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STEPHEN LANGTON AND GEOFFREY OF POITIERS ON THE NATURAL POWER TO BELIEVE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Stephen Langton (d. 1228) discusses at length the various issues related to the virtue of faith. In most cases, he deals with the traditional problems, in particular those debated already by Peter Lombard in his *Sententiae* and *Magna glossatura*. However, in the case of the natural power to believe, he chooses a rather individual path. Langton assumes that the virtue of faith is not the same thing as being capable of an act of believing. This presumption is the basis of Langton's theological question n. 74: *Vtrum potentia credendi sit naturalis an gratuita*. Not only is it difficult to find an earlier author who would discuss a similar problem, but it seems that Langton's approach was considered controversial even by his closest followers. One of them was Geoffrey of Poitiers (d. after 1231), the author of several theological questions and a *Summa*.¹ In all of his works he draws heavily on the Questions of the English theologian.² The controversy gives us an opportunity to take a closer look at the relationship among the texts of the two authors.

The article has a double aim: first, to discuss Langton's and Geoffrey's views on the natural power to believe; second, to clarify the issue of the authorship of some anonymous questions.

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¹P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, vol. I, Paris 1933, 298; O. Lottin, "Quelques «Questiones» de maîtres parisiens aux environs de 1225–1235", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 5 (1933), 79–95.

²See J.W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1970, vol. I, 31–32 and vol. II, 22, n. 159.

2. THE PROBLEM

“Fides virtus tantum a deo <est> et in nobis est sine nobis”.³ The virtue of faith is a gratuitous gift of God, who infuses it into us without us.⁴ The infusion of grace precedes any virtuous action, and a movement of faith is impossible without it. Faith is not a reward for one’s merits: it is the first grace,⁵ infused directly by God. The virtue of faith, therefore, is gratuitous, not natural. At the turn of the 12th century, there was some controversy concerning a natural faculty called “formless faith”: is there a non-gratuitous virtue of faith? Langton’s opinion in this regard is unclear.⁶ Whatever might be the case, it seems to be a minor problem for the English theologian. In fact, the natural kind of faith would not be a genuine virtue, it would differ substantially from *fides-virtus*, and would not be meritorious in God’s eyes. Moreover, Langton supports the opinion that no natural quality or potentiality can become or be transformed into a true virtue.⁷ Accordingly, the gratuity of the meritorious faith is unquestionable.

However, Langton’s q. 74 does not concern the virtue of faith *per se*. The problem at stake is whether a human being is by nature capable of believing, or whether each act of faith is a pure act of grace. Is there any sense in which one can say that, insofar as faith is concerned, the human nature cooperates with the divine grace? And if there is something in the human nature that enables us to believe, what is it?

3. IN SEARCH OF LANGTON’S SOURCES:
A PARALLEL TEXT BY PRAEPOSITINUS OF CREMONA

Among the theological works from the second half of the 12th century, the text which seems to come closest to Langton’s question is the *Summa* by Praepositinus, which contains a chapter *Vtrum virtutes sint bona gratuita tantum* (MS P, f. 34^{ra-vb}). At one point, Praepositinus asks whether the power to believe is the

³ Stephen Langton, *Summa*, c. “Utrum naturalia fiant gratuita”, ed. Ebbesen – Mortensen, 159.

⁴ Ibidem, c. “De quaestione utrum virtutes sint pares”, 140–142; I. Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*, Brill, Leiden 2011, 120.

⁵ Stephanus Langton, q. 69c, MS Cb 239^{rb}: “Responsio. Non concedimus quod uoluntas meritoria precedat fidem, quia fides est prima gratia et fundamentum meriti”.

⁶ See M. Bieniak, “Faith and the Interconnection of the Virtues in William of Auxerre and Stephen Langton”, in *Fides Virtus: the Virtue of Faith in the Context of the Theological Virtues. IGTM International Conference Proceedings (Padua, 6 to 9 July, 2011)*, ed. R. Quinto – S. Vecchio, Aschendorff, Münster 2014, 209–220, on 215–216.

⁷ See Stephanus Langton, q. 69c, MS Cb, f. 239^{rb}.

same thing as the virtue of faith (f. 34^{rb}: “Item, queritur utrum aliud sit potentia credendi quam fides”). There are several significant differences between the *Summa* and Langton’s q. 74. First, Praepositinus is mainly interested in the problem of the natural, i.e. formless, virtues. Langton discusses this issue elsewhere.⁸ Second, Praepositinus does not give a lot of space to faith, because he discusses all the virtues, not only the theological, but also the cardinal ones. Finally, he does not mention the key elements of Langton’s solution; in particular, he does not associate the problem of the virtues with the *liberum arbitrium*. Nevertheless, the two authors have something in common: they both distinguish between the natural power to believe and the virtue of faith. According to Praepositinus, there are three components of meritorious believing: a natural power to believe, an act of faith, which stems from this natural power, and the gratuitous virtue of faith. In a virtuous person, the virtue of faith plays the role of an intermediary between the other two components, namely between the natural power and the meritorious act of believing. It is only because of the grace of faith that a belief is meritorious, but the act of faith originally stems from a natural power.⁹

The focus, the wording, and the structure of q. 74 is so different that it would be hard to imagine that Praepositinus’s chapter was one of Langton’s sources. Nevertheless, the distinction between the natural power to believe and the virtue of faith is the starting point of Langton’s discussion.

4. LANGTON ON THE *potentia credendi*: Q. 74

In conformity to his usual style, Langton approaches the issue by analyzing a list of authoritative propositions that employ the verb “to be capable of” (*posse*). All but one¹⁰ seem to support the thesis that the power to believe is not natural, but gratuitous. Langton’s analysis begins with the query whether the verb *posse* attaches some potentiality (*copulat*)¹¹ — and therefore is used categorically

⁸ See Stephanus Langton, *Summa*, c. “Utrum naturalia fiant gratuita”, ed. Ebbesen – Mortensen, 159–164; id., q. 212, MS Ca, ff. 216^{va}–217^{rb}.

⁹ Praepositinus Cremonensis, *Summa*, MS P, f. 34^{va}: “Solutio. Tria attenduntur: naturale bonum, et usus, et qualitas media inter illa, uerbi gratia: potentia credendi, credere et fides. Potentia credendi naturale bonum est et nunquam efficitur uirtus. Credere est usus illius potentie. Fides est qualitas media inter illa, et gratuitum bonum est. Set de hoc uariantur magistri nostri. Quidam dicunt illam eliminari adueniente caritate ... Alii etiam dicunt quod adueniente caritate illa informatur, et hoc nobis magis placet”.

¹⁰ The only auctoritas quoted in favour of the naturalty of the power in question is a sentence by Augustine in two versions: the first one is based on the original text of *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (PL 44, 968); the second one is a medieval formulation based on the same Augustinian text; cf. infra, p. 84, l. 83–85.

¹¹ The semantic relation of *copulatio* is one of the key tools in Langton’s thought; cf. S. Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity According to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen”, in J. Jolivet

— or does not attach anything, and so it is used syncategorematically. A given term attaches or “joins” — *copulat* — when it assigns a certain property to the referent of the subject-term. Consequently, if the verb *posse* in statements such as “*iste potest credere*”, “*potes credere*” attaches something, it attributes some potentiality to the person in question. And if so, then this potentiality must be either natural or gratuitous. Otherwise, one would have to assume that the verb *posse* is to be understood syncategorematically, i.e. as a kind of notional possibility.

According to Langton, the solution of the problem lies in recognizing that the words *posse*, *potens* and *potentia* can be used in various ways. First, it is necessary to observe that these terms usually attach (*copulant*) a potentiality, but it is also possible to use them in a different way, i.e. syncategorematically. Second, the terms in question are always followed by a complement. The truth value of a sentence depends on both factors.

If we assume that in statements such as “*iste potest credere*”, “*iste potest habere caritatem*” the verb *posse* attaches a potentiality — and according to Langton it normally does — then the sentences are true in reference to anyone (*quocumque demonstrato*), because *posse* attaches a natural potentiality, and the complement, namely “to believe” or “to have love”, involves the natural free will (*liberum arbitrium*). In fact, even though faith and love are gratuitous (supernatural) virtues, their acts, namely believing and loving, cannot be performed without the use of free will. Moreover, a human being can neither receive nor preserve his or her virtues without the consent of free will, i.e. without the collaboration of human nature.¹² Accordingly, the propositions “*iste potest habere fidem*”, “*iste potest habere caritatem*” are universally true as well, despite the fact that the complement does not indicate an act or a movement (*motus*) of virtue, but the act of receiving or preserving the virtue itself.

By contrast, if a complement indicating something purely gratuitous, namely something beyond human power, follows a word that attaches a natural potentiality, then the sentence is false. For this reason, the proposition “*iste potest esse iustus*” is false, because nobody is capable of being just. Being just is a quality, and no quality is subject to free will. Similarly, whenever a human being is passively affected by some action, it cannot be correctly said of him or her that he or she is capable of it: “*respectu qualitatis uel passionis nulla attenditur potentia*”. Consequently, nobody is capable of being resurrected or justified.

– A. de Libera (eds.), *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la ‘Logica Modernorum’*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1987, 410–414; R. Quinto, “Stephen Langton,” in Ph. W. Rosemann (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. II, Brill, Leiden 2010, 57–62.

¹²Infra, q. 74, p. 85, l. 127–131.

There is, however, another way of interpreting the verb *posse*. This understanding is improper and non-standard. If we assumed the verb *posse* in an improper way, namely syncategorematically, then we could perhaps even say that someone can be justified, just as we could say that a sinful man can be just. This manner of speech indicates a kind of theoretical or notional possibility.

Apparently, Langton draws an analogy between the use of *posse* when referring, on the one hand, to passive states or qualities, and, on the other hand, to potencies in an improper sense, namely to natural powers (*vires naturales*). In both cases, the verb *posse* is used syncategorematically and does not attach anything. The natural powers depend on the nature (the species) of the subject and cannot be removed without destroying the subject itself. For example, an amputee has the natural power to walk, even though he lacks the ability to do it. The ability or potentiality is, in fact, accidental, because it depends on the accident of having legs. We do not normally say that “an amputee can walk”, even though walking is not contrary to his nature.¹³ Such a way of speaking is unusual, because “being capable of” never attaches a natural power. Consequently, the only way to defend the truth of such statements is to assume that the verb *posse* is used syncategorematically.

It is because of the distinction between the natural power and the accidental potentiality that Langton finally admits that the power to believe is both natural and gratuitous, and therefore the quoted authorities can correctly affirm that only God can make us capable of believing. The natural power to believe is nothing but the free will, and so it is correct to say that this power is present even in the devil.¹⁴ However, only God bestows on his chosen ones the accidental potentiality, i.e. the gratuitous ability. This supernatural ability gives form to the act of faith which stems from the natural power to believe. A virtuous movement necessarily involves both causes: the natural power alone is insufficient.

And so, is it correct to say that a person out of God’s grace is able to believe in a meritorious way? Doesn’t a person without grace resemble an amputee? And in that case, why does Langton affirm that *anyone* is capable of a virtuous act of faith?¹⁵

¹³The distinction between different kinds of potentiality is based on Aristotle’s *Categories* and was already present in Abaelard; see C. Martin, “An Amputee is Bipedal! The Role of the Categories in the Development of Abaelard’s Theory of Possibility”, in J. Biard – I. Catach-Rosier (eds.), *La Tradition médiévale des Catégories (XIIe-XVe siècles)*, Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie – Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve – Louvain – Paris 2003 (Philosophes médiévaux 45), 225–242.

¹⁴See below, p. 87, l. 192–193.

¹⁵“Vnde secundum quod ‘credit’ copulat motum uirtutis, hec est uera ‘iste potest credere’ quocumque demonstrato, quia motus fidei est liberi arbitrii” (infra, p. 85, l. 122–124).

The response to these queries is far from clear. No wonder that a close disciple of Langton decided to argue against his master's solution. MSS E and P transmit a question that is clearly inspired by Langton's q. 74, but openly rejects Langton's main thesis. Before examining the criticism, it is necessary to discuss some basic facts concerning the history of transmission and the authorship of the EP text.

5. THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS BY STEPHEN LANGTON AND THE ANONYMOUS QUESTIONS IN EP

The main speculative achievement of Stephen Langton, namely his *Quaestiones Theologiae*, have been transmitted in diverse manuscript collections.¹⁶ Some of these ensembles are explicitly attributed to Langton in the manuscripts, like the collections found in the manuscript C and in the families α and β : these testimonies transmit Langton's q. 74. By contrast, four codices — D, E, P and U — transmit groups of anonymous questions. Some of these questions have been attributed to Langton,¹⁷ others to Geoffrey of Poitiers,¹⁸ some may have a different author. The authorship of most of them remains dubious.

The lack of ascription is particularly troubling in case of MSS E and P. These MSS contain a collection of 20 questions that seem to constitute the most evident example of *reportationes* among all the texts attributable to Langton. On the basis of a swift comparison among these *reportationes*, Geoffrey's *Summa*, and Langton's questions from other collections, Riccardo Quinto suspected that two EP questions — *De bono* and *Quid sit virtus* — were not by Langton, but by Geoffrey, his disciple.¹⁹ Nevertheless, no decisive proof was found. The difficulty in determining the authorship of these texts lies in the fact that in the vast majority of cases, Geoffrey followed Langton so closely, that he borrowed his master's exact words and imitated his style. Many chapters of Geoffrey's *Summa* bear signs of such resemblance. Consequently, the only chance to resolve the EP authorship problem is to thoroughly examine each question, word by word, to see whether the solutions offered in the *reportationes* are compatible with those

¹⁶ A detailed description of the manuscript tradition of Langton's *Quaestiones* can be found in R. Quinto, *Doctor Nominatissimus. Stefano Langton († 1228) e la tradizione delle sue opere*, Aschendorff, Münster i. W. 1994 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 39; henceforth *DN*), and in "Introduction" to Stephen Langton, *Quaestiones Theologiae. Liber I*, ed. R. Quinto – M. Bieniak, The British Academy – Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014 (henceforth abbreviated as *SLQTI*).

¹⁷ See M. Bieniak, "A Critical Edition of Stephan Langton's Question 'De persona'", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 77 (2006), 85–109.

¹⁸ See *DN*, 140–144.

¹⁹ See *DN*, 142–144.

offered by Langton in the texts which are certainly his own. But even such comparison does not always guarantee satisfactory results, because Geoffrey very often simply embraces Langton's solutions and reproduces his argumentations. In order to recognize a question by Geoffrey, it is necessary to find a significant difference of approach or an explicit rejection of Langton's solution. In other words, one has to be lucky. It seems that the question on the natural power to believe is such a lucky case.

6. GEOFFREY OF POITIERS ON THE POWER TO BELIEVE

MS EP transmits an anonymous question without a title, which begins with the words "Hodierna disputatione quesitum est utrum potentia credendi uel diligendi uel meritorie aliquid operandi sit naturalis uel gratuita". Despite the difference in the definition of the subject, the EP question greatly resembles q. 74 by Stephen Langton. The two questions share the same fundamental assumptions; in particular, they are both based on a neat distinction between the virtue of faith and the power to believe. Most of the objections are present in both texts; the theological method and the semantic tools are the same; most of the key notions are reused.

Nevertheless, the unequivocal rejection of Langton's position proves that the EP question, although based on q. 74, is not by Stephen Langton.

After proposing numerous *auctoritates* and a couple of rational arguments in favour and against the natural character of the power to believe, the author of the EP question presents two solutions that he immediately rejects. The first one is quoted and criticized also in Langton's q. 74; the second one is by Langton himself.

According to the first, anonymous opinion (by *quidam*), the verb *posse* can never be followed by a complement that denotes something supernatural, i.e. something greater than human power. The implication is that the natural free will is insufficient to have faith, because God's grace is also required.

The account of the second, rejected opinion (by *alii*) clearly aims at describing the first part of the solution proposed in Langton's q. 74 (l. 119–159). The description is rather faithful. It emphasises the distinction between a movement or an act of faith, which involves free will, and the virtue itself, which is purely gratuitous. The account, however, does not mention (at least not explicitly) Langton's important distinction between believing or receiving faith on the one hand, and being of a certain quality on the other.²⁰

²⁰ See above, p. 68.

The author of the EP question chooses a third path: “Nos sine preiudicio aliter dicimus”. If the verb *posse* in the sentence “iste potest credere” attached the *liberum arbitrium* — and, indeed, Langton expressed this view in the first part of his solution — then one would have to admit that the devil can merit eternal life, and that Christ is capable of sinning, because they both have the free will. At least the first of these consequences apparently did not bother Langton,²¹ but the author of the EP question found them both inconvenient. In order to avoid the embarrassing corollaries, he turned to a distinction between the natural power, which is identical to the *liberum arbitrium*, and a kind of secondary potentiality that inheres in the natural power. He calls this secondary potentiality ability (*habilitas*), and distinguishes between *habilitas ad bonum* — the ability to do good, which is natural — and *habilitas ad malum*, which is a consequence of sin. It is the former type of ability that is intended when one says that somebody can believe. This aptitude is natural, but is destroyed by sin and restored through grace. A person who is deprived of the natural ability to believe is like somebody who has an eye disease: he has the natural potency of vision, but he cannot use it because of an impediment.

It is clear that the distinction between the natural potentiality and an ability recalls the Aristotelian distinction between the natural power and the accidental potentiality, i.e. the distinction that was adopted in the second part of the solution found in q. 74. But the difference between q. 74 and the EP question does not only consist in a change of vocabulary. The accidental potentiality was, according to Langton, gratuitous. In contrast, the secondary ability (q. EP) is naturally present in the primary natural power, even when it is supernaturally restored by grace after the fall. This is how the author of EP manages to maintain — together with Langton — that the power to believe is natural, even though he refuses to admit that the verb *posse* attaches the primary power, namely the free will. At the same time, he manages to avoid the possible inconsistency of Langton’s solution.

The author of the EP question is Geoffrey of Poitiers, one of the closest disciples of Stephen Langton. This ascription is shown by the extremely close relationship between the EP question on the power to believe and a chapter from Geoffrey’s *Summa*.²² The two texts — especially the solutions — are almost identical, as can be seen from the following passage:

²¹ See below, p. 87, l. 192–193.

²² I owe this identification to dr Wojciech Wciórka, who has prepared a transcription of selected parts of Geoffrey’s *Summa*. To him go my most sincere thanks.

Geoffrey's *Quaestio* (p. 91, l. 76-96)

Nos sine preiudicio aliter dicimus.

Distinguiamus enim *in alia questione* potentiam naturalem contra illam potentiam. Potentia naturalis bene uel male faciendi est liberum arbitrium; habilitas ad bonum naturaliter insita est ipsi potentie; habilitas ad malum adquisita est per peccatum.

Per hoc uerbum ergo 'potest' non copulatur prima potentia, set habilitas que est in potentia, <ut> cum dicitur "iste potest credere", "iste potest habere fidem". Si enim potentia prima copularetur, oporteret concedi quod Christus posset peccare et diabolus mereri uitam eternam, quia Christus habet liberum arbitrium eiusdem speciei cum nostro, et diabolus cum angelis. ...

Item, notandum quod licet illa habilitas naturaliter sit in homine, tamen corrumpitur per peccatum et reformatur per gratiam, unde dicitur dari quando reformatur.

Geoffrey's *Summa* II (MS K1, f. 47^{ra})

Nos distinguimus in hoc nomine 'potentia'.

Dicimus quod est potentia ipsa potentia naturalis ex qua elicitur actus, set habitu mediante, qui in quantum habitus uel habilitas ad bonum appellatur 'potentia'; et naturaliter est insita ipsi potentie.

Nota quod per hoc uerbum 'potest' numquam solet copulari prima potentia, set tantum habilitas que est in potentia, ut cum dicitur "iste potest credere", "iste potest habere fidem". Si enim copularetur illa potentia, oporteret concedi quod Christus peccare posset et diabolus mereri, quia Christus habet liberum arbitrium eiusdem potentie cum nostro. ...

Item, nota quod licet illa habilitas naturalis sit in homine, tamen corrumpitur per peccatum, *sicuti heri diximus*, set reformatur per gratiam, et dicitur dari quando reformatur.

Table 1

The similarities between Geoffrey's question (EP) and his *Summa*.

7. HOW MANY EP QUESTIONS CAN BE ASCRIBED TO GEOFFREY?

The EP question on the natural power to believe sends back to another question, in which the distinction between the primary power and the secondary potentiality (*habilitas*) is introduced. The question, called "De corruptione naturalium", is present in MSS EP.²³ The situation in Geoffrey's *Summa* is analogous: the chapter on the natural power contains a reference to a parallel chapter on the destruction of the natural goods, which is present on the previous folio of the *Summa*.²⁴ The relationship between the chapter and the question "De corruptione naturalium" is the same as in the case of Geoffrey's chapter and the question on the natural power to believe. Consequently, both EP questions

²³ I.e. in E, f. 58^{va-vb}, and in P, f. 149^{rb-vb}.

²⁴ I.e. in Av, f. 57^{ra} and K1, f. 46^{rb}.

mentioned here can be safely ascribed to Geoffrey of Poitiers. In the light of this discovery, it becomes highly probable that the EP group of 20 questions, which seems to be rather homogenous, contains more of Geoffrey's texts. Nevertheless, only an individual examination of each question will allow a trustworthy ascription.

8. IS GEOFFREY'S QUESTION A *reportatio*?

The distinctive feature of the aforementioned group of 20 questions in EP consists in their incipits. They all begin with expressions such as "Hodie quesitum est", "Hodierna questio est", etc. The EP question on the power to believe is similar in this respect: it begins with the expression "Hodierna disputatione quesitum est...". In the face of such an explicit hint, Riccardo Quinto concluded that we were dealing with a group of *reportationes*.²⁵ However, a closer look at the EP question on the power to believe reveals that, in spite of the opening sentence, it would be difficult to classify it as a rough, direct report of an oral discussion. The text runs smooth and is well-ordered; nothing is missing, no reasoning or quotation is incomplete; apart from the incipit, there are no signs of the oral language. Accordingly, if the text derives from a true discussion, it must have been thoroughly edited after the notes were taken down.²⁶

There is another fact that could perhaps be interpreted as an argument in favour of a reworked *reportatio*. The EP question on the power to believe is very similar to a chapter from the *Summa* by Geoffrey of Poitiers. The style and the contents of the two texts are almost identical; they might, therefore, have the same origin. Now, in the middle of the chapter *Vtrum potentia benefaciendi sit gratuita*, we find the expression "sicuti heri diximus". This remark suggests that at least this part of Geoffrey's *Summa* originated in an oral lesson or discussion. Nevertheless, both *Summa* and Geoffrey's questions must have been deeply reworked afterwards.

9. SOME PHILOLOGICAL REMARKS CONCERNING Q. 74

Q. 74 has been preserved in three different versions. The present article presents only the longest one (called "a"), transmitted by MSS Ca, LV (=α) and ABRS (=β). Accordingly, the "a" version is preserved in almost all the principal

²⁵ See *DN*, 145-156.

²⁶ On the problem of *reportationes*, see J. Hamesse, "La technique de la reportation", in O. Weijers – L. Holtz (eds.), *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–XVe siècle)*, *Actes du colloque international*, Brepols, Turnhout 1997, 405–421; *SLQTI*, 38–42, and the bibliography quoted there.

collections of Langton's *Quaestiones*. Moreover, it is the most elaborated and clear version of all. By contrast, each of the other two redactions is transmitted by only one branch of the MSS tradition, and each of them is shorter by half. Given that q. 74a is transmitted by almost all the principal manuscripts, including the authoritative Ca,²⁷ we can presume that this is the "official" version of the *quaestio* written by Langton in person, and authorized for distribution.

Version "b" is transmitted only by the four MSS that form the β family.²⁸ The text is rather corrupted and unclear. The presumable response, which occupies less than six lines, is difficult to understand and seems incompatible with 74a.²⁹ There are at least two possible explanations of this discrepancy between 74a and 74b. According to the first hypothesis, the two texts were written in two distant moments of time (first 74b, then 74a) and thus reflect an evolution in Langton's thought. In this case, 74a would reflect the mature thought of the theologian. According to the second hypothesis, 74b is a rough *reportatio* prepared by a student who misunderstood Langton's conception. The embryonal, very laconic form of 74b might speak in favour of this second theory. In any case, the version "b" should be interpreted with caution.

Version "c" is preserved only in MS Cb. This collection of Langton's *Quaestiones* probably transmits draft versions written by the author himself.³⁰ The whole version "c" is visibly more reliable than "b". In particular, the "c" solution is more detailed and clear than the "b" one and is fully compatible with q. 74a.³¹

²⁷ See A. Gregory, "The Cambridge Manuscript of the Questiones of Stephen Langton", *The New Scholasticism* 4 (1930), 193.

²⁸ Q. 74b starts at A 264^{rb}, B 132^{rb}, R 64^{vb} and S 73^{ra}.

²⁹ See R, f. 65^{rb}: "Item (*forsitan rectius*: solutio). "Potentia credendi inest huic", hec duplex; similiter hec: "iste potest credere". Si 'credere' copulet motum uirtutis, falsa; si liberi arbitrii, uera, et hec uera "iste potest esse malus". Hec duplex "iste potest peccare". Si 'potest' copula sit et non notet potentiam, 'peccare' deformitatem, uera; si potentiam, falsa. Si 'peccare' notet actum et 'potest' potentiam, uera".

³⁰ Several Cb questions have already been edited and will be published in volumes II-IV of Langton's *Quaestiones Theologiae*. In the light of the new material, the hypothesis that Cb contains early drafts written by Langton seems more probable than the hypothesis advanced in *SLQTI*, 19-20.

³¹ Cb, f. 221^{ra}: "Responsio. Cum dico "iste potest peccare", hoc uerbum 'peccare' potest copulare deformitatem tantum, et secundum hoc hoc uerbum 'potest' non copulat nisi terminum termino, sicut nec cum dicitur "antichristus potest esse homo". Si autem hoc uerbum 'peccare' copulet motum animi, hoc uerbum 'potest' copulat naturalem potentiam qua mediante homo potest moueri. Simili modo dico hic cum dico "iste qui est in mortali potest credere" si hoc uerbum 'credere' copulet sumptum a motu, tunc hoc uerbum 'potest' copulat aliquid; si sumptum a uirtute, non copulat aliquid. Nulla enim potentia inest isti qua potest esse bonus. Inest tamen ei quedam potestas qua potest moueri per fidem, set non meritorie. Illas autem auctoritates que uidentur uelle quod nullus habeat potentiam credendi refero ad gratiam, secundum scilicet quod

10. *Stemma codicum* OF Q. 74A

Q. 74a is transmitted by three independent branches of manuscript tradition:


Ca — f. 176^{vb}–177^{va}

α — L, f. 31^{va}–32^{rb} and V, f. 199^{va}–200^{rb}

β — A, f. 226^{vb}–227^{va}; B, f. 86^{va}–87^{vb}; S, f. 21^{rb}–22^{rb}; R, f. 17^{va}–18^{va}.

The existence of the families α and β has been already proven on other occasions;³² it is therefore unnecessary to reiterate these argumentations here. Given that the tradition is tripartite, the variants offered by the majority of the branches were included in the text. The critical apparatus does not register the individual readings of the members of the manuscript families, but it presents all the variants of Ca.

The history of transmission of Q. 74a can be, therefore, graphically represented in the following manner:

11. *Stemma codicum* OF GEOFFREY'S *Quaestio*

The Question by Geoffrey of Poitiers — *Vtrum potentia credendi uel diligendi uel meritorie aliquid operandi sit naturalis uel gratuita* — is transmitted by only two MSS:

E — f. 59^{rb}–59^{va}

P — f. 150^{va}–151^{rb}


The two manuscripts seem to be independent, because each of them contains individual errors. Nevertheless, these variants are not numerous. Moreover, both MSS share some corruptions that have to be corrected *ope ingenii*. It seems, therefore, that EP might belong to one family. However, in the absence

est sumptum a uirtute. Alias auctoritates, que uidentur uelle contrarium, refero ad motum liberi arbitrii”.

³²See *SLQTI*, 45–61.

of a more substantial proof, which could be given only by comparison to another, independent testimony, the manuscript tradition of Geoffrey's question will be treated as a simple bipartite tradition. Accordingly, the critical apparatus registers all the individual errors of both MSS.

The history of transmission of Geoffrey's *Quaestio* can be, therefore, graphically represented in the following manner:



12. CONCLUSION

Stephen Langton shares some basic convictions with his disciple, Geoffrey of Poitiers. Every person has a natural power to believe: this potentiality is the natural free will. But the *liberum arbitrium* is only a necessary condition of faith, not a sufficient condition. God's grace is indispensable in order to produce a meritorious act of believing. According to Langton, God bestows to his chosen ones an accidental, gratuitous faculty, which informs the acts stemming from the natural power. According to Geoffrey, free will has a natural ability in it. This natural ability is lost because of sin, but is restored by God's grace to its natural condition. Both thinkers maintain that in the sentence "this person is capable of believing" the verb "is capable of" attaches a natural potentiality. However, while Geoffrey clearly states that it is the secondary ability that is intended, and not the *liberum arbitrium*, Langton seems to hesitate. Apparently, he prefers to maintain that what is normally intended here is simply the *liberum arbitrium*, but he fails to explain why the linguistic use in analogous cases is different. Despite the fact that Geoffrey's solution only reworks Langton's concepts, his interpretation has the appeal of coherence and clarity that Langton's question perhaps fails to give.

Abbreviations

<i>add.</i>	—	<i>addidit</i>
<i>CCL</i>	—	<i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</i>
<i>del.</i>	—	<i>delevit</i>
<i>hom.</i>	—	<i>homoeoteleuton</i>
<i>inv.</i>	—	<i>invertit</i>
<i>iter.</i>	—	<i>iteravit</i>

<i>marg.</i>	—	<i>in margine</i>
<i>mss.</i>	—	<i>consensus codicum</i>
<i>om.</i>	—	<i>omisit</i>
<i>PL</i>	—	<i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne
<i>pCa</i>	—	<i>lectio codicis Ca ante correcturam</i>
<i>praem.</i>	—	<i>praemisit</i>
<i>sCa</i>	—	<i>lectio codicis Ca post correcturam</i>
<i>spat. vac.</i>	—	<i>spatium vacans</i>
<i>sup. lin.</i>	—	<i>supra lineam</i>
< >	—	<i>supplevi</i>

Manuscripts

A	—	Avranches, Bibl. Mun., 230
Av	—	Avranches, Bibl. Mun., 121
C	—	Cambridge, St. John's College Libr., C.7 (57)
Ca	—	C, ff. 171–218
Cb	—	C, ff. 219–282
<i>Index</i>	—	Index primus codicis C (ff. 345 ^{vb} –346 ^{rb})
E	—	Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 260
Kl	—	Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, Cod. 299
L	—	Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Lyell 42
P	—	Paris, BnF, lat. 14526
R	—	Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Ap. Vat., Vat. lat. 4297
S	—	Paris, BnF, lat. 16385
V	—	Paris, BnF, lat. 14556
α	—	<i>consensus LV</i>
β	—	<i>consensus ARS</i>

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STEPHANVS LANGTON
QVAESTIONES THEOLOGIAE, LIBER III
Q. 74

74a *Vtrum potentia credendi sit naturalis an gratuita*

Queritur utrum potentia credendi sit naturalis an gratuita.

1. Probatur quod gratuita.

1.1. Dicit enim Augustinus «In potestate nostra est uoluntatem nostram mutare in melius, set potestas ista nulla est nisi a deo detur», et ita uoluntas mutandi uoluntatem in melius datur a deo, et ita est gratuita. Non enim hic loquitur Augustinus de donatione que | fit in creatione anime quando omnia naturalia conferuntur. 5

V 199vb

1.2. Item, ad hoc quod aliquid bene fiat tria exiguntur, scilicet posse, uelle, scire; set duo — scilicet uoluntas et scientia — sunt gratuita; ergo et potentia. 10

1.3. Item, homini roganti Christum pro filio suo demoniaco curando dictum est «Si potes credere, omnia possibilis sunt credenti», quasi “si potes credere, statim impetrabis”. Set si sumpsit hoc uerbum ‘potes’ secundum quod est syncategorematicum, nichil dictu fuit cum ait “si potes credere”, quia secundum hoc quilibet potest. Si prout copulat potentiam, si illa potentia est naturalis, potest, et ita pro nichilo dixit “si potes”; ergo oportet ut copularet pro potentia gratuita qua ille carebat. 15

A 226vb; B 86va; Ca 176vb; L 31va; R 17va; S 21rb; V 199va (LV=α, ABRS=β)

1 Cf. Steph. Lang., *in II Thes.* 3, 3, ms. Tours BM 118, f. 139va: «...de hoc, scilicet utrum potentia credendi sit naturalis aut stricte gratuita, discutiendum in disputatione»; Praep., *sum.* II, ms. Paris, BN lat. 14526 (=P), f. 33va–34rb; Gaufr. Pict., *sum.* II, Kl 46vb–47rb, Av 57va–58rb; Alex. Neck., *spec. speculat.* IV, ed. Thomson – Wilson, 399–401; Guill. Alt., *sum. aur.* II, tr. 13, c. 2, ed. Ribaillier, II, 475–481. 4–5 Aug., *retr.* I, c. 22, n. 4, ed. Mutzenbecher, *CCL* 57, ?? (*PL* 32, 620). 11–12 Mc. 9, 22.

1 utrum potentia credendi sit naturalis an gratuita *Index* Ca] queritur utrum potentia credendi sit naturalis aut gratuita L(*index*) utrum potentia credendi sit naturalis ABS titulus principium questionis R de potentia credendi V 5 set potestas] om. β 5 ita uoluntas] potestas α 9 aliquid] aliquis α 10 potentia] scientia α cum bene facere similiter ex gratia *add. marg.* sCa 11 demoniaco] de monacho β 13 statim] satis β 14 dictu] dictum βV 15 potest] quilibet *praem.* Ca 16 copularet] copularetur β 17 carebat] credebatur pCa *del.* sCa

1.4. Item, in Euangelio dicit dominus Iudeis «Quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire», et post pauca dicens apostolis «Quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire modo». Ad hoc quod locum habeat aduerbialis determinatio, oportet quod eodem modo sumatur utrobique hoc uerbum | ‘potestis’. Si syncategorematicae, falsum est quod dicitur Iudeis, scilicet “uos non potestis uenire”. Si categorematicae et pro potentia naturali, item falsum est quod dicitur Iudeis, quia poterant uenire. Si pro potentia gratuita, habetur propositum, quasi “uos non potestis uenire, quia non habetis potentiam, set uos apostoli habetis, set adeo parua est quod non sufficit ad hoc ut possitis uenire modo”.

S 21^{va}

1.5. Item, «Quotquot receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri». Si potestas illa naturalis, quare dicitur eam dedisse recipientibus, cum omnes habeant eam?

1.6. Item, ibi dicit glossa «Mirabilis est illa potestas qua filius dei fieri potest». Certe si illa potestas esset naturalis, non esset mirabilis. Per hoc ergo quod dicit ‘mirabilis’ uult glossa quod sit gratuita.

1.7. Item, constat quod liberum arbitrium est potentia credendi et sperandi. Set de hac potentia nichil ad presens. Set loquor de illa potentia credendi que alia est quam potentia sperandi. Illa est naturalis, et talis potentia sperandi fuit in diabolo, set sublata est per obstinationem, quia non potest sperare ut hoc uerbum ‘potest’ copulet talem potentiam. Ergo si per obstinationem sublata est diabolo, per mortale citra obstinationem decrescit in uiatore ita quod per maius peccatum magis et per minus minus; ergo multo potius crescit per gratiam ita quod magis per maiorem. Ex quo sic: hec potentia crescit per gratiam ita quod per maiorem magis et per minorem minus, ergo est gratuita.

B 86^{vb}

1.8. Item, hec falsa “iste de natura est homo iustus”, immo de gratia; et tamen iste terminus ‘homo iustus’ notat duo, scilicet unum naturale et aliud gratuitum. Eadem ratione, cum “credere meritorie” notet duo, | scilicet motum nature et informationem gratie, debet dici quod | potentia credendi meritorie est gratuita.

R 17^{vb}A 227^{ra}

1.9. Item, in Mattheo_{10, 25-27}: «Facilius est camelum per foramen acus transire, quam diuitem intrare in regnum celorum. His auditis discipuli mirabantur ualde dicentes: Quis ergo poterit saluus esse? Aspiciens autem Iesus dixit illis

18–19 Io. 8, 21. 19–20 Io. 13, 33. 27 Io. 1, 12. 30 Cf. *gl. ord. marg.* in Io. 1, 12, ed. Rusch, IV, 1032^{vb}: «Mirabilis potestas ut qui filii diaboli erant, et filii Dei et fratres Christi per eum liberati dicantur, quo autem ordine filii Dei fiant et quomodo hec generatio distat a carnali subdit: Qui non ex sanguinibus».

18 Euangelio] Iohannis *add. CasL* 19–20 et post pauca dicens apostolis quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire modo V] et post paucis dixit apostolis quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire L discipulis loquens alibi modo Ca *om. β* 22–24 si categorematicae ... uenire Ca] si categorematicae falsum est quod dicitur Iudeis scilicet uos non (non *om. A*) potestis uenire AB *om. hom. αRS* 24 quasi] *om. Ca* dicens *add. AL* 25 potentiam] gratiam uel *praem. α* 28 si potestas illa naturalis] *om. Ca* 30 fieri potest] homo *praem. α* fieri *om. CaR*

“Apud homines impossibile, apud deum autem omnia possibilia sunt”. Set similiter homines intrare per se est impossibile apud deum. Set cum dixit “hoc est impossibile” demonstrauit hoc, scilicet diuitem intrare in regnum celorum, ergo ita ut fieret sermo de dicto, et sic est impossibile apud deum et homines, aut ita ut fieret sermo de re, et intelligeretur diuisa. Set sic est possibile apud homines si potentia intrandi uel meritorie agendi est naturalis; si uero est gratuita, nullus qui habeat mortale potest intrare. 50 55

1.10. Item, Crisostomus: «Spiritus sanctus superuenit in uirginem purgans eam, et deitatis uerbi uim receptiuam conferens simul et generatiuam», ergo beata uirgo non habuit naturalem potentiam generandi filium dei, set gratuitam. Set «maius est dominum portare uel concipere mente quam uentre», sicut dicit Augustinus. Set ipsa non habuit potentiam portandi dominum uentre nisi gratuitam, ergo nec mente. 60

Ca 177^{ra} 1.11. Item, maius est hominem suscitari mente quam corpore; set Lazarus non habuit aliquam potentiam naturalem qua posset suscitari corpore; ergo nec mente. Vel si potentia resurgendi mente est naturalis, ergo et resurgendi in corpore et iustificandi; et ita iustificabilitas est potentia naturalis, | ergo homo naturaliter iustificatur, quod absit. Et potentia fruendi naturalis, et potentia suscipiendi gratiam — scilicet susceptibilitas gratie — est naturalis, eadem ratione iustificabilitas. 65

1.12. Item, si potentia credendi meritorie est naturalis, numquam deletur per mortale, set obfuscatur. Et ita si diabolus habuit eam ante peccatum, adhuc habet eam, et ita potest credere meritorie (numquam sumatur hoc uerbum ‘potest’ prout copulat facultatem, set potentiam). 70

B 87^{ra} 1.13. Item, sicut est supra naturam humanam parificari deo, ita est supra | naturam humanam parificari angelo. Set nullus habet naturalem potentiam qua possit parificari deo, ergo | nec angelo. Et aliquis habet potentiam qua possit parificari angelo. Ergo illa est gratuita. 75

S 21^{vb} 1.14. Item, cum aliquis est in mortali, habet unicam scientiam: non gratuitam, set studio | adquisitam. Set cum iustificatur, datur ei donum scientie qua scit

56–57 Cf. Ioh. Dam., *de fid. orth.* III, c. 46, n. 2, ed. Buytaert, 171 (*PG* 94, 983); uerbatim Petr. Lomb., *sent.* III, dist. 3, c. 1 (II, 32): «Post concessum autem sanctae Virginis, Spiritus Sanctus praeuenit in ipsam, secundum uerbum Domini quod dixit angelus, purgans ipsam, et potentiam deitatis Verbi receptiuam praeparans, simul autem et generatiuam». 59 Cf. Aug., *serm.* 72A (25), ed. Denis, 162–163 (*PL* 46, 937): «Inde ergo et Maria beata, quia audiuit uerbum dei, et custodiuit: plus mente custodiuit ueritatem, quam utero carnem. Veritas Christus in mente Mariae, caro Christus in uentre Mariae; plus est quod est in mente, quam quod portatur in uentre».

49 possibilia sunt] intelli<ge> hominem intrare per se *add.* Ca 53 possibile] impossibile α 55 habeat] habet α 57 deitatis] deitatem β 59 sicut] set α 60 set] quia α 62 suscitari] suscitare β 72 potentiam] huius rei distinctio supra in secundo(?) *add.* β 75–76 et aliquis ...parificari angelo] *om. hom.* α 78 qua CaV] quia βL

80 bene conuersari in medio prae nationis, et hec scientia est gratuita, nec expellit priorem. Quare non similiter datur ei quoddam donum gratuitum spiritus sancti, scilicet potentia qua possit bene conuersari?

2. Set probatur econtrario, scilicet quod potentia credendi est naturalis.

85 2.1. Dicit enim Augustinus «Habere fidem gratie est fidelium, posse uero habere nature est hominum». Item, alia auctoritas: «Posse habere fidem est nature, credere uero est gratie», ergo potestas qua iste potest habere fidem est nature.

2.2. Item, sumatur hoc uerbum ‘credere’ communiter copulando pro motu fidei uirtutis et pro motu fidei informis, et hoc uerbum ‘potest’ prout copulat potentiam et non facilitatem. Ille qui est in mortali potest credere, ergo potest credere | meritorie, sumatur ‘credere’ predicto modo; ergo potest credere, 90 sumatur ‘credere’ pro motu uirtutis.

2.3. Item, cum dicitur “iste credit”, hoc uerbum ‘credit’ copulat motum liberi arbitrii qui est naturalis. Ergo potentia qua potest credere est naturalis, quia qua ratione potentia currendi dicitur naturalis ideo quia naturalis actus — scilicet cursus — procedit origine ex ea, et potentia credendi est naturalis quia naturalis 95 actus — scilicet credere — origine procedit ex ea.

2.4. Item, hoc uerbum ‘peccare’ in una significatione copulat actum cum deformatione que non est naturalis, et tamen propter actum naturalem hec est uera “potentia peccandi est naturalis”. Eadem ratione, licet ‘credere’ notet quiddam quod non est nature set gratie, scilicet informationem, tamen propter actum nature hec est uera “potentia credendi est naturalis”. 100

Item, hoc uerbum peccandi in alia significatione copulat tantum deformitatem que non est naturalis, et tamen etiam secundum hoc locutio est uera “potentia peccandi est naturalis”. Eadem ratione et hec uera “potentia credendi est naturalis” ita etiam quod uerbum credendi copulet non actum, set ipsam | uirtutem. Vel si in hac significatione ‘credendi’ potentia credendi est gratuita, 105 ergo naturaliter precedit rem gerundii, scilicet fidem. Et ita aliquid districte

L 32^{ra}R 18^{ra}

83–84 Aug., *praed. sanct.*, c. 5, n. 10, *PL* 44, 968: «Proinde posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, naturae est hominum: habere autem fidem quemadmodum habere charitatem, gratiae est fidelium». 84–85 Forsitan Ps.-Hugo de S. Vict., *qq. in Ep.*, *PL* 175, 0593B: «Posse habere fidem, id est potentia habendi, naturalis est; sed huius potentiae usum habere, solius gratiae est, et non naturae».

83–84 posse uero habere nature est] sese non α 86 credere communiter] coniunctim α 87 potest] *om.* Ca 88 facilitatem ille] facultatem similiter Ca 90 motu] fidei *add.* α 96–97 deformatione] determinatione Ca 99 informationem *scripsi*] informatio $\alpha\beta$ conformationem *s*Ca conformitatem *p*Ca 102 locutio] hec Ca 103–104 eadem ratione et hec uera potentia credendi est naturalis] *om. hom.* βV 104 uerbum β] potentia α *om.* Ca 106 naturale β] naturalem α naturaliter Ca 106 gerundii *ACa*] gerundiui *BR* gerundis *S* generandum *L* generandi *V* 106 districte] stricte *Ca*

B 87^{rb} gratuitum, scilicet sine quo non est salus et quod non potest haberi nisi cum caritate, naturaliter prece|dit fidem uirtutem.

2.5. Item, indirecte. Si potentia credendi est gratuitum donum spiritus sancti, quare non enumeratur inter alia dona spiritus sancti? 110

A 227^{rb} QUIDAM DIXERVNT quod quotiens aliquid quod sit supra naturam affirmative sequitur hoc uerbum ‘potest’, locutio est falsa. Set hoc uerbum ‘potest’ copulat potentiam; unde hec est falsa “iste potest credere”, siue ‘credere’ copulet uirtutem siue motum uirtutis, quia infinitiuus denotat aliquid quod est supra naturam. Set eadem ratione deberet dicere quod | nullus potest mereri augmentum gratie, quia augmentum est supra gratiam iam habitam, nec etiam ille qui habet gratiam potest mereri uitam eternam, quia uita eterna est supra gratiam in presenti habitam. 115

Ideo alia uia incedimus dicentes quod quando infinitiuus modus sequens hoc uerbum ‘potest’ denotat aliquid quod subest libero arbitrio uel nature, locutio est uera etiam secundum quod ‘potest’ copulat potentiam, siue designetur ibi aliquid gratuitum siue non. Vnde secundum quod ‘credit’ copulat motum uirtutis, hec est uera “iste potest credere” quocumque demonstrato, quia motus fidei est liberi arbitrii. Si uero nichil nisi gratuitum sequatur hoc uerbum ‘potest’, locutio est falsa secundum quod ‘potest’ copulat potentiam; unde nullus potest esse iustus, quia nullus habet aliquam potentiam qua possit esse iustus. 120 125

Ca 177^{rb} Dicimus itaque ad illud Augustini «Posse habere caritatem» etc. quod ‘habere’ ponitur ibi pro retinere uel suscipere, quod est motus liberi arbitrii, et habere — idest retinere uel suscipere — est gratie ratione informationis caritatis. Et homo est susceptibilis gratie, quia suscipere est nature, quia est motus liberi arbitrii, nec est aliqua potentia in homine nisi naturalis. | Vnde cum quedam auctoritates uelle uideantur quod aliqua sit gratuita, ut cum dicit Augustinus «Ista potestas nulla est nisi a deo detur», referendum est ad illud gratuitum quod sequitur hoc uerbum ‘potest’. Cum enim dicit Augustinus «In potestate nostra est mutare uoluntatem in melius» duo intelliguntur: unum naturale, scilicet mutare, quod 130 135
S 22^{ra} est motus liberi arbitrii, aliud gratuitum, scilicet bonum siue | melius. Propter naturale dicit quod in potestate nostra est, set propter gratuitum dicit quod hec potestas nulla est nisi a deo detur, quia etsi mutare sit hominis, tamen quod in melius hoc est dei.

108 Naturaliter fidem uirtutem: sed hoc absit, quia fides uirtus est prima gratia; cf. Steph. Lang., q. 69c, MS Cb 239rb: «Responsio. Non concedimus quod uoluntas meritoria precedat fidem, quia fides est prima gratia et fundamentum meriti». 127 Ad 2.1. 132–135 Ad 1.1.

108 uirtutem] non *praem.* α 111 dixerunt] dicunt Ca 112 set] non α 116 gratiam] naturam β 121 etiam] et Ca 121 designetur] donum generatur α 124 potest] *om.* β 127 itaque] utique Ca 132 cum] *om.* αS 135 naturale scilicet] *inv.* α 137 est set] *om.* α 138 mutare sit hominis Ca] mutare bonum sit α hominis β 138 quod] quo Ca

140 Quod uero dicitur in Euangelio «Apud homines hoc est impossibile» diuissim
intelligitur, set cum quadam auctoritate: homo enim sua auctoritate, | idest sine
preuia gratia, intrare non potest, set illa auctoritas, scilicet preparatio gratie, dei
est.

B 87^{va}

145 Quod uero dicitur «Dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri» non est intelligendum
quod dederit eis aliquam potestatem gratuitam naturaliter precedentem omnes
uirtutes, set nomine potestatis intellige ipsas uirtutes quibus sunt iustificati, et
sic consecuti sunt hanc dignitatem ut sint filii dei. Et quia illa potestas est ipsa
fides uel quelibet alia uirtus, non enumeratur inter dona spiritus sancti. Vel sic
expone: «Dedit eis potestatem», scilicet uirtutem adoptionis | per quam fient
150 filii dei adoptione.

V 200^{rb}

Nota quod respectu qualitatis uel passionis nulla attenditur potentia, set tan-
tum respectu actus naturalis. Vnde hec “iste qui est in mortali potest esse iustus”
non alio modo est uera quam hec “antichristus potest esse”, ut scilicet ‘pote-
st’ nichil copulet set sit syncategorema. Similiter si ‘potest’ copulet, hec est falsa
155 “iste potest iustificari”. Vnde licet aliquid sit susceptibilitas gratie, quia suscipere
gratiam est agere, tamen nichil est iustificabilitas, quia iustificari est passium,
sicut nulla est potentia qua homo possit ledi, immo potius impotentia. Simil-
ter nulla est potentia resurgendi in corpore, quia resurgere non est actus nature,
immo est qualitas.

160 Item, nota differentiam inter uim naturalem que improprie dicitur potentia,
quia numquam copulatur per hoc uerbum ‘potest’, et potentiam facultatem | ui
assistantem; uerbi gratia gressibilitas est uis naturalis que numquam auferri po-
test subiecto manente, | siue possit gradi siue non, set numquam copulatur per
uerbum. Potentia uero qua subiectum potest gradi est facultas que est accidenta-
165 lis, quia potest auferri mutilatis pedibus; et ex ista potentia procedit tamquam ex
radice actus gradiendi. Similiter cursibilitas in paruulo est uis, nondum tamen
habet potentiam currendi, scilicet accidentalem. Vnde si hoc uerbum ‘potest’ co-
pulet, hec est falsa “iste puer unius diei potest currere”, sicut et hec “iste pauper
potest illi reddere centum marchas”.

L 32^{rb}R 18^{rb}

170 Eodem modo distingue cura uirtutes. Ipsa enim uirtus est quasi gratuita, et
facultas accidentalis ei assistens est potentia gratuita que semper attenditur re-
spectu actus informati uirtute, ut cum dicitur “iste habet potentiam merendi”

140–143 Ad 1.9. 144–150 Ad 1.5. 147–148 Ad 2.6. 151–159 Ad 2.2. 160–179 Cf.
Steph. Lang., q. 31 (*De libero arbitrio*), ed. Ebbesen – Mortensen, p. 188.

142 preuia] prima β 142 set] si β 142–143 dei est] dicitur β dicatur α 144–145 filios
dei ... aliquam potestatem] iter. LS 146–147 et sic] om. β 151 passionis] compassionis α
156 gratiam est Ca] inv. β est gratie V est L 161 copulatur] potentia add. β 161 facultatem]
facilitatem α 161 ui pCa] uirtuti sCa in β ut α 164 facultas] facilitas α 170 cura]
circa(?) LS 170 gratuita] uis praem. Ca 171 accidentalis] om. β 171 potentia]
quasi praem. β 172 informati] informata α

uel “potest mereri uel credere meritorie”. Secundum hoc enim hec est falsa “iste potest agere”, quia ex ui uocis non datur intelligi quod agere sit meritorium. Hec autem facultas naturaliter est posterior uirtute. Quod autem talis facultas gratuita sit aliquid, habes in fine ad Philippenses^{4, 13} super illud uerbum «Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat», ubi dicit glossa «Omnia possum facere in eo, idest per eius auxilium, qui me | confortat, idest in Christo qui michi possibilitatem tribuit».

B 87^{vb}A 227^{va}

Secundum has uarias acceptiones huius nominis ‘potentia’ uarie loquuntur auctoritates. Nam de facultate gratuita dicit Augustinus | «Hec potestas nulla est nisi a deo detur»; similiter ibi «Si potes credere» etc., et ibi «Quo ego uado, uos non potestis uenire modo»: licet enim apostoli haberent tunc facultatem gratuitam, tamen non poterant tunc uenire tales, ut locutio composita intelligatur. Illud uero «Apud homines hoc est impossibile», scilicet homines per se intrare, coniunctim intelligi potest. Deus enim potest facere per se ut homines intrent, set homines non possunt facere per se. Non enim est sensus “deus potest facere per homines ut homines intrent”, sicut cum dicitur “solus Sortes uidet se” non est sensus “nullus alius uidet Sortem”. Vel facilius: apud homines hoc est impossibile, ut scilicet conferant gratuitam | facultatem intrandi, set non apud deum. Et ita sicut uoluntas et scientia bene agendi est gratuita, ita et potentia.

S 22^{rb}Ca 177^{va}

Item, naturalis potentia credendi — scilicet liberi arbitrii — est inseparabilis, et fuit in diabolo et est; non | tamen concedendum quod habeat potentiam sperandi nisi hec ‘potentia sperandi’ sit circumlocutio, quia non potest sperare. Facultas uero gratuita numquam fuit in eo, quia non habuit gratiam, set facultas naturalis quam per obstinationem ammisit. Et bene potest esse quod per mortale in homine debilitatur et remittitur, et per gratiam liberatur. Et ita utraque istarum est uera “potentia credendi est naturalis”, “potentia credendi est gratuita”: una propter naturalem actum, alia propter informationem. Hanc autem facultatem gratuitam, que uulgariter ‘aises’ dici potest, non habent paruuli citra annos discretionis, licet habeant uirtutes. Eodem modo intelligendum est illud “posse habere fidem est nature, credere uero est gratie”, et etiam credere in

177–179 Cf. *gl. ord.* interl. in Phil. 4, 13, ed. Rusch, IV, 1114^{rb}: «Non solum scio, set possum exequi eo confortante qui docuit facere per eius auxilium, in Christo qui michi possibilitatem tribuit». 181–182 Ad 1.1. 182 Ad 1.3. 182–183 Ad 1.4. 185–191 Ad 1.9. 200 Communius ‘aise’, i.e. absentia obstaculi, facilitas vel oportunitas in lingua Franca.

175 posterior] merito *praem.* α 177 ubi *scripsi cum* β] ut αCa 188–189 solus Sortes uidet se non est sensus nullus alius uidet Sortem] Sortes non uidet se non est sensus set alius uidet Sortem immo quod alius uidet se sCa 192 liberi arbitrii] *om.* β 194 nisi hec ‘potentia sperandi’ sit] nec hec potentia sperandi sit α sit potentie β 194 sperare CaV] separare βL 195 facultas] facilitas α 195 facultas] facilitas α 197 debilitatur] debilitetur α 199 hanc] nam α 200 facultatem gratuitam] propter facilitatem α 200 que uulgariter aises dici potest] *om.* α 200 aises *scripsi cum* sCa] aizes pCa gratuitam β (*deest* α) 200–201 citra] circa α cura S 202 credere] habere autem gratie uel *praem.* α

actu est nature ut habeatur respectus ad actum. Si uero ‘credendi’ uel ‘peccandi’ sumatur qualitate, nichil est potentia credendi uel peccandi.

205 3. ITEM. Quomodo intelligendum illud «Unicuique secundum propriam uirtutem», ubi glossa «Non pro largitate uel parcitate dantis, set pro captu uirium unicuique dedit»? Ex quo uidetur quod secundum meliora naturalia uel maiorem habilitatem maior gratia detur, quod falsum est.

210 NON ENIM DICTVR ibi ‘talentum’ gratia, set officium siue status in hac uita, ut esse agricolam uel esse clericum, et sic de aliis que dominus secundum uires naturales hominis secundum facultatem nature donat. Aliquis enim saluatur | in actiua qui non saluaretur in contemplatiua, et econuerso.

R 18^{va}

205–206 Mt. 25, 15: «Et uni dedit quinque talenta, alii autem duo, alii uero unum, unicuique secundum propriam uirtutem: et profectus est statim». 206–207 *Gl. ord.* interl. in Mt. 25, 15, ed. Rusch, IV, 959^{ra}: «Non pro largitate uel parcitate alii plus, alii minus, sed pro uiribus accipientium».

207 quod] ex quo β 210 uel] quam α 210 que] om. α

GAUFRIDVS PICTAVIENSIS
QVAESTIONES THEOLOGIAE

*<Vtrum potentia credendi uel diligendi uel meritorie aliquid operandi
sit naturalis uel gratuita>*

Hodierna disputatione quesitum est utrum potentia credendi uel diligendi uel meritorie aliquid operandi sit naturalis uel gratuita. Quod sit gratuita probatur auctoritatibus et rationibus sic. 5

1.1. In Euangelio Iohannis^{1, 12}: «Dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri». Et glossa: «Mirabilis est illa potestas qua homo filius dei fieri potest». Nisi enim esset illa gratuita potestas, non dixisset magis 'dedit'. Et naturalis etiam potestas non est mirabilis, cum talis sit in omnibus peccatoribus.

1.2. Item, in Iohanne^{8, 21}: «Quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire». Hoc dixit dominus Iudeis; sic ergo, cum haberent naturalem potentiam, illa auctoritas est intelligenda de gratuita. 10

1.3. Item, «Si potes credere, omnia possibilis sunt credenti». Hoc <dixit> dominus patri demoniaci. Set constat quod naturalem habuit potentiam, ergo intelligenda est auctoritas de gratuitis. 15

1.4. Item, in Iohanne^{15, 5}: «Sine me nichil potestis facere», ergo ex naturali potestate non potest bene facere.

P 150^{vb} 1.5. Item, Mattheus^{19, 24}: «Facilius est camelum per foramen acus transire quam diuitem intrare in regnum celorum», ergo diues ex naturali potentia non potest mereri regnum | celorum, quia camelum intrare per foramen acus est impossibile. 20

1.6. Item, in eodem capitulo: «Que impossibilia sunt apud <hominem> possibilis sunt apud deum», ergo homo ex naturali potestate non potest mereri regnum celorum.

E 59^{rb}, P 150^{va}

1–2 Cf. Gaufr. Pict. *sum.* II, K1 46^{vb}–47^{rb}, Av 57^{va}–58^{rb}. 7 Cf. *gl. ord.* marg. in Io. 1, 12, ed. Rusch, IV, 1032^{vb}. 13 Mc. 9, 22.

5 auctoritatibus *scripsi*] autoribus *ms.* 20–21 est impossibile *scripsi*] est impossibile est P *om.* E

25 1.7. Item, Iohannes Damascenus super illum locum «Spiritus sanctus superueniet in te, et uirtus altissimi» etc.: «Spiritus sanctus peruenit ibi in beatam uirginem secundum uerbum domini quod dicit angelus purgans ipsam, et potentiam deitatis uerbi receptiuam preparans, simul et generatiuam». Si ergo gratuita
30 est portare Christum in mente», ergo a spiritu sancto datur generatiua potentia qua homo portet Christum in mente.

1.8. Item, dicit auctoritas «Quia Adam noluit non peccare cum posset, inflic-
tum ei non posse cum uelit». Si ergo ex naturali potestate non potest homo non
peccare, multo fortius non potest bene facere.

35 2. Rationibus idem probatur.

2.1. Quia cecus non potest uidere, eadem ratione cecus in anima non potest
esse uidens.

2.2. Item, sicut homo non potest surgere in corpore, eadem ratione non po-
test surgere in mente, cum «maius sit iustificare impium quam creare celum et
40 terram», et ita homo non habet potentiam resurgendi.

2.3. Item, dicit auctoritas «Dedit eis potestatem calcandi super serpentes». Si
ergo illa potestas fuit gratuita, eadem ratione potestas calcandi uitia.

3. CONTRA optatam partem sic obicitur.

3.1. Augustinus dicit «In nostra potestate est mutare uoluntatem in melius».

45 3.2. Item, Marcus⁴, 28: «Vltro terra fructificat». Et glossa: «Quia est in arbitrio hominis», et sic in potestate hominis est fructificare «primo herbam, deinde spicam, deinde plenum frumentum in spica», scilicet fidem, spem et caritatem.

3.3. Item, Apostolus ad Romanos², 14: «Cum gentes, que non habent legem, naturaliter ea, que legis sunt, faciunt, huiusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi
50 sunt lex», etc., ergo gentes naturaliter possunt facere que legis sunt, ergo habent naturalem potestatem faciendi opus meritorium.

25–26 Lc. 1, 35. 26–28 Cf. Ioh. Dam., *de fid. orth.* III, c. 46, n. 2, ed. Buytaert, 171 (PG 94, 983); uerbatim Petr. Lomb., *sent.* III, dist. 3, c. 1 (II, 32): «Post concessum autem sanctae Virginis, Spiritus Sanctus praeuenit in ipsam, secundum uerbum Domini quod dixit angelus, purgans ipsam, et potentiam deitatis Verbi receptiuam praeparans, simul autem et generatiuam». 29–30 Cf. Aug., *serm.* 72A (25), ed. Denis, 162–163 (PL 46, 937). 32–33 Cf. Petr. Lomb., *collect.* in Rom. 7, 17, PL 192, 1422B: «Quia enim continere cum posset noluit, inflictum est ei non posse cum uelit». 39–40 Cf. Aug., *in Io. eu.*, tr. 72, 3, ed. Mayer, CCL 36, 509: «...iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare quam impios iustificare. Certe enim si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae»; *gl. ord. marg.*, in Io. 14, 12, ed. Rusch, IV, 1049^{vb}: «Et maiora horum faciet: maius uidetur impios iustificare quam iustos creare». 41 Lc. 10, 19. 44 Aug., *retr.* I, c. 22, n. 4, ed. Mutzenbecher, CCL 57, p. 66, l. 59–60 (PL 32, 620). 45–46 *Gl. ord. interl.* in Mc. 4, 28, Rusch IV, 970^{va}.

29 et P] uel *sup. lin.* E 31 portet] per *add.* P 39 maius P] magis E 39 impium P] ipsum E 46 primo *mss.*] primum *Mc. 4, 28*

3.4. Item, auctoritas: «Anathema sit qui dicit deum precepisse quod homo non potest implere», ergo habet naturalem potestatem faciendi legem. Ad idem ualet illa auctoritas «Nemo peccat in eo quod uitare non potest». Item, ad idem ualet «Sedere a dextris uel a sinistris non est meum dare uobis», et auctoritas super illum locum: «Regnum celorum non est dantis set accipientis», ergo in potestate accipientis est habere regnum celorum. 55

3.5. Item, si iste non habet potestatem bene faciendi, ergo non peccat ex eo quod non bene facit.

3.6. Item, Augustinus dicit «Posse habere fidem sicut posse habere caritatem nature est hominum; habere autem fidem sicut habere caritatem gratie est fidelium». 60

SOLVTIO. Ad predictum diuersi diuersa sentiunt. Quidam autem dixerunt quod omnes ille locutiones false sunt in quibus post hoc uerbum ‘potest’ aliquid sequitur quod sit gratuitum, quia illud est supra posse nature. Vnde huiusmodi false sunt secundum eos “homo potest habere fidem”, “homo potest credere”, nisi forte hoc uerbum ‘potest’ <accipiatur> syncategorematicae. Alii distinguunt dicentes locutiones esse ueras in quibus post hoc uerbum ‘potest’ sequitur infinitiuus significans motum uel opus uirtutis, quia motus uel opus est ex libero arbitrio. Si autem ipsa uirtus significatur, non motus uel opus eius, false sunt locutiones, quia ipsa uirtus non est in potestate nostri arbitrii; si motus uel opus eius, ex libero arbitrio est, ita tamen quod principaliter a gratia. Huiusmodi ergo uere sunt “homo potest credere”, “homo potest mereri”; tales autem false “homo potest habere iustificationem”, “homo potest esse fidelis”, nisi hoc uerbum ‘potest’ syncategorematicae accipiatur. 70 75

Nos sine preiudicio aliter dicimus. Distinguimus enim in alia questione potentiam naturalem contra illam potentiam. Potentia naturalis bene uel male faciendi est liberum arbitrium;abilitas ad bonum naturaliter insita est ipsi potentie; abilitas ad malum | adquisita est per peccatum. Per hoc uerbum ergo ‘potest’ non copulatur prima potentia, set abilitas que est in potentia, <ut> cum 80
P 151^{ra}
E 59^{va} dicitur “iste potest | credere”, “iste potest habere fidem”. Si enim potentia prima copularetur, oporteret concedi quod Christus posset peccare et diabolus mereri uitam eternam, quia Christus habet liberum arbitrium eiusdem speciei cum

52–53 Cf. Aug., *c. Iul.* II, c. 18, 35, *PL* 44, 720. 54 Cf. Aug., *perf. iust.*, c. 2, *PL* 44, 293: «Si quod vitari non potest, peccatum non est: si quod vitari potest, potest homo sine peccato esse, quod vitari potest. Nulla enim ratio vel iustitia patitur saltem dici peccatum, quod vitari nullo modo potest». 55 Cf. Mt. 20, 23. 55–56 Ans. Laud., *en. in Mt.* 20, 23, *PL* 162, 1421B. 60–62 Aug., *praed. sanct.*, c. 5, n. 10, *PL* 44, 968. 76 In alia questione: cf. Gaufr. Pict., *q. <De corruptione naturalium>*, E 58^{va-vb}, P 149^{rb-vb}; *sum.*, Av 57^{ra}, Kl 46^{rb}.

53 habet *scripsi*] non habet *mss.* 55 uobis] *om.* P 57 accipientis *scripsi*] accipitis *mss.*
66 fidem] hec autem *add.* E 74 iustificationem *scripsi*] iusti E iustus P 77 contra E]
circa P

nostro, et diabolus cum angelis, nisi forte quod hoc uerbum ‘potest’ copulat ibi
85 primam potentiam prout est habitata. Set primo uerbo magis inheremus.

(ad 2.1.) Cum enim dico “iste cecus non potest uidere”, non abnegatur ibi po-
tentia, set habitus uel habitas. Sic ergo omnes iste uere sunt “iste potest habere
fidem”, “iste potest credere”, “iste potest mereri”, quia habitas illa siue habitus
90 naturalis ad omnia ista est. Nec concedendum est quod iste cecus potest uidere,
quia licet habeat potentiam naturalem, tamen perdidit habitum siue habitatem
uidendi que ibi copulatur. Simili modo non concedimus quod homo non possit
resurgere in corpore, quia nulla est in eo habitas resuscitandi corpus, cum in
omni homine sit necessitas moriendi.

Item, notandum quod licet illa habitas naturaliter sit in homine, tamen cor-
95 rumpitur per peccatum et reformatur per gratiam, unde dicitur dari quando
reformatur, et dicitur homo non posse ex illa bene facere quando impeditur per
peccatum eius usus, sicut homo habens lippitudinem uel aliquam infirmitatem
in oculo dicitur non posse uidere non quia perdidit habitum, set quia perdidit
facultatem.

100 Secundum predicta ergo exponende sunt auctoritates que propositae sunt.

(ad 1.1.) Et primo illa «Dedit eis potestatem», idest eam reformauit que prius
per peccatum erat deformata, et illa potestas dicitur mirabilis non in quantum
est naturalis, set in quantum est reformata per gratiam. Vel distinguamus tripli-
cem potestatem: potestatem prime potentie, et potestatem habitas naturalis,
105 et potestatem gratie. Ipsa enim uirtus potest dici ‘potestas’, idest facultas bene
operandi, et secundum hoc ad litteram “dedit eis nouam potestatem”.

(ad 1.2-3.) Item, «Si potes credere» simili modo exponatur duobus modis,
idest “si habes gratuitam potentiam uel naturalem habitatem reformatam per
gratiam”. Eodem modo et illa «Quo ego uado uos non potestis uenire», uel
110 suppleatur ‘tales’.

(ad 1.5.) Illa autem auctoritas «Facilius est camelum» etc. quattuor modis ex-
ponitur. (1) Vel ut comparatio impossibile ad impossibile: magis est enim im-
possibile diuitem, idest amantem diuitias existentem talem, intrare in regnum
celorum, quam camelum intrare per foramen acus (ad litteram). Inter impossi-
bilia enim aliquid est magis uel minus impossibile alio. (2) Vel fiat comparatio
difficilis ad difficile sic: facilius est — deposito honore — camelum transire per
foramen acus, idest per strictum uicum in Ierusalem qui ita uocabatur, quam di-
uites huius mundi graui diuitiarum transire per artam uiam que ducit ad uitam.
115 (3) Vel facilius est camelum, idest gentilitatem gibba peccatorum deformem —
deposito honore — intrare per artam uiam, quam diuitem Iudeum de sua iustitia
120

97 Lippitudinem: i.e. infirmitatem oculorum.

101 illa P] *om. E* 101 que P] quia E 109 uado] *iter. P* 118 mundi graui *scripsi*] mundi
deposito honore graui *ms.* 119 gibba *scripsi*] giba E gibo P

superbientem intrare in regnum celorum. (4) Vel facilius est camelum nostrum, idest Christum qui tulit honus peccatorum nostrorum per foramen acus, idest per angustias mortis, intrare, quam homines ueteri uite deditos eum per artam uiam sequi.

(ad 1.6.) Quod autem sequitur «Que impossibilia sunt apud homines, possibilia sunt apud deum» uariis similiter modis potest exponi, scilicet (1) ut ponatur impossibile pro difficili; quod enim difficile est apud homines facile est apud deum; (2) uel sic determinetur “que impossibilia sunt apud homines quantum ad se ipsos; ex se enim intrare non possunt sine gratia, quia sine me, idest sine gratia mea — dicit dominus — nichil potestis facere”. Est enim homo spiritus uadens per se et non rediens per se. 125 130

(ad 1.7.) Item, auctoritas illa Iohannis Damasceni, scilicet «Spiritus sanctus superueniet in te» etc. sic intelligitur: “preparans potentiam”, idest conferens gratie habundantiam per quam digna, idest | conuersa, fuit concipere filium dei. Non enim intelligendum est quod spiritus sanctus dederit ei aliquam naturalem potentiam ex qua uirgo parere posset. Si enim haberet illam potentiam siue potestatem, usus eius esset naturalis, quia ex potestate naturalis procedit actus. Set in hoc fuit miraculum quod nulla tali potestate concessa peperit uirgo. 135

(ad 3.) Auctoritates autem ex <op>posita parte inducte sic intelligende sunt quod ex naturali potestate adiuta per gratiam hoc potest bene facere et mereri, non tamen per se. «In nostra ergo potestate — supple: adiuta per gratiam — est uoluntatem mutare in melius». Sic esse supplendum ipse autem uult, unde subiungit “set illa potestas nulla est nisi a deo detur”, idest non sufficit illa potestas per se nisi fuerit adiuta per gratiam. Eodem modo «Terra fructificat ultro», non tamen sine pluuiis; ita nec liberum arbitrium sine gratia, «quia est in libero arbitrio hominis» adiuto — supple — per gratiam, quod etiam ex glossa habetur. Sic omnes similes auctoritates exponende sunt. 140 145

122 per foramen acus P] *om.* E 126 potest P] possunt E 129 se] ipso *add.* E
 133 sic *scripsi*] sicut *mss.* 138 quod] in *add.* E 139 inducte] inductem E 142 uoluntatem *scripsi*] uoluntate *mss.* 146 quod E] quia P

STEPHEN LANGTON AND GEOFFREY OF POITIERS ON THE NATURAL POWER TO BELIEVE

S U M M A R Y

The article discusses the problem of the natural potentiality involved in faith. Stephen Langton and his disciple, Geoffrey of Poitiers, defend the view that the human being has a natural ability to believe, and by believing they intend acts and movements of a meritorious virtue. However, the two thinkers offer different interpretations of this natural ability. This difference makes it possible to ascribe a small group of anonymous questions to Geoffrey rather than to his English master. The article concludes with a critical edition of two theological questions by Geoffrey of Poitiers and Stephen Langton.

KEYWORDS: the virtue of faith, the natural power to believe, Stephen Langton, Geoffrey of Poitiers

SŁOWA KLUCZE: cnota wiary, naturalna zdolność wiary, Stefan Langton, Godfryd z Poitiers