contained an additional text in l. 63 and, more importantly, K cannot be regarded as *sharing* the same mistaken text as  $\alpha$  and Ce, since neither  $\alpha$  nor Ce seem to have noticed that something was missing. Indeed, the sentence "necessarium est istud preceptum Abrahe" is erroneous, because it strongly suggests a misconstrual in which *istud preceptum* is a subject term with respect to *necessarium* ("This precept is necessary for Abraham"), while the sense requires that the subject term with respect to *est necessarium* should be formed by the infinitival construction (such as *istud fuisse preceptum*) in which *istud* is the subject term with respect to *preceptum*, i.e.: "It is necessary that *it was demanded* of Abraham" (where "it" refers to believing that Christ would not be incarnated). Furthermore, *fuisse* fits the length of the empty space left in K and is present in a corresponding fragment of Langton's q. 102.<sup>9</sup> The mistake was overlooked by the corrector of Ce, but this might be due to the fact that although the misconstrual is strongly suggested by  $pCe$ , it still allows for the correct interpretation.

As was said above, the mistake of writing *discernendum* instead of *discredendum* might be polygenetic, arguably due to the dubious post-classical Latin of *discredere*. However, the consistency with which *both*  $\alpha$  and  $pCe$  perpetuate the error (seven times) suggests that it had already been committed by  $\zeta$ .

The last example might be called the "master argument" for  $\zeta$ , since both Ce and L left an empty space where the text clearly requires *dicendum*. This is a doubly strong case for the common subarchetype of Ce and L, and thus of Ce and  $\alpha$ , since the vacant space ensures that the defect is significant. I set aside the unlikely scenario in which the archetype had a lacuna here: it seems incompatible with K, especially if K — which usually leaves gaps in contentious places — is a direct descendant of the archetype. The expression *uidetur dicendum* is a standard phrase for introducing a statement to which you *seem committed* once you have accepted such-and-such a premise. It was also used earlier in ll. 30 and 34–35, when Langton (or, in this case, perhaps the editor or the reporter) made explicit the things that *we should say* in order to preserve the dialectical line of thought in a theological context.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 102, § 14, ed. Maggioni, 250: "Sicut necessarium fuit illud fuisse preceptum quando preceptum fuit, ita et necessarium fuit istud fuisse preceptum".

The errors discussed above show that — in the case of q. 134 — Ce and  $\alpha$  descend from a common subarchetype ( $\zeta$ ), and that K is independent from it. The *stemma codicum* can be found at the end of this introduction.

## 2.2. *The revision of Ce*

As already noticed by Alys Gregory,<sup>10</sup> section Ce of the Cambridge manuscript has been meticulously corrected by a well-trained theologian, who understood the text and was familiar with its intricacies. While several other elements of Gregory's reconstruction need revision in the light of new evidence, the point about the corrector's competence remains valid.<sup>11</sup> Master  $\Pi$ , as I shall call him, can be equated with  $\rho$ Ce in the apparatus, since all the corrections were made by the same person.

$\Pi$  started his revision after the scribe responsible for copying section Ce had already finished his task. The crucial question to ask in the case of q. 134 is whether or not  $\Pi$  had at his disposal a source better than  $\zeta$  and corrected  $\rho$ Ce against it. Perhaps he used his own expertise to figure out the correct readings? Indeed, with regard to all the interventions apart from restoring the text omitted due to *homoeoteleuton*, it is difficult to rule out the scenario in which  $\Pi$  came up with them on his own.<sup>12</sup> This is especially the case with all the errors listed as significant in section 2.1. Also two out of three omissions by *homoeoteleuton* are relatively easy to spot and reconstruct, even for a modern reader, since they disrupt the train of thought. However, the third omission of this kind (ll. 114–116) is almost undetectable, even for a skilled theologian (left to his own devices), because it comprises the *whole* optional objection:

ll. 113–117: Ergo de futuro pendet utrum opus sit magis meritorium.

CONTRA. Esto quod opus sit tantum quod totam penam dimittat. Ergo si decedat post opus, euolabit. Non ergo propter fructus futuros pendet ex futuro utrum opus sit magis meritorium.

SOLVTIO ...

Even if  $\Pi$  somehow managed to guess that an objection is missing, he could not possibly deduce or recall the *exact* words found in K: the *contra* is just

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript", 185–190 (and 177, n. 50).

<sup>11</sup> Due to certain characteristics of his handwriting, it is necessary to give up Gregory's distinction between the "first" and the "second" amanuensis, and — even more importantly — the distinction between the first/second "amanuensis" and the "master" who made marginal notes in pencil throughout the manuscript. Furthermore, it is now clear that the master in question can no longer be identified with "magister H." known from the schedule attached to f. 192<sup>vb</sup> of the Cambridge manuscript. The issue will be discussed elsewhere.

<sup>12</sup> With the possible exception of changing *hoc* into *eodem* in l. 34.

too peculiar, self-contained, and not really discussed in the solution (since it is roughly compatible with the master's views). Are we then entitled to postulate a top-down contamination? Only if the omission was already present in the source copied by  $pCe$ , i.e. if the mistake was not made by the copyist of  $Ce$ . For if he was to blame, then  $\Pi$  could either realize that a *contra* is missing and find it in the antigraph of  $pCe$ , or he could just stumble upon the omission in the process of a careful juxtaposition of  $pCe$  with the same source. Now, could this scenario<sup>13</sup> be disproved by the existence of  $\zeta$ ? After all, family  $\alpha$  has the same omission, so it should be traceable back to  $\zeta$ . Unfortunately, the *homoeoteleuton* is so deep (“*utrum opus sit magis meritorium*”) that the risk of independently repeating the error is particularly high. We cannot, therefore, confirm a vertical contamination.

Let us rearrange the dialectical see-saw presented above:

1.  $\Pi$  could not amend the omission in ll. 114–116 *ope ingenii*, i.e. without access to the text of the objection.
2. So he used a source better than  $\zeta$ , perhaps even the archetype (top-down contamination).
3. [against 2] But the omission could be due to  $pCe$ , thus  $\Pi$  did not need any source other than the antigraph.
4. [against 3] But the omission must have already been present in  $\zeta$ , since  $pCe$  shares it with  $\alpha$ .
5. [against 4] But this particular omission is easily repeatable (a polygenetic error).
6. So 2 is a *non sequitur*.
7. Thus, in the case of q. 134, we cannot tell whether  $\Pi$  used witnesses other than the manuscript copied by  $pCe$  (presumably  $\zeta$ )

### 2.3. Going against the stemma

#### 2.3.1. Readings which favour $K$ over $sCe$

The Chartres manuscript generally offers a more reliable text than even the revised  $Ce$ . The critical apparatus records multiple cases in which I favoured  $K$  over the final state of  $Ce$ , but the decision was hardly ever based *just* on the assumption that  $K$  is more trustworthy, without any semantic rationale (that would be arguably circular). Note that such readings also include those selected

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<sup>13</sup>Namely, the general scenario in which  $\Pi$  found the objection in the same MS which was available to  $pCe$ .

against the “uncorrected” Ce. The point is that the fact that  $p$ Ce was left uncorrected might be treated as a sign of  $\Pi$ 's acceptance, and so Ce in the apparatus would amount, in a way, to  $s$ Ce understood as the second state after the general revision performed by  $\Pi$ . Now, due to  $\Pi$ 's helpful corrections, it is tempting to treat  $s$ Ce *as though* it were an independent source, even if it is not an effect of contamination. On this account — i.e. if one were to view  $s$ Ce as effectively on a par with K and  $\zeta$  ( $\alpha p$ Ce) — choosing K over  $\alpha$ Ce (in contradistinction to choosing K over  $\alpha p$ Ce) might be considered as accepting a minority reading. Nevertheless, a simplified stemma disregards  $s$ Ce due to the lack of any proof of contamination. (Nor can we assume that  $\Pi$  intentionally “authorised” every uncorrected reading of Ce.)

### 2.3.2. Readings against the stemma

What follows is the list of readings which were accepted even though they violate the stemma drawn at the end of this introduction. I leave aside conjectures and occasional editorial supplements, which are, as it were, “vacuously” compatible with the diagram.

- ll. 2–3: necessarium ] utrum *praem.*  $\alpha$ K
- l. 13: necessarium ] ergo *praem.* CeK
- l. 60: credere *scripsi cum* L ] eidem Ce *spat. vac. iv litteris* K eadem V

In the opening sentence, I follow Ce in skipping the superfluous “whether”. The corresponding *utrum* is also absent from the titles of q. 134 in both Ce, K, and the so-called First Index (Ce 345<sup>vb</sup>–346<sup>rb</sup>). This redundant “whether” does not seem to be a trace of a spoken language, but rather a result of a “mechanical” insertion of the interrogative particle at the beginning of the consequent which forms the proper question (it is quite natural to “forget” about the first *utrum*). The addition might have been present in the archetype.

Similarly, the *ergo* in l. 13 was rejected on stylistic grounds: although it is common to put *ergo* at the beginning of a consequent, in this case it seems particularly sloppy. Yet it does not necessarily derive from an oral discussion.

The conjecture offered by L in l. 60 is a natural way of emending the corrupted passage, so there was no reason to dismiss it in favour of my own speculation. I assume that the word *modo* which follows the corrupted spot in both  $\alpha$  and Ce was itself  $\zeta$ 's attempt at salvaging the text. *Modo* was then preserved by L, whose scribe might have understood it in the sense of “now”. Accordingly, it has been removed from l. 60 in this edition. The whole phrase *credere Christum* is absent from K: the copyist left a short empty space instead.

## 3. THE ORIGIN OF Q. 134. GEOFFREY OF POITIERS

The *quaestio* is relatively polished and — unless the above assessment of ll. 2–3 and 13 is wrong — it bears no sign of spoken language. If we take q. 134 in isolation, the only reason for thinking that it was based on a report from an actual oral discussion would be the single occurrence of the phrase *magister dicit*:

ll. 64–67: RESPONSIO. Magister dicit quod impossibile est talia precipi ad probationem ad que homo statim obligetur, ut credere aliquid, set talia ad que statim non tenetur, ut immolare. Non enim statim tenebatur [*sc.* Abraham] immolare, set preparatoria facere.<sup>14</sup>

I have been unable to find the source of this view. It gives the impression of an *ad hoc* (and rather evasive) reaction to the discussed issue, which might speak in favour of identifying the master in question with Stephen Langton himself, the teacher whose spontaneous response was recorded by the reporter. In such a case, we could be certain that q. 134 was edited by someone else: it would be rather awkward if Langton himself preserved the phrase *magister dicit* once he found it in the *reportatio*. However, the issue is muddled by the fact that the otherwise context-dependent term *magister* was standardly used to refer to Peter Lombard (already by Langton, who seems to have set the trend). Furthermore, at this point we cannot rule out the possibility that ll. 64–67 invoke another teacher, e.g. Peter Comestor, especially if we take into account Mark Clark's insistence on the strong link between Langton and *Magister Historiarum*.<sup>15</sup> In fact, in his commentaries on *Historia Scholastica* Langton used the term *magister* to refer to Comestor.<sup>16</sup>

Some help might be offered here by Geoffrey of Poitiers, Langton's younger contemporary, who in his *Summa* discusses the same topic as q. 134, in the same order. Geoffrey directly engages with his master's text and disagrees at crucial points.<sup>17</sup> In the corresponding passage, his own position is compatible with the principal objection, but nevertheless he mentions a solution equivalent to the one put forward in q. 134 and uses "the same" reference to a master:

Hec obiectio non est contra me, ut patet ex predictis. Bene enim dico quod potest aliquis credere falsum meritorie; et contingente quod Christus non fuisset

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 102, § 14, ed. Maggioni, 250: "Respondeo. Magister dicit quod impossibile est talia precipi ad probationem ad que homo statim obligetur, set talia ad que statim non tenetur, scilicet ut immolaret, quia non tenebatur statim immolare, set preparatoria facere".

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Clark, *The Making*, esp. ch. 1 and 5–7.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. e.g. Clark, *The Making*, 166, n. 43: "Premittit Magister prologum epistolarem ...".

<sup>17</sup> The whole *quaestio*, transcribed from Kl 49<sup>ra-va</sup> and checked against Av 60<sup>rb-vb</sup>, can be found in the Appendix to this edition, cf. below, p. 27.



incarnandus, Abraham tamen meritorie credit Christum fuisse incarnandum, sicut recolo me dixisse in questione de fide. Dico tamen ad hanc obiectionem cum *magistro* quod impossibile est quod aliquid precipiatur ad probationem ad quod statim teneatur, set ad tale quid ubi oportet preparatoria facere.<sup>18</sup>

The other two occurrences of *magister* in Geoffrey's *quaestio* apparently refer to Langton, in a similarly polemical fashion, in order to contrast it with Geoffrey's own position. Thus we could make a case for a uniform use of the term *magister* in his text. However, one cannot exclude the alternative: if Geoffrey was drawing on q. 134 in our version, or on a similar testimony which also explicitly invoked "master" in this solution, he might have just copied the reference to *magister*. It would be especially understandable if he himself was unable to determine the teacher's identity. Incidentally, we know that he did not transcribe this label "automatically", since at least in one passage of his unedited *Summa*, in the counterpart of Langton's q. 84 on the death(s) of Lazarus, he explicitly refers to the Lombard whereas the single version of Langton's question has *dicit magister*.<sup>19</sup>

In short, considered *in isolation*, q. 134 cannot be easily classified as originating in a *reportatio* of an oral discussion in the classroom.

#### 4. *Stemma codicum*

The above discussion can be summarised as follows:

1.  $\alpha$  and Ce derive from a common subarchetype ( $\zeta$ ), independent from K (2.1).
2. The status of  $s$ Ce is problematic:
  - a. on the one hand,  $s$ Ce might be a result of correcting  $p$ Ce against the archetype  $\omega$  or against a reliable copy of  $\omega$ ,<sup>20</sup> or against private notes;
  - b. on the other hand, the highly competent corrector of Ce seems to have been capable of "internal" reconstruction: either *ope ingenii* or by means of a careful examination of the antigraph (2.2).


<sup>18</sup> Gaufr. Pict., *sum.*, Av 60<sup>va</sup>, Kl 49<sup>rb</sup>, cf. below, p. 28, ll. 60–65.

<sup>19</sup> Gaufr. Pict., *sum.*, Av 87<sup>ra</sup>, Kl 72<sup>rb</sup>: "Lumbardus dicit quod bone cogitationes fecerunt quod anima Lazari sciens et intelligens non contraxit originale"; Steph. Lang., q. 84, A 219<sup>va</sup>, B 82<sup>ra</sup>, Ca 193<sup>rb</sup>, H 56<sup>r</sup>, L 64<sup>va</sup>, R 9<sup>rb</sup>, S 13<sup>rb</sup>, V 234<sup>ra</sup>: "Dicit magister quod quia anima Lazari sciens et intelligens erat in infusione, bone cogitationes fecerunt ne contraheret originale" (I set aside minor textual divergences).

<sup>20</sup> Excluding K. Indirect evidence for this qualification is given in section 2.3.2.

3. In isolation from other *quaestiones*, there is no robust evidence for supposing that the archetype of our version of q. 134 originated in an oral discussion (3).

The upshot can be represented by the following simple diagram:



### Abbreviations

<i>add.</i>	—	<i>addidit</i>
<i>hom.</i>	—	<i>homoeoteleuton</i>
<i>inv.</i>	—	<i>invertit</i>
<i>marg.</i>	—	<i>in margine</i>
<i>mss.</i>	—	<i>consensus codicum</i>
<i>om.</i>	—	<i>omisit</i>
<i>PL</i>	—	<i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne
<i>pCe</i>	—	<i>lectio codicis Ce ante correcturam</i>
<i>praem.</i>	—	<i>praemisit</i>
<i>sCe</i>	—	<i>lectio codicis Ce post correcturam</i>
<i>spat. vac.</i>	—	<i>spatium vacans</i>
<i>sup. lin.</i>	—	<i>supra lineam</i>
< >	—	<i>supplevi</i>

### Manuscripts

A	—	Avranches, Bibl. Mun., 230
Av	—	Avranches, Bibl. Mun., 121
B	—	Arras, Bibl. Mun., 965 (394)
C	—	Cambridge, St. John's College Libr., C.7 (57)
Cc	—	C, ff. 283–306
Ce	—	C, ff. 323–346
<i>Index</i>	—	<i>Index primus codicis C</i> (ff. 345 <sup>vb</sup> –346 <sup>rb</sup> )
K	—	Chartres, Bibl. Mun., 430

Kl	—	Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 299
L	—	Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Lyell 42
L( <i>tabula</i> )	—	Index codicis L (ff. 97 <sup>v</sup> –98 <sup>r</sup> )
R	—	Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., Vat. lat. 4297
S	—	Paris, BnF, lat. 16385
V	—	Paris, BnF, lat. 14556
α	—	<i>consensus</i> LV

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STEPHANVS LANGTON  
QVAESTIONES THEOLOGIAE, LIBER III

Q. 134

*Vtrum si aliquis meruit, necessarium sit illum meruisse*

In hac questione tria principaliter queruntur: (1) utrum si aliquis meruit, necessarium sit illum meruisse, et si meruit hoc motu, utrum necessarium sit illum meruisse hoc motu; (2) secundo, utrum pendeat de futuro utrum aliquis motus sit meritorius; (3) tertio, utrum motus meritorius possit esse demeritorius. 5

1. PRIMVM sic probatur. Dominus dixit Petro «Ter me negabis», necessarium ergo fuit Christum dixisse aliquid. Similiter: Ysaia<sub>7,14</sub> prophetauit Christum nasci de uirgine, necessarium ergo fuit Ysaiam prophetasse. Ergo, pari ratione, si meruit, necessarium est eum meruisse, et si demeruit, necessarium est eum demeruisse. 10

Item, si sic habuit caritatem, necessarium est eum <sic> habuisse caritatem, et si habuit hoc donum prophetie, necessarium est eum habuisse hoc donum. Ergo, similiter, si Abraham preuidit aliqua propheticè, necessarium est eum illa preuidisse. Sit ergo quod non preuiderit nisi ista: Christum esse nasciturum, K 127<sup>vb</sup> Christum esse passurum. Circumscribantur omnia alia. Ergo si preuidit | ista 15 duo, necessarium est <eum> preuidisse ista duo. A simili, si meruit hoc motu, necessarium est illum meruisse hoc motu. Pone ergo quod Abraham crediderit Christum esse nasciturum et Christus non fuerit nasciturus, et oppone dicto quod fidei non subsit falsum. Set Abraham meruit hoc motu credendo hoc. Ergo necessarium fuit illum meruisse hoc motu etc. 20

Ce 343<sup>va</sup>; K 127<sup>va</sup>; L 77<sup>va</sup>; V 245<sup>va</sup>

1 Cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, Av 60<sup>rb-vb</sup>, K1 49<sup>ra-va</sup>, infra, Appendix, p. 27. 6 § 1: cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, infra, § 1, p. 27. 6 Mt. 26, 34; Mc. 14, 75; Lc. 22, 61; cf. Mc. 14, 30; Lc. 22, 34; Io. 13, 38. Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 21a, § 1.3, *SLQTI*, 425–426. 9 Cf. Guill. Alt., *sum. aur.* III, tr. 27, c. 6, ed. Ribaillier, III.1, 542, ll. 37–38. 19 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 71, *Vtrum falsum subsit fidei*, Ce 325<sup>va-vb</sup>, K 91<sup>va-92ra</sup>, L 50<sup>vb-51ra</sup>, V 222<sup>rb-222va</sup>.

1 utrum si aliquis meruit necessarium sit illum meruisse *Index Ce*] utrum si aliquis meruit necessarium fuit illum meruisse K queritur utrum si quis meruit necessarium sit illum meruisse L(*tabula*) utrum motus idem possit esse meritorius et demeritorius V *deest L(rubrica)* 2 tria] *om. α* 2–3 necessarium] utrum *praem. αK* 7 fuit] *forsitan rectius est* 7–8 Christum dixisse ... necessarium ergo fuit *sCeK*] *om. hom. αpCe* 8 fuit *sCeK*] *forsitan rectius est (deest α)* 9 necessarium<sup>2</sup>] similiter *praem. Ce* 13 necessarium] ergo *praem. CeK* 16 necessarium ... ista duo *sCeK*] *om. hom. αpCe* 16 est *scripsi*] fuit *sCe om. K (deest αpCe)* 17 crediderit *sCe*] meruerit et preuiderit α preuiderit *pCe* ediderit K 19 subsit] subsistit Ce 19 ergo] *om. K* 20 fuit] *forsitan rectius est*

RESPONSIO. Si iste habuit caritatem, necessarium est eum habuisse <caritatem>; et si meruit uitam eternam, necessarium est eum meruisse uitam eternam; et si prophetauit, necessarium est eum prophetasse. Set hoc falsum “si meruit | hoc motu, necessarium est illum meruisse hoc motu”: in generali uerum  
 25 est, set in speciali non. Et si preuidit ista, non est necessarium preuidisse ista; et illa circumscriptio non fit quoad possibilitatem euentus set quoad euentum.

V 245<sup>vb</sup>

Michi uidetur quod hoc potius sit dialecticum quam theologicum, et questio dialectica est. Et sicut dialecticus diceret quod necessarium est deum enuntiasse  
 30 quando dixit «Ter me negabis», non tamen necessarium est Christum enuntiasse hanc enuntiationem, eodem modo uidetur dicendum quod necessarium est istum meruisse, set non est necessarium istum meruisse hoc motu.

Alius dialecticus diceret quod necessarium est Christum enuntiasse hanc enuntiationem, set hac enuntiatione potuit dicere aliud possibile, et ideo non est necessarium Christum enuntiasse hoc. Eodem modo secundum istum ui-  
 35 detur dicendum quod necessarium est istum meruisse hoc motu, set hoc motu potuit moueri in aliud. Similiter: hac prophetia preuidit hoc et potuit eadem prophetia preuidisse aliud.

2. CONSEQUENTER dicendum est de secundo membro, scilicet an de futuro pendeat utrum aliquis motus sit meritorius.

2.1. QUOD VIDETVR, quia tu dicis quod si iste meruit hoc motu, non est necessarium ipsum meruisse hoc motu. Ergo de futuro pendet utrum iste motus fuerit. Ergo, a simili, de futuro pendet utrum iste motus fuerit meritorius.

CONTRA. Si iste meruit, necessarium est eum meruisse. Ergo, a simili, si iste motus fuerit meritorius, necessarium est istum motum fuisse meritorium. Non  
 45 ergo de futuro pendet etc.

21–31 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 21b, § 2, *SLQTI*, 430; Steph. Lang., *in I Sent.*, ed. Landgraf, 55; Petr. Cap., *sum.*, q. 20, ed. Pioppi, 299–300, 312–313, 318–319; Petr. Pict., *sent.* IV, c. 1, *PL* 211, 1139C–1140A. 32–34 Cf. Petr. Cap., *sum.*, q. 20, 7, ed. Pioppi, 314: «Quidam dicunt ad hoc quod necessarium est actionem enuntiandi verum infuisse Christo, sed non actionem enuntiandi hoc verum, quia actione — qua enuntiavit hoc verum — potest enuntiasse aliud verum»; Steph. Lang., *in I Sent.*, ed. Landgraf, 55–56; Steph. Lang., q. 102, § 4, ed. Maggioni, 241: «Contra. Abraam non tenetur credere quod angelus utatur illa uoce in propria significatione; immo potest credere quod aliud dicat ea, sicut nec Petrus tenebatur credere quod hac uoce “ter me negabis” diceretur ei quod ei dictum est». 34–37 Sed cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, *infra*, p. 27, ll. 27–30. 36–37 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 22, § 4, *SLQTI*, 436. 38 § 2: cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, *infra*, § 2, p. 28.

24 illum] eum αCe 24 in] que *praem.* α 24 uerum] uera V 25 non<sup>2</sup>] *om.* α 26 euentus] *spat. vac. vii vel viii litteris* K 27 hoc] *om.* α 27 questio] quomodo α 28 deum] Christum αCe 30 hanc enuntiationem] hac enuntiatione αCe 32–34 hanc enuntiationem ... Christum enuntiasse] *om. hom.* K 32–33 hanc enuntiationem *scripsi*] hac enuntiatione αCe (*deest* K) 33 possibile] sCe] impossibile] αpCe (*deest* K) 34 hoc eodem] sCe] hoc α hoc hoc] pCe (=ζ) set eodem K 35 hoc<sup>2</sup>] sCeK] *om.* αpCe 36 hac] hec α 38 dicendum est] *om.* α 40 si] *om.* α 42 fuerit<sup>1</sup>] meritorius *add.* α 43 est eum Ce] est istum α *om.* K

L 77<sup>vb</sup> SOLVTIO. Dicimus quod ubi essentia actionis pendet de futuro, tunc de futuro pendet utrum fuerit meritoria. Set ubi necessarium est actionem | fuisse, tunc non pendet de futuro utrum actio illa etc.

Ce 343<sup>vb</sup> 2.2. ITEM. Tu dicis quod de futuro pendet utrum iste mo|tus fuerit quo Abraham credidit Christum incarnandum esse. Obicitur ergo posito quod Abrahe preceptum sit ad probationem credere Christum non esse incarnandum et simus in tempore in quo reuelatum fuerit ei Christum esse incarnandum. Hoc est possibile, quia similiter preceptum fuit ei ad probationem immolare filium, et tamen reuelatum fuit ei quod «in semine» eius etc. Cum ergo istud sit ei preceptum, ergo tenetur illud credere, et ratione precepti. 50 55

CONTRA. Adhuc pendet de futuro utrum Christus non sit incarnandus, ergo adhuc pendet de futuro utrum iste motus sit meritorius quo credit Christum non esse incarnandum. Ergo adhuc pendet de futuro utrum teneatur credere hoc. Ergo adhuc pendet de futuro utrum hoc fuerit ei preceptum.

CONTRA. Sicut fuit preceptum Abrahe immolare filium, ita credere Christum non esse incarnandum. Et sicut illud fuit malum in genere, ita et istud; ergo sicut Abraham tenebatur immolare, ita et iste tenetur credere. Et sicut necessarium est istud <fuisse> preceptum Abrahe, ita et illud. 60

RESPONSIO. Magister dicit quod impossibile est talia precipi ad probationem ad que homo statim obligetur, ut credere aliquid, set talia ad que statim non tenetur, ut immolare. Non enim statim tenebatur immolare, set preparatoria facere. 65

2.3. ITEM. Queritur utrum de futuro pendeat utrum aliquis motus sit <de>meritorius. Quod uidetur probari. Esto quod dicatur Loth quod Christus est nasciturus, et discredit. Si Christus est nasciturus, iste motus est demeritorius; si non est nasciturus, non est demeritorius. Ergo de futuro pendet etc. 70

RESPONSIO. Aliquis peccat uel propter malam uoluntatem que precedit uel sine mala uoluntate, scilicet ubi genus peccati committit non mala intentione quando peccat, set propter genus peccati tantum. Dicimus ergo quod ubi mala 75

49 § 2.2: huic articulo congruit Steph. Lang., q. 102, § 14, ed. Maggioni, 250; cf. ibidem, § 3, 239–241. 49 De futuro pendet utrum iste motus fuerit: i.e. essentia istius motus (fidei) de futuro pendet. 54 Gen. 22, 18; 26, 4; 28, 14.

46 essentia ] est natura (?) αCe 47 fuisse ] non *praem.* α 49 motus fuerit ] *cf. supra*, p. 22, l. 42 50 ergo ] *om.* α 53 filium ] suum *add.* K 56 non ] *om.* α 57–59 utrum iste motus ... preceptum ] *om.* V 57–58 utrum iste motus ... de futuro ] *om. hom.* KL (*deest* V) 60 credere *scripsi cum* L ] eidem *Ce spat vac. iv litteris* K eadem V 60 Christum ] modo *praem.* αCe *om.* K 61 et<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* αCe 62 tenetur credere ] credere tenebatur α 63 fuisse *supplevi* (*cf. Steph. Lang., q. 102, ed. Maggioni, p. 250, ll. 334–335*) ] *om.* αCe *spat. vac. vi vel vii litteris* K 66 immolare<sup>1</sup> ] filium *add.* α 70 et ... nasciturus ] *om. hom.* α 70 discredit ] decedit Ce (*deest* α) 70 si ] set *praem.* Ce (*deest* α) 71 si non est ... demeritorius ] *om. hom.* K 73 propter malam uoluntatem ] mala uoluntate Ce 75 quando ] *om.* α

uoluntas precesserit, necessarium est motum fuisse demeritorium, set ubi intentio est bona et peccat propter genus peccati, | tunc de futuro pendet utrum motus sit demeritorius, ut si credat Loth non credendum bona intentione.

K 128<sup>ra</sup>

3. CONSEQUENTER queritur utrum motus meritorius possit esse demeritorius.

80 Motus, dico, qui totus precessit, quia de alio constat.

Quod sic OSTENDITVR. Esto quod cogites de hoc: antichristum fuisse futurum. Cogitatio hec ueri potest esse cogitatio falsi, quia possibile est antichristum non fuisse futurum. Pari ratione creditio qua Abraham credidit Christum nasciturum de uirgine potuit esse creditio falsi si Christus non esset nasciturus. Et ita potuit esse creditio discredendi. Et ita motus ad credendum potuit esse motus ad discredendum. Et ita actio meritoria potuit esse demeritoria.

85

CONTRA. Necessarium est Abraham tunc habuisse caritatem, ergo impossibile est quod aliquis motus — manente illa caritate — fuerit demeritorius in eo.

90

SOLVTIO. Aliquid potest credi motu malo, ut si diabolus credit mala intentione Christum natum de uirgine. Similiter, aliquis potuit credere mala intentione Christum nasciturum de uirgine: in tali dico quod creditio credendi potuit esse creditio discredendi. Set in bono non concedo, posito quod Christus non fuerit nasciturus. Si enim Christus non esset nasciturus, ille motus | quo Abra-

V 246<sup>ra</sup>

95

ham credidit Christum esse nasciturum non esset. Pendet enim de futuro utrum fuerit. Et ita in bono creditio credendi non potuit esse creditio discredendi; creditio, dico, informata caritate. Et hec argumentatio non ualet “cogitatio credendi potuit esse cogitatio discredendi, ergo creditio credendi” etc.; tamen si cogitatio intelligatur informata caritate, prima est falsa. Hec autem | duplex

Ce 344<sup>ra</sup>

100

“motus ad credendum potuit esse motus ad discredendum”, quia iste dictiones ‘credendum’, ‘discredendum’ possunt esse gerundia et possunt non esse. Et ita

78 Si credat Loth non credendum bona intentione: i.e. si bona intentione credat aliquid quod non est credendum. 79 § 3: cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, infra, § 3, p. 28. 93–96 Cf. Steph. Lang., in I *Sent.*, dist. 40, c. 1, ed. Landgraf, 55: «Hec falsa: necessarium est motum huius fidei fuisse in Habraham, quoniam hic terminus *motum fidei* terminus est accidentalis et connotat, quod istud sit futurum verum, quod Habraham credidit. Alioquin non fuit istud futurum fides. Non est autem necessarium ita fore futurum. Quare illa falsa».

77 et peccat] peccat tamen α 83–84 nasciturum] esse *add.* K (cf. *infra*, p. 24, l. 92) 84–85 falsi ... creditio] *om. hom.* L 85 discredendi sCeK] discernendi pCeV (*deest* L) 86 discredendum sCeK] discernendum αpCe 87 est] fuit α 90 aliquid] aliquis α 91 similiter] dico quod *add. marg.* Ce 92 tali] casu *add. marg.* Ce 93 discredendi sCeKpV] discernendi pCeLsV 93–94 concedo posito ... esset nasciturus sCe] concedendo primo ... pCe concedo si enim non esset nasciturus posito quod Christus non fuerit nasciturus K primo concedendo ... L posito concedendo ... V 96 discredendi sCeK] discernendi αpCe 97 informata] formata α 97 et] set L item V 98 potuit] non *praem.* α 98 discredendi] discernendi αCe 100 discredendum sCeK] discernendum αpCe 101 discredendum sCeK] discernendum αpCe



hec est falsa “motus meritorius potest esse demeritorius”. De motu dico qui totus meritorius precessit.

4.1. ITEM. Postea queri potest utrum de futuro pendeat utrum motus meritorius sit magis meritorius uel minus. Dicimus quod non, quia non pendet de futuro utrum mereatur maius premium uel minus, quia quantitas caritatis non pendet de futuro. Set constat quod opus est et meritorium premii et est meritorium dimissionis pene. Queritur ergo utrum pendeat de futuro utrum sit magis meritorius uel minus quantum ad dimissionem pene.

L 78<sup>ra</sup> Quod sic OSTENDITVR. Esto quod iste det agrum illi ecclesie cum fructibus illius anni, et fructus sunt futuri. Inde sic: de futuro pendet quanti sint fructus futuri, ergo de futuro pendet quanta erit dimissio pene, quia secundum maiorem | fructum erit maior. Ergo de futuro pendet utrum opus sit magis meritorium.

CONTRA. Esto quod opus sit tantum quod totam penam dimittat. Ergo si decedat post opus, euolabit. Non ergo propter fructus futuros pendet ex futuro utrum opus sit magis meritorium.

SOLVTIO. Distinguendum est inter opus operans et opus operatum: ‘opus operans’ appellat ipsam actionem dandi, ‘opus operatum’ ipsum datum. Vbi ergo essentia actionis pendet de futuro, tunc quantitas dimissionis pene pendet de futuro, sicut dictum est supra. Vbi autem actio siue motus non pendet, licet fructus agri pendeat, non pendet dimissio. Vnde, si ante decedat, non consideratur quantitas secundum quantitatem fructus sequentis, set secundum quantitatem motus qui precessit in eo. Videtur tamen quod opus operatum ualeat, quia si iste celebret pro isto mortuo uel det elemosinam, ualebit mortuo ad dimissionem pene, ergo si ipse dedisset pro se, ualeret ei ad idem.

4.2. ITEM. Postea queritur utrum pendeat de futuro an motus sit magis demeritorius uel minus.

K 128<sup>rb</sup> Quod VIDETVR sic. Esto quod Loth non uelit credere Christum nasciturum et tamen scit hoc esse uerum, set ex malitia non uult credere. Iste peccat ex duabus causis, scilicet ex mala uoluntate et ex eo quod scit illud futurum uerum. Et ita iste due circumstantie magis aggrauant quam altera per se. Set possibile est quod Christus non sit nasciturus, et si non est | nasciturus, minus peccat. Ergo de futuro pendet utrum magis peccet uel minus, ergo utrum iste motus sit magis demeritorius.

104 § 4: cf. Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, infra, § 4, p. 29.

102 potest ] posset  $\alpha$  105–106 dicimus ... uel minus ] *om. hom.*  $\alpha$  105 non<sup>1</sup> sCeK ] *om. pCe* (*deest*  $\alpha$ ) 107 est et ] *inv. apCe* est sCe 107 et est ] *om.*  $\alpha$  112 erit ] sit Ce 114–116 contra ... magis meritorium sCeK ] *om. hom. apCe* 115 propter sCe ] post K (*deest apCe*) 119 actionis ] operis operantis  $\alpha$  Ce idest actionis *add. sup. lin.* Ce 119 futuro ] siue operis operantis quod idem est *add.* K 121 pendeat CeK ] penant(?) L pendeant V 124 mortuo<sup>2</sup> ] *om.*  $\alpha$  126 motus ] *om.*  $\alpha$  127 minus ] meritorius *add.*  $\alpha$  128 uidetur sic ] *inv.*  $\alpha$  129–130 ex duabus causis ] ex duobus causis  $\alpha$  duabus de causis Ce

135 Preterea, auctoritas dicit «Incertum est quanta sit pena Arrii, quia nescitur quot per eius errorem sint subuertendi».

RESPONSIO. Quidam dicunt quod euentus sequens aggrauat peccatum. Secundum illos uidetur dicendum quod pendeat de futuro utrum aliquis motus sit magis demeritorius. Nos non dicimus ita, immo dicimus quod non pendet de futuro, et quando homo moritur, statim taxatur eius pena. Vnde dicimus quod  
140 — siue Christus nascitur siue non — tantum peccat mala uoluntate quantum cum euentu sequenti. Et est simile in illo qui dicit “iste qui est futurus episcopus est albus”: tantum si non sit futurus episcopus quantum si est futurus. Et generaliter nulla circumstantia temporis futuri aggrauat peccatum, set preteriti  
145 uel presentis.

Ad illud dicimus quod auctoritas illa de Arrio non est intelligenda de pena culpe, scilicet inflictata a deo pro peccato, set de pena infamie quam infligit ecclesia. Set «multitudini credentium» iudicando eum dignum «erat cor unum» etc.

135–136 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 33, Cc 295<sup>ra</sup>, H 66<sup>r</sup>, L 9<sup>rb</sup>, V 174<sup>vb</sup>: «Item, auctoritas dicit “Incerta est pena Arrii, quia incertum est quot per eius hereses sint subuertendi”»; A 256<sup>rb</sup>, B 116<sup>ra</sup>, R 54<sup>va</sup>, S 61<sup>va</sup>: «Item. “Incerta est pena Arrii, quia nescitur quot sint seducendi per eum”. Hoc dicit glossa». Illa sententia variis auctoribus tribuebatur: Hilario (a Petr. Cant., cit. infra), Augustino (a Guill. Alt., *sum. aur.* II, tr. 18, c. 5, ed. Ribaillier, II.2, 628, et a Bonav., *in IV Sent.*, d. 46, a. 1, q. 1, ed. cit., 956–957), Ambrosio (ab Alberto Magno, cf. Fries, *Der Doppeltraktat*, 101–102), Hieronymo (a Thom. Aq., *in IV Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 4, arg. 2). Cf. Petr. Cant., BN lat. 9593, 197<sup>vb</sup>: «Item, Hylarius: “Quanta sit Arrii pena nescio, quia quante multitudini perniciosum dogma causa fuit perditionis penitus ignoro”» (cf. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4.2, 276); Petr. Pict., *sent.* II, c. 6, ed. Moore – Garvin – Dulong, 31; Thom. Chob., *sum. conf.*, a. 7, d. 11, q. VIa, ed. Broomfield, 546; Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, infra, p. 30, ll. 118–119; *sum.*, Av 46<sup>ra-rb</sup>, Kl 36<sup>va</sup>, ed. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1, 382; anon. q. ed. ibidem, 397. 137–149 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 33 (Cc 294<sup>va</sup>–295<sup>ra</sup>, H 65<sup>v</sup>–66<sup>r</sup>, L 8<sup>vb</sup>–9<sup>rb</sup>, V 174<sup>va-vb</sup>, A 256<sup>ra</sup>–256<sup>va</sup>, B 115<sup>va</sup>–116<sup>va</sup>, R 54<sup>ra</sup>–54<sup>vb</sup>, S 61<sup>rb</sup>–62<sup>ra</sup>), excerpta in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1, 362–363. 143 Tantum: i.e. tantum albus est. 146–148 Cf. Steph. Lang., q. 33, Cc 295<sup>ra</sup>, H 66<sup>r</sup>, L 9<sup>rb</sup>, V 174<sup>vb</sup>: «Responsio. Non loquitur auctoritas de pena culpe, immo de pena infamie, quam tanto magis constat augeri quanto magis seducti per heresim uidentur multiplicari»; A 256<sup>rb</sup>, B 116<sup>ra</sup>, R 54<sup>va</sup>, S 61<sup>va-vb</sup>: «Responsio. Pena Arrii statim iuxta quodlibet eius peccatum constituta fuit, statim ergo fuit determinata, set nobis incerta. Nullius enim damnati pena crescit, sicut nec premium iusti ante diem iudicii. Set pena infamie crescit»; Gauf. Pict., *sum.*, Av 46<sup>va</sup>, Kl 36<sup>vb</sup>: «... pena, idest infamia. Vel potest dici: incerta pena, quia non certa homini, licet deo ...» (cf. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1, 383); cf. anon. q. eidem Gauf. tributam (a Lottin, “Quatre quaestiones”, et Quinto, *DN*, 278), Douai, Bibl. Mun., 434 II, f. 28<sup>vb</sup>, ed. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 4.1, 397: «... pena hic appellatur infamia quia quanto plures scandalizantur, tanto maior infamia. Vel sic: incerta est pena Aarii homini sed non Deo ...»; Guill. Alt., *sum. aur.* II, tr. 18, c. 5, ed. Ribaillier, II.2, 628. 148–149 Cf. Act. 4, 32.

135 incertum sCeK] ignotum αpCe 135 sit] futura *add. marg.* Ce 138 dicendum sCeK] spat. vac. pCeL om. V 139 non<sup>1</sup> sK] uero αCepK 139 ita immo dicimus] om. hom. αCe 142 cum] om. α 143 tantum scripsi] tamen peccat *ms.* 143 episcopus] albus *prae.* α 147 pena infamie] infamia Ce 148 multitudini] multitudinis V 148–149 erat cor unum] om. K

146–148 ad illud ... ecclesia] Vel incertum est nobis, tamen certam habet penam *add. marg.* Ce (cf. Steph. Lang et Gauf. Pict., *loc. cit.*).

## APPENDIX

ex *Summa* Gaufridi Pictaviensis

## &lt;VTRVM MERITORIVS MOTVS POSSIT ESSE NON MERITORIVS&gt;

1. Queritur utrum meritorius motus possit esse non meritorius. Probatur quod non. Si Abraham meruit, necessarium est ipsum meruisse. Ergo, eadem ratione, si meruit hoc motu, necessarium est ipsum meruisse hoc motu. 5

Contra. Ponatur quod credat Christum esse nasciturum. Possibile est Christum non esse nasciturum, ergo Christum esse nasciturum potest esse falsum. Set si est falsum, Abraham non meruit credendo illud. Set possibile est ipsum esse falsum, ergo possibile est Abraham non meruisse credendo illud. Ergo possibile est motum meritorium non fuisse meritorium. 10

Set contra. Necessarium est Abraham meruisse, ergo necessarium est motum fuisse meritorium.

Ad hoc dicit magister quod omnes huiusmodi sunt uere: “si prophetauit, necessarium est ipsum prophetasse”, “si meruit, necessarium est ipsum meruisse”, et consimiles. Set in speciali omnes sunt false, sicuti ista “si iste meruit hac actione, necessarium est istum meruisse hac actione”. Et ita contingens fuit Abraham meruisse credendo Christum nasciturum. Set non ualet hec argumentatio “necessarium est istum meruisse hac actione, ergo necessarium est Abraham etc.; set non credit nisi hac actione; ergo necessarium est Abraham credidisse hac actione”. Instantia: necessarium est Ysaïam prophetasse aliquid; set non prophetauit nisi hoc; ergo necessarium est ipsum prophetasse hoc. 15 20

De hac argumentatione quam ipse adducit pro instantia bene dico quod non tenet, set primam | argumentationem dico esse necessariam. Bene enim concedo quod si meruit hoc motu, necessarium est ipsum meruisse hoc motu. Non uideo quod si motus est hoc motu, quod possit non fuisse motus hoc motu. Michi enim uidetur necessarium eum motum fuisse ex quo ipse fuit. Nec dico quod sit simile de hac “necessarium est Ysaïam prophetasse” etc., tum quia huiusmodi dicta, *istum prophetare hoc*, *Christum preuidere hoc*, de futuro pendent, tum quia uoce prophetica potest aliud significatum fuisse quam fuit significatum. 25 30

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Av 60<sup>rb</sup>; Kl 49<sup>ra</sup>

16 ista *scripsi*] iste AvKl 27 eum *scripsi*] om. Av est Kl 30 potest] esse *add.* AvKl 30 significatum<sup>1</sup>] uel implicite uel munitum (minutum? *lege* innutum *aut* minatiuum) *add.* Av

Quod autem si Abraham meruit hoc motu, necessarium sit Abraham meruisse hoc motu, sic probo. Si aliquis fuit informatus albedine, non potest non fuisse informatus albedine; similiter si fuit informatus nigredine, et sic de aliis. Ergo, a simili, si fuit informatus caritate, non potest non fuisse informatus caritate. Set si meruit hoc motu, iste motus fuit informatus caritate, ergo si meruit hoc motu, non potuit non fuisse iste informatus caritate. Set si non potuit iste motus non fuisse informatus caritate, non potuit non meruisse hoc motu. Ergo, a primo, si meruit hoc motu, non potuit non meruisse hoc motu. Ergo si motus iste fuit meritorius, non potest non fuisse meritorius.

40 2. Item. De futuro pendet utrum aliquis motus sit meritorius | secundum Av 60<sup>va</sup>  
ipsum.

2.1. Contra. Si iste meruit, necessarium est istum meruisse. Ergo, a simili, si iste motus fuit meritorius, necessarium est istum motum fuisse meritorium.

45 Ad primam obiectionem scio quod non est solutio ad istam. Dicimus secundum ipsum, si teneamus eius solutionem, quod cum natura actionis pendet de futuro, de futuro pendet utrum ille motus sit meritorius, et ita cum natura huius actionis pendet de futuro, de futuro pendet utrum iste motus sit meritorius. Quare non ualet argumentatio, accidentale enim est actioni qua meruit fuisse hanc actionem.

50 2.2. Item. Tu dicis: de futuro pendet utrum iste motus sit meritorius quo Abraham credidit Christum esse incarnandum. Contra: sicut fuit preceptum Abrahe immolare filium — et illud fuit malum in genere — ita potuit ei precipere credere Christum non esse incarnandum; ergo sicut Abraham tenebatur immolare, ita et tenebatur credere.

55 Contra. Adhuc pendet de futuro utrum Christus sit incarnandus, ergo adhuc pendet de futuro utrum iste motus sit meritorius.

Set contra. Preceptum est illi ut crederet, et ipse credidit, ergo preceptum adimpleuit, ergo meruit. Prima sunt necessaria, ergo illatum. Ergo necessarium est hunc motum fuisse meritorium.

60 Hec obiectio non est contra me, ut patet ex predictis. Bene enim dico quod potest aliquis credere falsum meritorie; et contingente quod Christus non fuisset incarnandus, Abraham tamen meritorie credidit Christum fuisse incarnandum, sicut recolo me dixisse in questione de fide. Dico tamen ad hanc obiectionem cum magistro quod impossibile est quod aliquid precipiatur ad probationem ad quod statim teneatur, set ad tale quid ubi oportet preparatoria facere.

65 3. Item. Queritur utrum motus meritorius possit esse demeritorius. Motus, dico, qui totus precessit. Probat. Cogitatio ueri potest esse cogitatio falsi, quia

43 fuisse meritorium *scripsi cum Av*] *inv.* sKl necessarium fuisse pKl 51 incarnandum *scripsi cum Av*] incarnatum Kl 65 preparatoria *scripsi cum Steph. Lang., supra, q. 134, § 2.2, p. 23, l. 66*] preparatorie AvKl 65 facere] quia dicitur non ualere hec responsio *add. marg.* Kl

illud quod est falsum potest esse quod numquam fuerit uerum, ut antichristum fore. Ergo eadem ratione creditio credendi potest esse creditio discredendi. Ergo motus ad credendum potest esse motus ad discredendum. Ergo actio meritoria potest esse demeritoria. Et ita Abraham motu quo meruit <potuit credere discredendum, scilicet> Christum esse nasciturum; <ergo> possibile est quod demeruit illo motu. 70

Kl 49<sup>va</sup> Dico sine preiudicio melioris sententiae quod cogitatio ueri potest | esse cogitatio falsi. Set de hac dicerem, secundum quod consueui dicere, quod est falsa 75  
 “creditio credendi potest esse creditio discredendi”. Dico quod si debuit credi Christum esse nasciturum, non potest esse quin debuerit tunc credi, licet etiam potuisset fore falsum. Nec ualet hec argumentatio “fuit falsum, ergo debuit discredi”, nec ista “non fuit uerum, ergo non debuit credi”. Nisi forte sumat ‘credi’ ad copulandum motum fidei, secundum quod fides est de articulis. Immo dico 80  
 quod in hoc sensu non potuit credi et esse falsum.

Set secundum hoc non ualet hec argumentatio “cogitatio credendi potest esse” etc., “ergo creditio” etc. Procedit a superiori ad inferius affirmando. Si tenerem uiam magistri, dicerem quod creditio potest teneri uel pro credulitate, que non 85  
 Av 60<sup>vb</sup> est fides, uel pro motu fidei, ut sit sensus: credulitas rei creden|de potest esse credulitas rei discredende. Et hoc uerum est, quia secundum illum potest fuisse tunc discredendum, sicut antichristum fore; quod est uerum modo potest esse falsum modo, idest potest esse quod modo sit falsum. Vel potest esse sensus: motus fidei de re credenda potest esse motus fidei de re discredenda. Et hoc falsissimum est. Hanc autem dicerem duplicem “motus ad credendum potest 90  
 esse motus ad discredendum”, quia (1) iste dictiones ‘credendum’, ‘discredendum’ possunt esse gerundia, et secundum hoc fere equipollet huic “motus qui est credere potest esse motus qui est discredere”, et sic falsa; (2) item, potest teneri nominaliter, ut sit sensus “motus ad rem que debet credi potest esse motus ad rem que debet discredi”, et uera est sicuti hec “motus ad uerum potest esse 95  
 motus ad falsum”.

4.1. Item. Queritur si pendeat de futuro utrum motus sit magis meritorius uel minus quantum ad dimissionem pene. Esto quod iste det agrum illi ecclesie et fructus sint futuri. Inde sic: de futuro pendet quanti sint fructus futuri; set secundum maiorem fructum erit maior dimissio; ergo de futuro pendet utrum 100  
 opus sit magis meritorium.

Dico quod est opus operatum et opus operans. Opus operatum est ipsum datum; ubi autem opus operans pendet ex futuro, quantitas dimissionis pene pendet ex futuro, sicut dictum est supra. Set ubi actio non pendet ex futuro, sicuti hic, licet fructus pendeant, non pendet dimissio. Si ante decedat, non 105

105 ante decedat *scripsi cum Steph. Lang., supra, q. 134, §4.1, p. 25, l. 121*] autem dede-  
 rat(?) AvKl

consideratur quantitas secundum quantitatem fructus sequentis set secundum actionem et uoluntatem ipsius dantis. Vnde licet futuri sint fructus maiores uel minores, non ideo maior uel minor dimissio. Non enim erat in ipso quod fructus essent maiores uel minores. Et ideo non computatur pene dimissio nisi secundum ualorem agri et uoluntatem dantis cum ceteris circumstantiis. Dico enim,  
 110 sicuti dixi in alia questione, quod circumstantie ualeant ad dimissionem pene.

4.2. Item. Quero utrum ex futuro pendeat utrum motus sit magis demeritorius. Probatio. Sit ita quod Loth discredat Christum esse nasciturum et putat illud esse uerum. Loth peccat ex mala uoluntate et ex eo quod scit illud futurum  
 115 uerum et non credit. Et ita iste due circumstantie magis aggrauant quam una per se, ergo si Christus non sit nasciturus, minus peccat Loth. Ergo de futuro pendet utrum magis uel minus peccet.

Item, «incertum est quanta sit pena Arrii» etc., sicut opposuimus longe supra ubi eam exposuimus.

120 Dicimus quod non minus peccat Loth siue sit futurum uerum siue non, quia cum credat se debere credere et non credit, tantum peccat quantum si esset uerum. Non dico quod aliqua circumstantia de futuro augeat peccatum.

## DOES MERIT DEPEND ON THE FUTURE? A CRITICAL EDITION OF STEPHEN LANGTON'S Q. 134

### S U M M A R Y

The paper contains a critical edition of Stephen Langton's (d. 1228) theological question *Vtrum si aliquis meruit, necessarium sit illum meruisse* (no. 134 in Quinto's catalogue). Placed by an anonymous medieval compiler within Book III of what we now call Langton's *Quaestiones Theologiae*, q. 134 asks whether the moral value of actions or mental "movements" (*motus*) is immediately decided and remains fixed once they have been performed. The potential problem lies in the future contingent events that might be regarded as an *ex post* threat to that value. The edition is preceded by an introduction focusing on textual transmission and followed by a transcription of a corresponding fragment of Geoffrey's of Poitiers's *Summa* (Appendix).

KEYWORDS: Stephen Langton, Geoffrey of Poitiers, Gaufridus Pictaviensis, merit, necessity, futura contingentia, quaestio

SŁOWA KLUCZE: Stefan Langton, Galfryd z Poitiers, Gaufridus Pictaviensis, zasługa, konieczność, futura contingentia, quaestio