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LANGUAGE AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE REALITY IN GRAMMATICAL TEXTS FROM KRAKOW IN THE 15TH CENTURY. THE MODIST INHERITANCE

“Propterea sermonis est ordinata communicatio, ut praesto forent mutuae voluntatis indicia”:¹ this quotation, from Calcidius’ translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, was the motto of the 13th century modist grammarians in their attempts to specify the scientific goal of grammar as the discipline responsible for the transmission of concepts and emotions from one human subject to another. In the modistically inspired grammar of John of Glogovia (1445–1507),² presented at the end of the 15th century at the University of Krakow, this reference to Plato follows the statement: “Sermo significativus est aggregatum ex pluribus vocibus, per quod unus potest alteri exprimere mentis conceptum.”³ In agreement with the modist tradition, this specific language relation between people is possible

¹ PLATO, *Timaeus*, 47c–d, in: *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus*, edited by J.H. Waszink, London: The Warburg Institute, 1962, p. 44–45; cf. BOETHIUS DACUS, *Modi significandi sive Quaestiones super Priscianum Maiorem*, edited by J. Pinborg, H. Roos, P.J. Jensen, (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 4), Hauniae: G.E.C. GAD, 1969, p. 22: “Finis grammaticae est, ut alteri conceptus et affectus exprimamus, secundum quod vult Plato in Timaeo: ‘ad hoc datus est nobis sermo, ut praesto fiant mutuae voluntatis indicia.’”

² For more information on John of Glogovia’s modism see: K. KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ, “*Modi significandi* in Johannes Glogoviensis’ grammar”, *Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos*, vol. 23 (2004), p. 53–65; EADEM, “Ioannes Glogoviensis: The Modist Grammarian on the Boundary between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” *Przegląd Tomistyczny*, vol. 9 (2003), p. 123–139; EADEM, “Johannes Glogoviensis’ Concept of Construction,” *Logic, Language, Methodology. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric*, vol. 6 [19] (2003), p. 31–39; EADEM, *Jan z Głogowa i tradycja gramatyki spekulatywnej*, Warszawa: Semper, 2008. The latter book is in Polish, for the *Summary* in English, see p. 392–398.

³ IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Quaestio tertia*, edited by K. Krauze-Błachowicz, *Wokół średniowiecznej filozofii języka*, edited by A. Górniak, (Studia nad Dziejami Filozofii Starożytnej

thanks to the modes of signification, which are ultimately grounded in reality through the mediation of modes of understanding. Language categories are secondary to the real modes of being of things and modes of understanding common to all people, making it possible for them to achieve mutual understanding.⁴

In this paper I will show how John of Glogowia and some of his post-Modist Krakow predecessors dealt with the problems of semantic adequacy, binding some particular language categories with the things to which they referred. We will see that not only the original Modist solutions but also the ideas of 14th century conceptualists and of traditional positive grammarians were taken into account in this late mixed grammatical tradition.⁵

i Średniowiecznej, 1), Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2002, p. 171–188, especially p. 183: “Sermo significativus est aggregatum ex pluribus vocibus, per quod unus potest alteri exprimere mentis conceptum. Dicit enim Plato in Timaeo: ‘Ad hoc datus est nobis sermo, ut mutuo voluntatis fiant indicia.’”

⁴For general information on the theory of the modes of signification see: R. VAN DER LECQ, “Modistae,” *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by H. Lagerlund, Berlin: Springer, 2011, p. 806–808. A great number of studies on the theory of the *modi significandi* and of many editions of the *modistae* were published in the second half of 20th and the first decade of 21st century. The bibliography by E.J. ASHWORTH, *The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1977; and its continuation by F. PIRONET, *The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar. A Bibliography (1977–1994)*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1997, contain all important publications. The pioneering research on the subject was done by J. PINBORG in his monumental *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter*, Münster – Kopenhagen: Aschendorff – Verlag Arne-Frost Hansen, 1967; and by G.L. BURSILL-HALL in his *Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages: The Doctrine of the “Partes Orationis” of the “Modistae,”* Hague: Mouton, 1971. Their efforts were preceded by M. Grabmann’s research (e.g. M. GRABMANN, *Thomas von Erfurt und die Sprachlogik des mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus*, [Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, 2], München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1943) and R. Gansiniec’s studies and editions published posthumously in R. GANSINIEC, *Metrifocale Marka z Opatowca i traktaty grammatyczne XIV i XV wieku*, (Studia Staropolskie, 6), Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1960. Further developments can be found e.g. in I. ROSIER, *La grammaire spéculative des Modistes*, Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1980; C. MARMO, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella scholastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330*, Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1994; IDEM, “The Semantics of the Modistae,” *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, edited by S. Ebbesen, R.L. Friedman, Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999, p. 83–104; L.G. KELLY, *The Mirror of Grammar. Theology, Philosophy and the Modistae*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2002. The bibliography relevant for Modism and especially for the topic of this paper up to the year 2007 can be found in: K. KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ, *Jan z Głogowa i tradycja gramatyki spekulatywnej*, p. 327–340.

⁵The conceptualist criticism and developments of grammar and in particular the changes of the concept of signification are presented in the following works: J. PINBORG, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter*, p. 106–109; L. KACZMAREK, “*Modi significandi* and their Destructors. A 14th Century Controversy about Methodological Issues in the Science and Theory of

Accordingly, in the first part of this paper (1) I will recall the Modists' methodological assumption concerning the invention of the modes of signification and its later post-Modist interpretations. Secondly, I will present (2) a couple of Modist and post-Modist attempts at finding the real grounds for some grammatical forms (modes of signification) apparently incompatible with reality, i.e., the modes of being that should be reflected in those forms.

(1)

There is an old grammatical introductory *accessus* question preserved in grammar through the end of the Middle Ages: "Who invented grammar? Was a grammarian competent enough to do it?" In the 13th century it was obvious that this question was connected with the search for the metaphysical basis of grammar and not the search for the first actual grammarian. The Modist approach made the discussion more sophisticated by taking into account that *modi significandi* were derived from *modi essendi*. The first grammarian should have been a philosopher, and moreover, while occupying himself with the modes of being, he should actually have been a metaphysician. We can find this opinion in the works of Boethius of Dacia and John of Dacia.⁶ Michael of Marbais also said that such an "inventor of grammar" was not a pure grammarian, he was a grammarian and a philosopher of nature.⁷ Thus, on the one hand, the Modists claimed that grammar was a separate domain of knowledge and on the other,

Language," *Fallstudien zur Historiographie der Linguistik: Heraklit, d'Ailly und Leibniz*, edited by K.D. Dutz, P. Schmitter, Münster: Universität, 1985, p. 21–33; IDEM, *Destructiones modorum significandi und ihre Destructionen*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1994; J. BIARD, *Logique et Théorie du signe au XIV^e siècle*, (Études de Philosophie Médiévale, 64), Paris: Vrin, 1989, p. 238–288; C.H. KNEEPKENS, "On the Notion of *Constructio* in Conceptualist Grammar: *Quaestio XXXV* of the Doctrinale-Commentary Preserved in Erfurt, Amplon. Q70A and Attributed to a Master Marcilius," *Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the International Marsilius of Inghen Symposium*, edited by H.A.G. Braakhuis, M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1992, p. 143–172; cf. J. PINBORG, "A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 29 [113] (1975), p. 286–296. For the information on the continuation of conceptualist current in Krakow post-modist grammar, see: K. KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ, "Was Conceptualist Grammar in Use at Krakow University?," *Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne*, vol. 6 [41] (2008), p. 275–285.

⁶BOETHIUS DACUS, *Modi significandi*, Qu. 1: "Primo ergo quaerendum est de inventione grammaticae, quis invenerit grammaticam, an sit grammaticus an philosophus", p. 4–10; JOHANNES DACUS, *Summa gramatica*, edited by A. Otto, in: IDEM, *Opera*, (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 1), Hauniae: G.E.C. GAD, 1955, p. 68–71.

⁷MICHAEL DE MARBASIO, *Summa de modis significandi*, edited by L.G. Kelly, Stuttgart – Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1995, p. 6: "Nam ille qui invenit grammaticam et dictiones imposuit ad significandum debuit habere cognitionem rei significandae et vocis quae ei debuit imponi. In considerando ipsam rem fuit naturalis et in considerando vocem secundum quod huius-

they claimed that it was rooted in philosophy. In the 15th century, Michael of Marbais's comment that the first inventor of grammar was a grammarian and a natural philosopher at the same time⁸ turned out to be more attractive than Boethius's opinion that a grammarian is also a metaphysician. This may be an interesting trait showing that grammar had also felt the consequences of the 14th century attempts to move the focus from metaphysics to the philosophy of nature, traces of which can be seen also in John of Glogovia.⁹ His question concerning the relation between grammar and natural philosophy is not a naïve one. He does not ask who invented grammar but rather whether the teaching found in the second part of Alexander (syntax, *diasynthetica*) is a "necessary science." In this context, he emphasizes the role of original interrelation between grammar and what he calls: "natural philosophy," which in this context means the domain of theoretical, i.e. real, sciences including physics and metaphysics.¹⁰

The old question (Who invented grammar? Was he a philosopher?) can only be found in one Krakow grammatical manuscript, i.e. in the Donatus commentary (BJ 1946) written by an anonymous Krakow teacher at some time between 1445–1465. The *dubitatio* used by Boethius of Dacia is repeated here: grammar could not have been invented by a grammarian, for this would result in an absurd conclusion that grammar had existed before grammar came into existence (*grammatica fuisset ante inventionem grammaticae, quod est absurdum*). In his reply, the author introduces the concept of a "natural grammarian" (*grammaticus naturalis*), who dealt only with modes of being. As a result, he was an "imperfect grammarian" (*grammaticus imperfectus*), even though his grammar had a universal character. A "perfect grammarian" (*grammaticus perfectus*) must have invented grammar *a posteriori*, and his grammar is derived not only from the modes of

smodi, sed in tribuendo ei rationem significandi fuit grammaticus. Et sic impositor dictionum grammaticalium non fuit purus grammaticus."

⁸ GERARDUS DE ZUPHANIA, *Prima pars Doctrinalis Alexandri cum sententiis notabilibus*, Coloniae: Heinrich Quentell, 1498, fol. a2r: "Fuit naturalis philosophus et grammaticus, quia consideravit congruitatem, que est existens in proportione modorum significandi et illi modi sumuntur originaliter secundum modistas a modis essendi rerum. Sed cognitio illorum spectat ad philosophum et utebatur vocibus, quarum consideratio spectat ad grammaticam. Ergo simul fuit grammaticus et philosophus."

⁹ JAN Z GŁOGOWA, "Komentarz do ksiąg Arystotelesa *O duszy*," translated by J. Domański, *700 lat myśli polskiej. Filozofia i myśl społeczna XIII–XV wieku*, edited by J. Domański, Warszawa: PWN, 1978, p. 412.

¹⁰ IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Exercitium secunde partis Alexandri*, Cracoviae: Johannes Haller, 1517, fol. a2v: "Dico verum argumentum concludit, quod regimen et constructio secundum se considerata absolute sunt res contingentes. Sed in quantum resolvuntur et reducuntur in modos essendi rerum a quibus originaliter causantur, necessitatem habent. Dictum enim est ante, quod regimen et constructio oriuntur a proportione modorum significandi, modi significandi accipiuntur a modis intelligendi, modi intelligendi a modis essendi. Constat autem quod modi essendi rerum sunt necessarii ex quo de ipsis est scientia et philosophia naturalis."

being but also modes of cognition (*modi cognoscendi*). Moreover, his grammar is — and here the anonymous author deviates from the classical Modists — a grammar of a particular language (not only Latin or Greek, but also Polish and other vernaculars) and has an accidental character. The author also says that mental grammar is a universal one because of the universality of human concepts. From this example one can see how conceptual grammar was superimposed on the old Modist thought. The author is not very clear, but we may guess that mental grammar, albeit not perfect, is the foundation of particular — perfect — grammars.¹¹

(2)

According to the Modists, the substantive was a part of speech whose mode of signification and mode of understanding are caused by the mode of being of substance and permanence. A noun denoted stability that was specific of a substance. Thus, the mode of being of substance seems to be the first and most suitable category if one wants to talk about the reflection of the real, i.e. Aristotelian, world of substances within the categories of modes of signification. Thomas of Erfurt and other Modists, however, were fully aware that, as Jack Zupko said: “Tidy conceptual schemes tend to become less so when confronted with the facts.”¹² Questions were raised concerning the mode of signification of names signifying fictions (like “Chimera,” “goat-stag,” “golden mountain”) or names of privation (like “blindness”) as well as the mode of signification of the feminine gender of names referring to God or deity (the feminine gender was

¹¹ ANONYMUS, *Commentarium in Artem minorem Aelii Donati*, ms. BJ 1946, fol. 168v–169r: “Secundum dubitatur, utrum ille, qui invenit grammaticam, fuit grammaticus. Videtur quod non, quia si sic, tunc grammatica fuisset ante inventionem grammaticae, quod est absurdum. Respondetur quod ille, qui invenit grammaticam, fuit grammaticus naturalis. [...] Ille fuit grammaticus imperfectus, quia habuit grammaticam universalem solum ex modis essendi. Sed grammaticus a posteriori, qui invenit grammaticam a posteriori, fuit perfectus, quia non solum habuit grammaticam ex principiis essendi sed etiam ex principiis cognoscendi et sic habuit grammaticam particularem. Unde taliter sive secundum modum hunc aliquis potest intelligere significatum primi vocabuli in suo idiomate [...] enim puer audit aliquem frequenter dicere ‘panis’ in Latino aut Polonico et videt signati ad monstrationem ut quia clamanti panem datur illa res: panis, et si hoc saepius percipit, virtute intellectus concludit, quod vox ista illam rem significat. Et sic sensus, memoria et experientia ducunt puerum [...] ad notitiam primi vocabuli. Unde grammatica mentalis est eadem apud omnes homines, quia conceptus sive rerum similitudines sunt eadem apud omnes homines, ut habitur primo *Perihermeneias*. Sed vocalis et scripta non est eadem apud omnes homines, quia alias voces habent Latini, alias Graeci etc.”

¹² J. ZUPKO, “Thomas of Erfurt,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2015 Edition), edited by E.N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/erfurt/> (accessed 2018-12-06); cf. J. PINBORG, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter*, p. 121.

traditionally understood as passive and God and deity as active). All such modes of signification were explained in some way or another by the activity of intellect that produced modes of understanding proper for justifying the function of the above names and thus for grounding them in reality.¹³ The examples and solutions offered by Thomas of Erfurt are widely known and can be easily traced in the output of the late Krakow grammarians. But to understand some of John of Glogovia's considerations one has to turn to a couple of traits preserved from the earlier Modist tradition, namely from John of Dacia or at least from someone connected to this author. According to John of Dacia, "the word signifies a concept of mind, by means of which it signifies a thing, and since the concept happens to be a concept of being and of non-being, it is obvious that the word is constituted to signify being and non-being as well."¹⁴ We can use words to signify everything that is subject to our cognitive power sensible and non-sensible, beings and non-beings alike.¹⁵ Among non-beings, there are potential beings, e.g. matter that can be signified by its analogy or proportion to form (*per quamdam analogiam et proportionem ad formam*).¹⁶ Imaginative beings like a golden mountain, chimera and a goat stag are also counted among non-beings and they are signified thanks to some attribution of being. We can imagine these things, because we know and can imagine the real parts that form them, e.g. gold and mountain. Another group of non-beings is formed by those that are neither actual, nor potential, nor fictitious beings and are known as beings *secundum quid*. They are non-beings intelligible *per speciem alterius*.¹⁷ For instance, privation is intelligible thanks to the intelligibility of the positive state (*habitus*).¹⁸

¹³ THOMAS OF ERFURT, *Grammatica speculativa*, edited and translated by G.L. Bursill-Hall, London: Longman, 1972, p. 136–141; cf. J. ZUPKO, "Thomas of Erfurt."

¹⁴ JOHANNES DACUS, *Summa gramatica*, p. 201: "vox imponitur ad significandum conceptum mentis et mediante illo rem significat, et quia contingit conceptum mentis esse entis et non entis, ideo patet vox institui ad significandum tam ens quam non ens."

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 203: "Ad istam questionem dicendum, quod quodlibet genus entis, quod cadere potest sub cognitione nostra significatum potest esse per vocem. [...] De omni genere entis contingit loqui, et scilicet de sensibilibus et insensibilibus, et mutuo contingit alterum alteri de ipsis exprimere suas voluntates."

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 200: "quamvis materia per suam quidditatem non est intelligibilis, est tamen intelligibilis per quamdam analogiam et proportionem ad formam."

¹⁷ *Ibidem*: "Aliter aliquid autem intelligitur per speciem alterius, ut privatio intelligitur per suum habitum et sic de consimilibus;" cf. note 19.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 201–202: "Uno modo non ens actu, potentia tamen ens, [...] ut materia. Alio modo est non ens, quod nec potentia nec actu est ens, habet tamen aliquam ymaginationem alicuius entis, quia ad modum entis alicuius cadentis sub ymaginatione sicut mons eneus vel aureus. Ymaginando enim montem et aurum vel es imaginabitur mons mons aureus vel eneus. Similiter autem est de chimera et de yrocervo [...]. Et talia non entia et etiam non entia primo modo significari possunt per vocem, secundum quod habent aliquam attributionem ad ens. Tertio modo aliquid est non ens, quod nec actu, nec potentia est ens, nec entis ymaginationem habet,

According to John of Dacia, every intelligible thing can be signified,¹⁹ yet there is a question concerning the naming of God, who does not seem to be fully intelligible to us. John's answer is that God is intelligible by means of His effects (*per species suorum effectuum*), thanks to which we can give Him a signifying name.²⁰

It is concluded by John of Dacia that a thing signified by a name does not have to be a substance, since it is the concept that makes a name significative. It is sufficient to have a concept of substance, a concept of accident or the concept of privation of them to constitute a name.²¹ John says that both Priscian's "substance" contained in the definition of a name (*Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare*)²² and a "thing and body" included in Donatus' definition (*nomen quid est? "pars orationis cum casu corpus aut rem proprie communiterue significans"*)²³, are a *significatum*, a mental concept that refers to every essence: *essentia huius modi quae in nullo genere est*.²⁴ The signified thing cannot be univocally called "essence," because God, whiteness, chimera, and nothingness have nothing in common univocally, but rather analogically.²⁵

et tale ens nullo modo cadit in intellectu nec per consequens significari potest per vocem, quia vox est indicativa intellectus. Sed si non ens aliquo modo per privationem entis in actu vel entis in potentia intelligatur, sic significari potest, quod exprimimus per hoc, quod est inpotentiale et non est ens simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia apud intellectum est ens."

¹⁹Ibidem, p. 200: "Juxta quod intellige, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit intelligibile, sufficit, quod vel per speciem suam sit intelligibile ut homo, vel per effectus ut deus, vel per analogiam ad formam ut materia, vel quolibet alio modo [...] Juxta quod adhuc notandum, quod aliquid intelligi est duobus modis vel per propriam speciem, ut homo per propriam speciem et per proprium fantasma cognoscitur. Aliter aliquid autem intelligitur per speciem alterius, ut privatio intelligitur per suum habitum et sic de consimilibus. Quicquid autem intelligitur hoc modo vel illo, potest esse significatum vocabuli, ideo etc."

²⁰Ibidem: "Cum dicitur, quod deus est significatum vocabuli, concedatur. Et cum dicitur, quod ipse non est intelligibilis, dicendum ad hoc per per interemptionem, quia quamquam deus per speciem suam non est intelligibilis, ipse nichilominus tamen per species suorum effectuum est intelligibilis."

²¹Ibidem, p. 266: "quicumque mentis conceptus sufficit ad faciendum vocem nominalem significativam, ut patet volenti experiri penes se. Conceptus enim substantialis bene facit vocem significativam, et accidens et privatio horum;" cf. ibidem, p. 264.

²²PRISCIANUS, *Institutiones*, edited by M. Hertz, (Grammatici Latini [GL], 2), Lipsiae: Teubner, 1857, p. 55.

²³AELIUS DONATUS, *Ars Minor*, edited by H. Keil, (GL, 4), Lipsiae: Teubner, 1864, p. 355.

²⁴JOHANNES DACUS, *Summa gramatica*, p. 266: "significatum nominis, [...] est quicumque conceptus mentis [...]. Sic autem acceptus se extendit ad omnem essentiam [...] et essentia huius modi, que generaliter significatum nominis est, in nullo genere est."

²⁵Ibidem, p. 267: "significatum nominis non potest esse aliquid univocum. Nam deo, homini, albedini et chimere et nichilo, nichil est commune univocum, sed ens seu essentia dicta est de ipsis vel equivoce vel saltem analogice."

First of all, a significate of name should be substance, yet generally it is some *essentia per se* or *per accidens*, that can be found either outside the mind or in it.²⁶

Against such a background, it is easier to understand John of Glogovia's solutions. His answer concerning fictions follows the common grammatical tradition. He says that fictitious names do not signify real things. It is enough for them to signify imaginable things. Thus names can signify impossible things (*impossibile est significabile*).²⁷ John of Glogovia then asks how it is possible to signify God by means of the mode of determinate apprehension. According to him God is not cognizable *a priori* in a determinate way. However, since the human mind cognizes God through His effects *a posteriori*, the determinate intellectual apprehension of God is possible. Thus, signifying God by the mode of signification of a determinate apprehension is possible as well (*Deus non est determinate cognoscibilis a priori sed bene a posteriori per effectus*).²⁸

The mode of signification of the first matter is also a subject of argument. The name "matter" should not be a name, because names are endowed with the mode of determinate apprehension. But how to deal with the fact that matter is a pure potentiality?²⁹ Glogovia's answer is in the spirit of John of Dacia: First matter

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 267–268: "significatum nominis primum in ordine rerum est substantia, universaliter autem significatum nominis non est substantia, sed quaecumque essentia vel per se vel per accidens, vel essentia, que esse habet extra intellectum vel apud intellectum."

²⁷ IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Declaratio Donati minoris de octo partibus orationis cum pulcherrimis quaestionibus admodum studiosis scholaribus proficua*, Lipsiae: Wolfgang Stöckl, 1500, fol. 21r–v: "Chimera, similiter alia nomina ficta, non significant corpus aut rem directe, tamen indirecte, quia significant illud quod per partes suae definitionis exprimitur, ut caput virgineum, ventrem leoninum et caudam serpentinam. Vel etiam possumus dicere, quod licet nomina ficta non significant rem veram, tamen sufficit quod significant rem imaginabilem et quae potest imaginari. Correlarie sequitur, quod impossibile est significabile;" cf. ibidem, fol. 22r: "Aliquod est nomen, quod non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis. Probatur, de isto nomine 'chimera', quod non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis. Patet, quia chimera non est intelligibilis. Probatur, quia dicitur III *De anima*: 'non ens non intelligitur.' Modo chimera non est ens et per consequens 'chimera' non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis. Dico verum argumentum concludit, quod hoc nomen 'chimera' non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis directe, tamen indirecte. Non ens enim non intelligitur directe, sed indirecte, imaginamur enim chimeram esse, licet non sit."

²⁸ Ibidem, fol. 21v–22r: "aliquod est nomen, quod non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis, igitur modus significandi nominis non valet. Probatur: Nomen 'deus' non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis. Probatur, quia Deus non potest cognosci a nobis determinate. Dicitur enim II *Metaphisicae*: 'sicut se habet oculus nocte ad lumen solis, ita se habet intellectus noster ad ea, quae manifestissima sunt in natura;' et III *De anima*, quod nihil est in intellectu nisi, prius fuerit in sensu. Constat autem, quod Deus non est sensibilis, Deum enim nemo vidit unquam, ut dicit scriptura. Dico, verum argumentum concludit, quod Deus non est determinate cognoscibilis a priori, sed bene a posteriori per effectus."

²⁹ Ibidem, fol. 22r: "Aliquod est nomen, quod non significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis, ergo modus significandi nominis non valet. Probatur, quia hoc nomen materia non

is not intelligible as such, but it is sufficient for it to be understood by analogy and disposition to form (*sufficit quod est intelligibilis in analogia et habitudine ad formam*).³⁰

Last but not least, Glogovia's attempts to explain why a name is to signify substance even though its *significatum* is not always a substance. Thanks to the earlier explanation known from John of Dacia, we can better understand Glogovia's argument that substance is generally understood as essence and this way even accidents happen to have essence and proper nature (*essentiam et naturam propriam*).³¹

When John of Dacia posed questions concerning the names of God and non-beings, he was interested in the problem of signification and the role of the intellect — old topics common to both grammar and the logical commentaries on hermeneutics. In Thomas of Erfurt's work, the same discussion was to be found under the heading: "what does the mode of signifying basically originate from," and it was translated into the language of modes of signification. The late post-Modist tradition joined those threads together, the result of which can be seen in John of Glogovia's grammar.

The post-Modist grammarians of the 14th and early 15th century once again introduced references to logic into their commentaries. The traces of such an attitude and the remnants of Buridan's influence can be found in the grammatical texts of Glogovia's predecessors. The above-mentioned anonymous author of the Donatus commentary preserved in the manuscript BJ 1946 says that names signify things as they are or — in the case of fictitious names — in accordance with the parts of their description. John Buridan is the authority invoked by our author in this context.³²

significat per modum determinatae apprehensionis. Probat: quia materia non est intelligibilis. Probat: quia materia prima est ens in pura potentia, ut dicitur I *Physicorum*. Modo omne quod intelligitur intelligitur ut est ens in actu, ut dicitur XII *Metaphysicae*."

³⁰Ibidem: "Dico: verum argumentum concludit, quod materia prima non est intelligibilis secundum se, tamen sufficit quod est intelligibilis in analogia et habitudine ad formam."

³¹Ibidem, fol. 23v: "Secundo capitur substantia communiter ut tantum valet sicut essentia. Et sic capitur, cum dicitur: 'omne nomen significat substantiam.' Accidentia enim ita habent essentiam et naturam propriam sicut substantia, licet non ita perfectam naturam sicut substantia, ut declarat Doctor Sanctus in tractatu *De quidditatibus rerum*;" ibidem, fol. 24v: "Aliquod est nomen, quod non significat substantiam. Probat, quia 'albedo,' 'nigredo' sunt nomina et tamen non significant substantiam sed accidens. Modo accidens et substantia sunt primo diversa. Dico: verum argumentum concludit, quod hoc nomen 'albedo,' 'nigredo' non significat substantiam capiendi substantiam proprie. Sed bene communiter, qualiter hic debet capi."

³²ANONYMUS, *Commentarium in Artem minorem Aelii Donati*, fol. 174v: "Dicitur secundum se vel secundum partes suarum descriptionis propter nomina ficta ut 'chimera,' 'hircocervus,' 'tragelaphus' etc., quae non significant aliquid secundum se, quia nulla res est illorum significato correspondens, sed significant secundum partes suarum descriptionum, ut dicit Buridanus."

As for gender, let us turn our attention to one example which Glogovia took from the previous tradition. According to him, and to the old *modistae* as well, if we take into account the definition of gender, “gender is the active mode of signifying by means of which a noun consignifies the property of being active or passive,”³³ and further “feminine gender is the mode of consignifying the thing by means of the property of being acted upon,”³⁴ we will face a problem with the name “deity.” Its mode of signifying should refer to the mode of existence of being passive or acted upon, which is not possible in case of God. Following the footsteps of classical Modists, John of Glogovia says that the name “deity” does not signify by means of the property of God being passive of himself, but according to our imagination. We imagine God, as it were, being acted upon by our prayers.³⁵

The Modists never reached an agreement concerning the definition of the mode of signifying of an interjection. Donatus’ definition: “an interjection is a part of speech signifying the affection of mind (*mentis affectus*) expressed with confused voice”³⁶ was everybody’s starting point. There was a controversy about the status of an interjection as a sign — whether it is natural or conventional — and about the status of an interjection as a part of speech. *Mentis affectus* was sometimes understood as an affection of the soul, confused voice (*incondita*) was changed with time into *incognita* — unknown. Donatus’s definition prompted the discussion about the rational and irrational phenomena occurring in the soul. A list of views and disagreements among medieval pre-Modist and Modist grammarians can be found in the works of Maloney, Rosier, and Kelly.³⁷ Some of them were still present in the milieu of late medieval Krakow.

In the Krakow manuscript BJ 2461 preceding the times of John of Glogovia, we find an interesting specimen of the conceptualist and the same time Modist grammar, i.e. anonymous *Quaestiones super Artem minorem Aelii Donati*.

³³IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Declaratio Donati minoris*, fol. 36v: “Unde genus in communi describitur sic secundum auctorem *Modorum significandi*: ‘Genus est modus significandi nominis attributus nomini mediante quo sub proprietate activa vel passiva consignificat.’”

³⁴Ibidem: “Genus femininum est modus significandi nominis attributus nomini mediante quo sub proprietate passiva consignificat, ut ‘mulier,’ ‘petra.’”

³⁵Ibidem, fol. 37r-v: “nomen ‘deitas’ non significat rem sub proprietate passiva secundum se, tamen secundum imaginationem nostram. Nos enim imaginamur deum pati ab orationibus et petitionibus nostris, quas suscipit, modo recipere et pati.”

³⁶AELIUS DONATUS, *Ars minor*, p. 366: “Pars orationis significans mentis affectum voce incondita.” Cf. ibidem, p. 391: “Interiectio est pars orationis interiecta aliis partibus orationis ad exprimendos animi affectus.”

³⁷T.S. MALONEY, “The Semiotics of Roger Bacon,” *Mediaeval Studies*, vol. 45 (1983), p. 120–154; I. ROSIER, “La grammaire dans le *Guide de l’étudiant*,” *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle: Autour du “Guide de l’étudiant” du ms. Ripoll 109*, edited by C. Laffeur, J. Carrier, Turnhout: Brepols, 1997, p. 255–279, esp. p. 274; L.G. KELLY, *The Mirror of Grammar*, p. 137–142.

This grammar functioned in Krakow since around 1464. The text contains a section on interjections where the author considers the problem of whether an interjection is a separate part of speech. The argument says that a part of speech should signify a concept, but an interjection does not signify a concept. In answer to the argument, the author puts forward an old hypothesis that the speaker produces an interjection by the mode of affection, and the hearer interprets it by the mode of concept. Thus the interjection is a part of speech.³⁸ Interestingly, our author makes an attempt to “save” Donatus’s definition for the sake of his own (i.e. the anonymous author’s) grammar. According to him, someone could say that Donatus’s phrase “incognita voce” should not be used in the context of conceptualist grammar, because it is not suitable for the description of mental language. However, though the name “voice” should generally denote only vocal sounds, it can be used in such situation in a broad interpretation, especially when combined with “incognita” meaning “not thought through.”³⁹

Like many other Modists, the author considers the signification of an interjection to be a specific mode of signification. Then, following the old Modist tradition, he takes into account four kinds of the signification. Interjection signifies the movement of the appetitive faculty of the soul towards the good or apparent good, or towards the evil or apparent evil.⁴⁰ The good may be twofold: present or future, so what is signified is a joy or wish. In the case of present or future evil, pain or fear are signified by an interjection. The interjection (from *interiacere*) is something between a concept and a significative voice.⁴¹

³⁸ ANONYMUS, *Quaestiones super Artem minorem Aelii Donati*, ms. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, BJ 2461, fol. 108r: “Pro secundo sciendum: interiectio capitur dupliciter: uno modo quoad audientem et sic interiectio significat bene conceptum mentis sicut et qualibet alia pars orationis, quia aliquis audiens dicere ‘ah’ intellectus ipsius statim concipit dolorem. Alio modo interiectio consideratur quoad proferentem et sic tunc per mentis affectum.” For the older expression of the same opinion see: ms. München Universitätsbibliothek, Clm 19868, fol. 190r, after: L.G. KELLY, *The Mirror of Grammar*, p. 141.

³⁹ ANONYMUS, *Quaestiones super Artem minorem Aelii Donati*, ms. BJ 2461, fol. 108r: “tamen aliqui dicunt, quod illa particula non est de necessitate definitionis, sed solo additur propter aliorum cognitionem, quia sufficeret dicere interiectio est pars orationis significans mentis affectum et sic convenit omnibus interiectionibus, sed addendo ‘voce incognita’ tunc definitio solum convenit interiectionibus vocalibus, vero tunc ‘vox’ caperetur valde large sicut ‘voce incognita,’ id est ‘non diu praemeditata.’ Et sic interiectiones mentales salvarentur.”

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, fol. 109r: “interiectio significat motionem appetitus vel igitur talis motio fit ad bonum, vel ad apparens bonum, vel ad apparens malum, vel ad malum. Si ad bonum vel ad apparens bonum, hoc est dupliciter: vel ad bonum praesens, sicut habetur significatio laetitiae, vel ad bonum futurum et sic habetur significatio desiderii. Sed si fit ad malum vel ad apparens malum, hoc est dupliciter: vel ad malum praesens, sic habetur significatio doloris, vel ad malum futurum, sic habetur significatio metus vel timoris.”

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, fol. 108r: “dicitur, quod hoc est verum, scilicet quod ‘interiectio’ dicitur ab ‘interiacere.’ Sed non ideo, quia interiacet aliis partibus orationis, sed ideo quia omnis interiectio interiacet

John of Glogovia's view concerning interjections as a part of speech is very similar to the anonymous text from after 1464: the speaker produces an interjection by the mode of affection, and the hearer interprets it by the mode of concept.⁴² The mode of signification of interjection called 'signification' reflects the affection of the soul and "is about" either present or future good (so what is signified is joy or wish), or present or future evil (so what is signified is pain or fear).⁴³

To conclude: Classical Modists observed that their assumption that every mode of signification originated in a real mode of being could not be retained

inter conceptum et vocem aliquid significantem." This actually is an old opinion expressed in *Graecismus* by Eberhard Bethune, see EBERHARDUS BETHUNENSIS, *Graecismus*, XXIV, 4–8: "Nam menti et voci interiacet ipsa," after: L.G. KELLY, *The Mirror of Grammar*, p. 137.

⁴²IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Declaratio Donati minoris*, fol. 96r: "Unde pars orationis capitur dupliciter. Uno modo proprie pro dictione Latina, quae finaliter est adinventata ad exprimendum mentis conceptum et isto modo interiectio non est pars orationis. Interiectio enim non significat mentis conceptum sed affectum, ut dicit definitio. Secundo, capitur pars orationis generaliter pro qualibet dictione sive Latina, sive alterius idiomatis non curando, an per eam exprimat mentis conceptus vel affectus. Et sic interiectio est pars orationis. Sciendum etiam, quod interiectio dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo quoad proferentem, qui scilicet profert voces interiectionis ex aliquo affectu accidente et eveniente circa animam; et isto modo interiectio significat mentis affectum et hoc vult definitio. Secundo modo potest considerari interiectio quoad audientem et sic significat mentis conceptum. Ille enim, qui audit, format conceptus de voce interiectionali per aliquem prolata, ut si dolor occurrit vel evenit alicui, proferens sine deliberatione profert vocem interiectionalem. Ille autem, qui audit determinate, format conceptum de dolore vel passione illius proferentis vocem interiectionalem." Cf. *ibidem*, fol. 15v: "sic interiectio quoad audientem bene significat conceptum, sed quoad proferentem significat affectum." More detailed discussion of the Glogoviensis' concept of interjection can be found in: K. KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ: *Jan z Głogowa i tradycja gramatyki spekulatywnej*, p. 220–222.

⁴³IOANNES GLOGOVIENSIS, *Declaratio Donati minoris*, fol. 96v–97r: "Sequitur corollarie, quod significatio interiectionum est quadruplex. Patet, quia significatio interiectionum significat sub affectu animae, sed affectus animae sunt quatuor, scilicet spes, gaudium, dolor et timor. Et per consequens etiam significatio interiectionum est quadruplex. Pro quo notandum: significatio capitur dupliciter. Uno modo absolute et simpliciter pro modo determinantis actum verbalem sub ratione affectus simpliciter. Isto modo significatio est de essentia interiectionis. Designare enim affectum animae ponitur in definitione essentiali interiectionis. Secundo capitur significatio specialiter pro modo determinantis actum verbalem in speciali. Scilicet ratione gaudii vel spei, vel doloris, vel timoris. Et isto modo significatio est accidens interiectionis. Sequitur corollarie, quod non est inconueniens idem esse essentialia rei et etiam accidentalia secundum diversum modum acceptum. Patet hoc de significatione interiectionum. [...] significatio interiectionum est quadruplex. Patet per sufficientiam significationis interiectionum, omnis enim significatio interiectionis aut est circa bonum, aut circa malum. Si circa bonum, hoc est dupliciter: aut circa bonum praesens — sic est gaudium, aut circa futurum et sic est spes. Gaudium enim de praesenti bono, spes vero circa futurum bonum. Si autem est circa malum, hoc est dupliciter: vel est circa praesens malum — sic est dolor, vel circa futurum — sic est timor. Dolor enim est circa praesens malum, timor vero circa futurum malum;" cf. Anonymus, *Quaestiones super Artem minorem Aelii Donati*, ms. BJ 2461, fol. 109r.

without qualification. Their ways of keeping their theory consistent, which actually could be epitomized by John of Dacia's formula "what is intelligible can be significable," were *mutatis mutandis* taken over by their later followers including the anonymous and non-anonymous authors of the texts taught in Krakow. The most famous and the latest of them, John of Glogovia, whose grammatical handbook was still read in Krakow up to the middle of the 16th century, greatly contributed to the petrification of the opinion that linguistic categories mirror the real categories of being, even though he strived ever harder to justify the obvious exceptions from this rule.⁴⁴

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⁴⁴I wish to thank Professor Marek Gensler and Dr Janice Bell for the linguistic revision of this paper.

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LANGUAGE AS REPRESENTATION OF THE REALITY
IN CRACOW GRAMMATICAL TEXTS FROM
THE 15TH CENTURY. THE MODIST HERITAGE

S U M M A R Y

“Propter hoc enim datus est nobis sermo, ut praesto nobis faciunt mutuae voluntatis indicia”: this quotation from Calcidus’ translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* was a motto of the 13th century Modist grammarians in their attempts to specify the scientific goal of grammar as a discipline responsible for the transmission of concepts and emotions from one human subject to another. In the modistically inspired grammar of John of Glogovia, presented in the end of the 15th century at the University of Cracow, this reference to Plato is followed by a comment: “Sermo significativus est aggregatum ex pluribus vocis, per quod unus potest alteri exprimere mentis conceptum.” In agreement with the Modist tradition, this specific linguistic relation between people is possible thanks to the modes of signification, which are ultimately grounded in reality through the mediation of modes of understanding. Language categories are secondary to the real modes of being of things and modes of understanding common to all people make it possible for them to achieve mutual understanding. In the 15th century, in grammatical texts taught in Cracow, and above all in of John of Glogovia’s handbooks, one can see how later medieval philosophy of language tried to find a suitable form of semantic adequacy binding particular language categories with things to which they referred to with the help of various forms of tradition of both positive and Modist grammar. Substantives, the non-evident gender of nouns and the not fully specified language function of interjections are just a few examples of the categories whose understanding often depends on the explanation of the way in which a human soul operates on the discovery of seemingly non-evident modes of the being of things that are subjects of linguistic description.

KEYWORDS: *modi significandi*; John of Glogovia; Cracow University; representation; fictions; non-beings

SŁOWA KLUCZE: *modi significandi*; Jan z Głogowa; Uniwersytet Krakowski; reprezentacja; fikcje; nie-byty