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UTRUM TANTUM SIGNA SINT UNIVERSALIA.
A QUESTION FROM
JOHN OF MÜNSTERBERG'S
COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS*
(VII, 32)*

John of Münsterberg (pol.: Jan z Ziębic, † 1416) was one of the most prominent Silesian philosophers active at the turn of the fifteenth century. Educated at the Prague University, he lectured and ran a wide range of administrative activities there¹ until the Decree of Kutná Hora in 1409, which ended the conflict between *nationes* in favour of the Czechs. As a result, a large group of scholars left their *alma mater* in protest and started a new university in Leipzig. John was one of its founders and became its first rector.²

Although his writings became popular among scholars at Central European universities and influenced authors not only in Prague and Leipzig, where he lectured, but also in Vienna, Krakow and Erfurt, not many of his works have

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¹For more information see: F. ŠMAHEL, *Die Prager Universität im Mittelalter: Charles University in the Middle Ages*, Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2007, p. 293.

²F. KRAUZE, “Jan z Ziębic,” *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej*, edited by A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 1, Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011, p. 565.

survived to the present.³ Among them, there is a monumental *Commentary on the Metaphysics* written ca. 1407⁴ in Prague.⁵

Münsterberg's *Commentary*... covers over 250 questions to books 1–12 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.⁶ The vast majority of them are relatively short and vary from half a column to four columns, with the average being two. Based on the number of questions devoted to each book, it can be assumed that he was especially interested in issues from books 1 (40 questions), 5 (38 questions) and 7 (35 questions).

Münsterberg's commentary on book 7 has a peculiar structure, which is seldom seen in other fourteenth and fifteenth century commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. In the vast majority of them, questions devoted to the status of universals are arranged in such a way that they form the core of the book, and for that reason they are situated in the middle. Contrary to that tradition, John of Münsterberg placed a set of four questions related to this topic at the end of the book (qu. 32–35) as a kind of appendix, giving the impression that they are somehow misplaced. The most likely explanation is that John must have been using that material separately before incorporating it in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

Some hints in favour of this hypothesis can be found in a codex now held in Österreichische Nationalbibliothek with shelf mark 4483.⁷ The manuscript contains a record of discussions concerning the status of universals which took

³ Cf. C.H. LOHR, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries Authors: Johannes de Kanthi — Myngodus," *Traditio*, vol. 27 (1971), p. 265–266.

⁴ This date is given in the colophon of Marsilius' of Inghen questions to *De generatione et corruptione* contained in the same codex as John of Münsterberg's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, namely in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26929, f. 138^{rb} (henceforth abbreviated as Clm 26929): "Et sic est finis quaestionum super *De generatione et corruptione*, quae quidem quaestiones editae sunt per honorabilem magistrum Marsilium, scriptae Pragae et finitae anno Domini 1407^o, 17^o Kalendae mensis Novembris, pro quo laudetur Iesus Christus Mariae filius per infinita saecula saeculorum."

⁵ If we accept 1407 as the time of origin of the commentary, we can assume without hesitation that it was written in Prague, since all of his academic writings before 1409 originated there. For more information on the historical background of Münsterberg's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* see: M. MANSFELD, "Prolegomena to a Study of John of Münsterberg's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*," *Studying the Arts in Medieval Bohemia*, edited by O. Pavlíček, Turnhout: Brepols, 2019 (forthcoming).

⁶ See the full list of questions: M. MANSFELD, "Prolegomena to a Study of John of Münsterberg's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*."

⁷ See: J. SEDLÁK, "Filosofické spory pražské v době Husově," *Studie a texty k náboženským dějinám českým II*, edited by J. Sedlák, Olomouc: Maticе Cyrillo-Methodějská, 1915, p. 204–206. Cf. M. MARKOWSKI, "Die Stellungnahme des Johannes von Münsterberg gegenüber den Universalien," *Acta Mediaevalia*, vol. 8 (1995), p. 57–68.

place in Prague at the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁸ On the basis of that record, it can be concluded that John of Münsterberg actively participated in those discussions. The arguments he presented were directed against the Czech radical realists influenced by the writings of John Wyclif,⁹ such as John Hus, Štěpán of Pálec, and Stanislaus of Znojmo. It is for that reason that cod. 4483 is an invaluable source for the doctrinal study of Münsterberg's views on the status of universals, because together with his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* it presents his philosophical *credo* on this matter. What is most interesting for the current considerations, is that the doctrinal solutions Münsterberg presented in the discussions of cod. 4483 strictly correspond to his opinions from the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*.¹⁰ It is especially visible in the first debate record *Utrum sint aliqua universalia in rebus condistincta signis vel utrum tantum signa sint universalia* (cod. 4483, f. 54^v–55^v), which has a counterpart in the question VII, 32: *Utrum tantum signa sint universalia* (Clm 26929, f. 62^{va}–63^{ra}), that is the main subject of this paper.

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According to John of Münsterberg, universals really exist in things that are not signs in the proper sense. He claims that if this problem is interpreted in line with Aristotle's solution, universals exist in things understood as something universal (*universalia in re intellecta universaliter*). In both texts, these two theses are central pieces of argumentation.¹¹ As a result, if we restrict the conclusions

⁸ For more information on cod. 4483 and the historical background of Hussite debates of the early fifteenth century see: M. VAN DUSSEN, *From England to Bohemia: Heresy and Communication in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 49–51.

⁹ His views were written down on f. 54^v–61^v. The beginning of the passage is marked with a marginal note: "Disputatio Magistri Minstrberg." Vide JOHANNES DE MÜNSTERBERG, *Quaestiones disputatae de universalibus*, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 4483 (henceforth abbreviated as cod. 4483), f. 54^v, in marg. sin.

¹⁰ All four of them: *Utrum sint aliqua universalia in rebus condistincta signis vel utrum tantum signa sint universalia* (cod. 4483, f. 54^v–55^v), *Utrum universalia sint separata a singularibus* (cod. 4483, f. 55^v–56^f), *Utrum sint universalia in essendo* (cod. 4483, f. 56^f–60^f), *Utrum res intellecta universaliter sit universale* (cod. 4483, f. 60^f–60^v), have counterparts in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Clm 26929, f. 62^{va}–65^{rb}).

¹¹ JOHANNES DE MÜNSTERBERG, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, Clm 26929, f. 62^{vb}: "De quaestione dicitur, quod illa quaestio uno modo potest intelligi de signis in genere, sive sunt signa proprie ultimate vel non. Et sic quaestio est vera, quia res ad extra etiam est signum sui ipsius. Sed quaestio quaeritur de signis significantibus ultimate proprie, sicut termini mentales et vocales etc. Et de illa materia sunt duae opiniones. Una Ockham, qui concedit quaestionem. Alia est, quod res ad extra condistincta signis etiam sint universalia, sed talia universalia sunt duplicia. Quaedam universalia in essendo et illa duplicia: quaedam coniuncta singularibus, sicut <dicit> Socrates, quaedam separata a singularibus, sicut <dicit> Plato. Alia sunt universalia in re intellecta universaliter et illa est de intentione Aristotelis."

Cf. JOHANNES DE MÜNSTERBERG, *Quaestiones disputatae de universalibus*, cod. 4483, f. 55^f:

concerning John of Münsterberg's doctrinal orientation to these two texts only, his opinions on universals are moderately realist, even though he himself was traditionally presented as a moderate nominalist.¹² Nonetheless, any definitive conclusions in this matter can only be proposed after a critical edition of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* is prepared, and of the questions devoted to the problem of universals in particular.¹³

The interpretative problems concerning Münsterberg's views on universals, which make it difficult to assign him to any particular doctrinal orientation, seem to be caused mainly by the irregular structure of his questions. Even though the majority of them at first glance resemble the standard scholastic questions we are accustomed to, i.e. they contain all the constitutive elements, like arguments (*rationes*), replies (*ad rationes*), and the body of a question (*corpus quaestionis*), some of those elements are used by Münsterberg in a way slightly different from the standard. Only after reading a question as a whole one is able to distinguish between fragments in which the author presents his erudition and those in which he expresses his own opinions.

The structure of question VII, 32 is a good example of this phenomenon. It is composed of three thematically and doctrinally unified parts. The first one consists of a set of six arguments (*rationes contra*) that deal with the thesis that all the universals are signs, which is contrary to the author's views, and replies to these arguments (*ad rationes contra*). The replies to these arguments are formulated in a comprehensive way and focus on presenting other authors' opinions on the topic. This is where Münsterberg shows his erudition, which is admittedly impressive. He quotes or paraphrases a wide range of philosophical authorities,

"Nota: de quaestione sunt duae opiniones. Una est ipsius Ockham et sequentium suorum, quod nulla sunt universalis condistincta signis significantibus ultimate proprie. Alia est opinio Aegidii, Scoti et Alberti Magni, qui dicunt, quod aliqua sunt universalis condistincta signis significantibus ultimate proprie. Haec cauda (*scil. significantibus ultimate proprie* — M.M.) additur ideo, ratio quia omnis res significat se primo, naturaliter, communiter [...]. Sed pro praesenti mihi apparet, quod aliqua universalis sint in rebus, sed qualia sint, posterius apparebit."

¹²Cf. M. MARKOWSKI, "Die Stellungnahme des Johannes von Münsterberg gegenüber den Universalien," p. 57–68. Cf. M. VAN DUSSEN, *From England to Bohemia*, p. 50. In his doctrinal analysis, F. Krauze suggested that regarding the discussion on the status of universals John of Münsterberg presented moderately realistic views; this observation is supported by Münsterberg's text itself. Cf. F. KRAUZE, *Poglądy filozoficzne Jana z Ziębic*, Gdańsk: Akademia Medyczna, 1993, p. 149–159.

¹³There are four questions to the problem of universals in book 7 of Münsterberg's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, namely qu. 32: *Utrum tantum signa sint universalis* (Clm 26929, f. 62^{va}–63^{ra}), qu. 33: *Utrum sint ponenda universalis realia separata a singularibus* (Clm 26929, f. 63^{ra}–63^{va}), qu. 34: *Utrum aliquod sit universale in essendo idem in singularibus* (Clm 26929, f. 63^{va}–64^{va}), qu. 35: *Utrum res, prout est intelligibilis vel conceptibilis universaliter, convenienter dicatur universale* (Clm 26929, f. 64^{va}–65^{rb}), and a single question from book 1, qu. 27: *Utrum universalis sint difficillima ad cognoscendum, quia sunt a sensu remotissima* (Clm 26929, f. 9^{vb}–10^{rb}).

from nominalists like Wilhelm Ockham, through Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, to radical realists, like John Wyclif. He also cites anonymous authors of *Logica ad Rudium* and *Logica valde realis contra Ockham*. Apart from general notes, divisions, remarks on the terminology and presentation of alternative solutions given by other authors, there seem to be very few statements that would characterize Münsterberg's own views.

The arguments from the first part are separated from replies to them by the body of the question (*corpus quaestionis*), which is not very extensive as it does not go far beyond refining the terminology. The most important information from this part is certainly John of Münsterberg's statement that according to Aristotle universals are something existing in things understood in a universal way (*universalia in re intellecta universaliter*).

The third part is the most troublesome fragment of this question, not just for the editor but also for the reader. It is so because of two reasons. Firstly, this part of the question seems misplaced, for arguments *in oppositum* conventionally follow arguments *contra*; yet in question VII, 32 arguments of that type are placed just after the replies to the arguments *contra*. Secondly, the opinions placed there are called *in oppositum*, because they argue against the thesis discussed before, so placing them after the whole discussion gives the impression that the author is actually arguing for a thesis that has already been proved, i.e. that not only signs are universals. A closer study of this fragment, however, shows that this impression is due to the fact that the theses in both sets of arguments (*contra* and *in oppositum*) are not contradictory in the proper sense: while the arguments from the first part (*rationes contra*) argue for the thesis that the universals are signs only, arguments from the third part (*rationes in oppositum*) argue for the conclusion that since not only signs are universals, there are universals in things. John of Münsterberg cunningly swaps the theses before giving his reply.¹⁴ It must be noted that the last part of question VII, 32 is the place where his own opinions on the topic are expressed in the most elaborate form.

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The critical edition of the question *Utrum tantum signa sint universalia* (VII, 32) is based on its only witness, which is now held in Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich (Clm 26929, f. 1^{ra}–86^{vb}).¹⁵ It is a paper codex 2° (30×21 cm), bound in

¹⁴JOHANNES DE MÜNSTERBERG, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, Clm 26929, f. 63^{ra}: "Pro argumentis apparet, quod illa argumenta satis persuadent, quod sunt universalia distincta signis."

¹⁵Cf. *Polonica w średniowiecznych rękopisach bibliotek monachijskich*, edited by J. Wolny, M. Markowski, Z. Kuksewicz, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1969, p. 169–170. Cf. *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis, tomi IV pars IV codices Latinos (Clm) 21406–27268 complectens*, edited by K. Halm, W. Meyer, Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz,

wooden boards covered with skin, coming from Prague and written before 1407. It contains 298 leaves and some unnumbered inserts. It seems to be a copy for personal use: the handwriting is clumsy, with numerous, sometimes unconventional abbreviations. There are very few marginal notes and no visible signs of later corrections or additions; even the scribe's self-corrections are scarce. Apart from John of Münsterberg's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, the codex contains the following texts:

- f. 88^{ra}–193^{rb} — Marsilius de Inghen, *Quaestiones in De generatione et corruptione*;
- f. 194^{ra}–250^{vb} — Anonymus, *Quaestiones in Parva naturalia secundum Marsilium*;
- f. 251^{ra}–262^{vb} — Albertus de Saxonia, *Quaestiones in De caelo*;
- f. 264^r–274^r — Petrus de Alliaco, *Quaestiones in Meteorologica*;
- f. 275^r–298^r — Anonymus, *Quaestiones in De anima*.

John of Münsterberg's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*¹⁶ begins with an unfinished list of questions which breaks after the last question from the book 1: *Utrum bonum sit causa mali*. The remaining books are not included in the list, nor is there any space left for later supplement. The text in two columns is written in a sloppy manner by one hand and is deprived of any decorations, except for the incipits of the first questions of each new book, which are written in larger script and much more neatly; in books 1–7 there are also intermittent initials in red.

Considering the fact that Clm 26929 is the only copy of Münsterberg's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, some corrections and complements were necessary when preparing a critical edition in order to retain the consistency of the text; these interventions were scrupulously recorded in the critical apparatus. The headings, paragraphing and punctuation were introduced by the editor. The orthography has been classicised.

1961, p. 229. Cf. "Katalog dzieł Marsyliusza z Inghen z ewidencją rękopisów," edited by M. Markowski, *Studia Mediewistyczne*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1988), p. 100; M. MARKOWSKI, *Burydanizm w Polsce w okresie przedkopernikańskim. Studium z historii filozofii i nauk ścisłych na Uniwersytecie Krakowskim w XV wieku*, Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków – Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1971, p. 470. The general description was supplemented by my own remarks on the decoration and handwriting.

¹⁶Münsterberg's authorship is mentioned in the colophon. "Et sic est finis *Metaphysicae Aristotelis* reportatum(!) per me Leonardum Heczestorff, baccalarium in artibus, a magistro Johanne de Monstenberg, de quo Deus gloriosus sit benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen. Etc." JOHANNES DE MÜNSTERBERG, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, Clm 26929, f. 86^{vb}.

JOHANNIS DE MÜNSTERBERG
 QUAESTIONES IN *METAPHYSICAM* ARISTOTELIS

qu. VII, 32

UTRUM TANTUM SIGNA SINT UNIVERSALIA

Editio critica

UTRUM TANTUM SIGNA SINT UNIVERSALIA

<Rationes contra>

62^{vb} <1> Contra arguitur sic: universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est suis singularibus, sed illud posterius non est aliud nisi signum universale. Argumentum probatur, quia res universalis, si esset, non esset posterior singularibus, sed prior singularibus. Vel sic: illud posterius nec est res distincta a singularibus nec causa singularibus, igitur etc. Si causa, tunc idem | esset sibi ipsi posterius. 5

<2> Item sic: si non signum tantum est universale, tunc esset aliquod distinctum a signo, sed hoc est falsum. Probatur sic, quia quodlibet ens est signum, igitur nullum ens <distinctum> a signo est universale.

<3> Item: si esset tale universale, vel ipsum esset substantia vel accidens. Quod non substantia, patet per litteram: „impossibile est aliquod illorum esse substantiam alicuius rei”, et per Commentatorem super eandem litteram, et decimo *Metaphysicae*: „nullum universale esse substantiam erit possibile”. 10

<4> Item sic: omne universale est aptum ingredi propositionem, sed nulla substantia est apta ingredi propositionem; igitur nulla substantia est universale. Maior probatur: omne universale est praedicabile, sed non potest praedicari nisi in propositione. Argumentum probatur, quia ibi praedicatur proprium de suo 15

5 esset] *scripsi*, non est *ms.* 6 signum] est *add. ms.*

1 universale... est] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, I, 1, 402b 7–10 (AL 12.2, 3b, 8–11): “Formidandum autem quatinus non lateat utrum una ratio ipsius est, sicut animalis aut secundum unumquodque altera, ut equi, canis, hominis deique, animal autem uniuersale aut nichil est aut posterius.” 10–11 impossibile... rei] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 13, 1038b 9–10 (AL 25.2, p. 147, 28–29): “Videtur enim impossibile esse substantiam esse quorumlibet et universaliter dictorum”. 11 per Commentatorem] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, com. 45 (Junt. II, 197K): “Dicamus igitur, quod impossibile est, ut aliquid eorum, quae dicuntur universalialia, sit substantia alicuius rei, et si declararent substantias rerum”. 12 decimo *Metaphysicae*] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, X, 2, 1053b 17–18 (AL 25.2, p. 188, 13–14): “Si nullum universalium esse substantiam esse possibile [...]”.

subiecto; si universale ponitur in signo et signato, tunc praedicabile debet poni in signo et signato.

20 <5> Item sic: omnis propositio est vocalis, mentalis vel scripta, sed nulla substantia potest esse pars alicuius propositionis vocalis, mentalis vel scriptae; ergo nulla substantia potest esse pars alicuius propositionis, ergo nulla substantia potest esse praedicatum, ergo nulla substantia potest esse universale. Consequentia tenet, quia omne universale potest esse praedicatum.

<Corpus quaestionis>

25 De quaestione dicitur quod illa quaestio uno modo potest intelligi de signis in genere, sive sunt signa proprie ultimate vel non. Et sic quaestio est vera, quia res ad extra etiam est signum sui ipsius. Sed quaestio quaeritur de signis significantibus ultimate proprie, sicut termini mentales et vocales etc. Et de illa materia sunt duae opiniones. Una Ockham, qui concedit quaestionem. Alia est quod
30 res ad extra condistincta signis etiam sint universalialia; sed talia universalialia sunt duplicia. Quaedam universalialia in essendo; et illa duplicia: quaedam coniuncta singularibus, sicut <dicit> Socrates, quaedam separata a singularibus, sicut <dicit> Plato. Alia sunt universalialia in re intellecta universaliter, et illa <opinio> est de intentione Aristotelis.

35 <Ad rationes contra>

<Ad 1–2> Sed pro argumentis nota: primo *De anima* dicitur: „universale nihil est, aut posterius est”. Communiter exponitur quod universale in essendo nihil est, sed universale in significando plura vel in concipiendo universaliter est posterius singularibus, quia conceptus universalis abstrahitur a rebus singularibus.
40 Per hoc ad argumentum dicitur quod universale in significando est posterius singularibus; et de illo loquitur Philosophus. Etiam posset dici quod res intellecta

17 subiecto] *scripsi; forsitan substantia ms.* 38 universaliter] *hoc add. ms.*

29 Ockham] Cf. GUILLELMUS OCKHAM, *Summa logicae*, pars prima, cap. 15 (BOEHNER 1957, p. 48, 80–103): “Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est, quod nullum universale est substantia, qualitercumque consideretur. Sed quodlibet universale est intentio animae, quae secundum unam opinionem probabilem ab actu intelligendi non differt. Unde dicunt, quod intellectio, qua intelligo hominem, est signum naturale hominum, sicut gemitus est signum infirmitatis vel tristitiae seu doloris, et est tale signum, quod potest stare pro hominibus in propositionibus mentalibus, sicut vox potest stare pro rebus in propositionibus vocalibus. [...] Nam omne universale secundum omnes est praedicabile de multis; sed sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum natum est praedicari et non substantia aliqua; ergo sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum est universale; sed nunc non utor ‘universali’ pro signo voluntarie instituto, sed pro illo, quod naturaliter est universale”. 36 *De anima* dicitur] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, I, 1, 402b 7–10 (AL 12.2, 3b, 8–11).

universaliter diceretur posterior singularibus non simpliciter, sed prout intellecta universaliter.

<Ad 3> Secundo nota: non solum substantia est universale nec solum accidens, quia sicut in praedicamento substantiae invenimus genera et species, sic etiam in praedicamentis accidentium reperimur illa. 45

Sed nota: littera dicit: „videtur esse impossibile substantiam esse universale”. Isti textus debent intelligi quod nulla substantia est universale in essendo, quae est distincta. Similiter dictum Commentatoris. Etiam unus potest evadere sic, quia Philosophus dicit: „videtur autem”, id est apparet, et consequentia ibidem decimo: „impossibile est aliquid commune in pluribus substantia”. 50

<Ad 4> Nota tertio quod dupliciter aliquid ingreditur propositionem. Uno modo tamquam signum, et hoc formaliter ponitur in propositione. Alio modo aliquid ingreditur propositionem tamquam signatum vel dicibile remotum, et sic universale in re ad extra ingreditur propositionem tamquam signatum per subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Alii dicunt quod res ad extra possunt imponi ad significandum, sic quod illa res: *homo* posset imponi ad significandum tantum, sicut ille terminus ‘homo’ et illa res: *panis*. Alii ponunt quod cuilibet propositioni verae correspondet propositio in re; sed difficile est salvare de istis 55

48 quae] *scripsi, lectio illegibilis ms. (forsitan plane vel plura)* 51 pluribus] *scripsi, forsitan particularibus ms.*

47 littera dicit] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 13, 1038b 9–10 (AL 25.2, p. 147, 28–29). 49 dictum Commentatoris] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, com. 45 (Junt. II, 197K). 50 Philosophus dicit] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 13, 1038b 9 (AL 25.2, p. 147, 28). 50 apparet] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, VII, com. 45 (Junt. II, 197I): “Dixit: Et existimatur etiam, quod universale etc., id est quia existimatur quod universale est causa rerum magis quam causae particularium, et causae substantiarum existimantur esse substantiae; perscrutandum est, utrum universale possit esse substantia aut non”. 51 impossibile... substantia] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, X, com. 6 (Junt. II, 255K): “[...] quia impossibile enim est ut aliquid commune pluribus sit substantia”. 56 Alii dicunt] Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qu. 1, art. 10, appendix (1773, p. 28, 19–21): “[...] cum accommodare res ad significandum nihil aliud sit, quam facere eas esse non solum res, sed signa aliorum rerum”. 58 Alii ponunt] Cf. ANONYMUS, *Logica ad Rudium*, II, 5–9 (DE RIJK, p. 59–60): „Et hic est unum dubium utrum aliqua propositio, sive aliquid complexum, componatur ex rebus existentibus extra animam. Et videtur michi posse dici probabiliter quod sic. Primo quia virtus sensitiva, ut distinguitur contra intellectivam, format aliquid complexum de sensibilibus [...]. Ergo virtus sensitiva, ut distinguitur contra intellectivam, format aliquando aliquid complexum de sensibilibus, et per consequens tale complexum componitur ex rebus sensibilibus extra animam existentibus. [...] Preterea. Eius est primo complexum cui primo et propter se assentitur; non enim assentio termino nisi propter rem. Ergo complexum primo est ipse rei. Preterea. Voluntas primo diligit rem. Ergo primo intelligit eam, qui [*forsitan rectius quia — MM*] nichil amat nisi cognitum, secundum Augustinum. Si ergo primo intelligit eam, ex ea debet primo formare complexum”. — *Adn. prosequitur p. 220.*

60 propositionibus: ‘Deus est Deus’, ‘prima causa est Deus’ et sic de aliis. Sed
cautius est dicere quod res ingreditur propositionem tamquam signatum. Et sic
dicitur quod substantia realis ingreditur propositionem.

<Ad 5> Et consimiliter dicitur ad ultimum argumentum. Ibi dicitur: licet nul-
la substantia potest esse pars alicuius propositionis vocalis, mentalis vel scrip-
65 tae, tamen signum ingreditur propositionem, et sic signatum dicitur ingredi
tamquam per suum signum.

<Rationes in oppositum>

<6> In oppositum arguitur sic: species humana est, et illa non est signum;
igitur etc. Argumentum probatur, quia si species humana est signum, tunc non
70 est ita bona sicut musca; et si res ad extra, tunc non tantum signa sunt universalia.
Sed contra: species humana est species, igitur est universale. Consequentia tenet
ab inferiori ad superius.

<7> Item sic: species humana est nobilior specie asinina, sed unum signum
non est nobilior alio; igitur etc. |

75 <8> Item sic: circumscriptis omnibus signis adhuc Socrates differt specie ab
asino, igitur species humana adhuc est in re.

<9> Item sic: si tantum signa sunt universalia, sequitur quod omnia univer-
salia essent in praedicamento qualitatis, modo sic universalia omnia ut signata
sunt in praedicamento qualitatis; igitur omnia universalia sunt in praedica-
80 mento qualitatis. Tunc ultra: sed *homo, corpus* sunt universalia, igitur sunt in praedi-
camento qualitatis, sed cuilibet qualitati convenit secundum eam simile vel
dissimile dici, sed *homo, asinus* et *animal* sunt qualitates; igitur convenit eis se-
cundum eas simile vel dissimile dici, sed hoc est falsum, quia nullae res dicuntur
similes secundum illa etc.

74 non] *superscr. ms.* 76 species humana] humanitas *superscr. ms.*

58 Alii ponunt (*sequitur ex p. 219*)] Cf. Ps.-RICHARDUS CAMPSALL, *Logica valde realis contra Ockham*, cap. 13 (SYNAN, p. 116): “Ante, enim, quam ista propositio ‘sortes est homo’ formetur in mente, vere est in re — non quod isti termini, vel iste voces in re precedant, sed una propositio correspondens. Sicut, enim, vni propositioni in voce correspondet vna propositio in mente — non quod iste propositiones in mente precedant, sed precedit una propositio que significat idem et pro eisdem verificatur de quibus verificatur propositio vocalis et pro tanto dicitur quod propositio formata in voce prius formatur in mente — ita propositioni in mente correspondet et precedit propositio in re, a veritate cuius propositionis dependet veritas propositionum mentalium et vocalium, et licet in veritate ita sit, tamen, propositio ista nobis latet nec innoscit nisi per propositiones mentales vel vocales”. — Cf. JOHANNES WICLEFUS, *De universalibus*, 1 (MUELLER, p. 27): “[...] diligenter est notandum de triplici praedicandi manerie, scilicet de praedicatione formali, de praedicatione secundum essentiam et de praedicatione secundum habitudinem. Talis autem praedicatio principaliter est ex parte rei”. 60–61 Sed cautius... signatum] Cf. GUALTERUS BURLEY, *Quaestiones in Analytica Posteriora*, 2.49 (SOMMERS, p. 62, 370–372): “Propositio primo modo dicta componitur ex rebus compositione intellectuali, et non compositione reali; et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signato”.

<10> Item sic: logica considerat aliter de universalibus quam metaphysicus et non aliter, nisi quia metaphysica considerat de rebus et logica de signis, igitur universalia sunt in re. 85

<11> Item sic: secundo *De anima* dicitur quod natura producit individua ad perpetuandum ea secundum speciem.

<12> Item sic: Commentator dicit secundo *Metaphysicae*: „qui dicunt nihil esse speciem praeter nomen, destruunt scientias”. 90

<13> Item sic: kathegoreuma reale est, igitur universale reale est. Consequentia tenet, quia omne kathegoreuma reale est universale. Probatur sic: omne praeter kathegoreuma est per se praedicabile, et tamen est res ad extra kathegoreuma; igitur res ad extra est per se praedicabile. Minor probatur, quia kathegoreuma est substantia, igitur kathegoreuma est res ad extra. Argumentum patet septimo *illius*, ubi dicitur quod nullum aliorum kathegoreumatum est separabile nisi haec sola substantia. 95

<Ad rationes in oppositum>

Pro argumentis apparet quod illa argumenta satis persuadent quod sunt universalia distincta signis. 100

<Ad 6–7> Sed tamen, qui vellet, posset dicere ad primum quod species humana esset ille terminus ‘species humana’. Et dicitur quod illa species humana est nobilior specie asinina; et ibi est duplex sensus. Unus sensus est proprius, scilicet quod ille terminus ‘homo’ specificus est nobilior quam ille terminus specificus ‘asinus’; et sic est falsus. Alius est improprius quod res significata per terminum specificum ‘homo’ est nobilior quam res significata per illum terminum ‘asinus’. 105

<Ad 8> De secundo dicitur quod Socrates et asinus differunt specie, id est hac specie homo, quia homo melius est concludi Socratem et asinum differre specie. Et tunc dicitur: ‘si nullum signum esset...’, diceretur quod tunc non different specie actu sed aptitudine, quia essent apta differre. 110

<Ad 9> Nota: isti termini ‘homo’, ‘corpus’, ‘substantia’ possunt considerari uno modo ut sunt signata et sic considerando ut sunt signata vel res. Et sic isti

85 logica] *forsitan rectius* logicus 97–98 nisi haec] *scripsi*, haec autem *ms.* 104 et ibi... sensus] *in marg. sin. ms.* 105 specificus] homo *add. sed exp.*

88 *De anima* dicitur] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II, 4, 415b 3–7 (AL 12.2, 95a, 15–19): “Quoniam igitur communicare non possunt ipso semper et diuino continuatione, propter id quod nichil contingit corruptibilium idem et unum numero permanere, secundum quod potest participare unumquodque, sic communicat, hoc quidem magis, illud uero minus, et permanet non idem, set ut idem, numero quidem non unum, specie autem unum”. 90 Commentator dicit] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, I, com. 6 (Junt. II, 8I): “[...] opponendo dicentibus quod nulla est res, in qua communicant individua, nisi nomen tantum, et isti sunt illi, qui destruunt scientiam”. 97 nullum... separabile] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 1, 1028a 34–35 (AL 25.2, p. 124, 1–2): “Aliorum enim cathegorematum nullum est separabile, sed ea sola”.

115 haberent dicere quod omnia universalia essent qualitates, quia vel essent vocalia, vel mentalia, vel scripta. Alio modo considerantur ut signa sunt, et sic non omnia universalia sunt in praedicamento qualitatis, quia aliqua significant substantiam substantialiter et alii significant substantiam et connotant, et sic ponuntur in diversis praedicamentis. Et secundum illas qualitates res sunt aptae dici similes vel dissimiles.

120 <Ad 10> Nota: logica aliter considerat de universalibus et aliter metaphysici considerant universalia, sed difficile est dicere de signis quomodo ambo considerant. Et dicit Commentator: logicus considerat definitionem prout est instrumentum et ducit intellectum ad intelligere proprietates rerum, metaphysicus autem considerat definitionem prout significat naturas rerum. Et sic diceretur
125 ad propositum quod logicus considerat universale prout est instrumentum ad intelligere res ad extra, sed metaphysicus considerat prout significant naturas rerum. Primum dicit Commentator.

<Ad 11> Nota. Secundo *De anima* auctoritas sic exponitur: natura producit individua ad perpetuandum ea secundum speciem, id est quod semper sit
130 aliquod individuum speciei, id est sensibile per speciem.

<Ad 12> Sed <opinionem> Commentator<is> secundo *Metaphysicae* isti exponunt sic: qui dicunt nihil significare speciem praeter nomen, destruunt scientiam. Et quarto *Topicorum*: „interempto genere interimuntur species”, hoc est quod a negativa genere ad speciem negative valeret consequentia.

135 <Ad 13> Sed ad auctoritatem septimo *Metaphysicae*, quod aliorum kathegoreumatum nullum est separabile, nota: kathegoreuma est per se praedicabile. Isti exponunt sic quod aliorum kathegoreumatum, <id est> significata per alia kathegoreuma, <nullum> est separabile nisi haec sola substantia etc.

122 dicit Commentator] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, I, com. 44 (Junt. II, 24M–25A): “[...] philosophia utitur rebus universalibus, ut perveniat ad res existentes, sicut utitur eis in definitionibus et demonstrationibus, cum scientia eorum ducit ad intellectum et rectum apud considerationem de entibus universalibus. Et ideo demonstrationes acceptae hoc modo sunt ex propositionibus logicis communibus, non ex propositionibus essentialibus et convenientibus”.

127 dicit Commentator] *Ibidem*. 128 Secundo *De anima*] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II, 4, 415b 3–7 (AL 12.2, 95a, 15–19). 131 <opinionem> Commentator<is>] Cf. AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, *In Metaphysicam*, I, com. 6 (Junt. II, 8I). 131–132 isti exponunt] Cf. PS.-BEDA VENERABILIS, *Sententiae philosophicae collectae ex Aristotele atque Cicerone* (PL 90, 1010D). According to him, this quotation comes from Boethius’ *De divisione*, not from Aristotle’s *Topics*. Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Topica*, VI, 4, 141b 29–30 (AL 5.1, p. 120, 23–24): “Interimit enim genus et differentia speciem, quare priora haec quam species”. 135 septimo *Metaphysicae*] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 1, 1028a 34–35 (AL 25.2, p. 124, 1–2).

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UTRUM TANTUM SIGNA SINT UNIVERSALLA.
 A QUESTION FROM JOHN OF MÜNSTERBERG'S
 COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS* (VII, 32)

S U M M A R Y

John of Münsterberg's opinions concerning the status of universals are preserved in two sources: his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and an anonymous record of discussions in which he participated in Prague. In both sources, John's own opinions on the topic are paired with comments on the positions of his opponents, especially radical realists, such as John Hus, Štěpán of Pálec, and Stanislaus

of Znojmo. Although John of Münsterberg was often considered in secondary literature to be a nominalist, a more detailed analysis of his texts leads to a conclusion that the opinions he presented there are more characteristic of moderate realism. Question 32 from book 7 of his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the critical edition of which constitutes the main part of this paper, is devoted not only to the title-question, viz. whether signs are only universals, but also to the problem of how universals exist in things. It is preceded by the editor's short introduction.

KEYWORDS: John of Münsterberg; medieval philosophy; the problem of universals; metaphysics; Hussite debates

SŁOWA KLUCZE: Jan z Ziębic; filozofia średniowieczna; spór o uniwersalia; metafizyka; debaty husyckie