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WILLIAM OF GODIN
ON THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD.
A CRITICAL EDITION AND STUDY OF HIS
COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES
(BOOK I, DISTINCTION 2)*

A thorough and multifaceted study of William of Godin's *Commentary on the Sentences*, usually called *Lectura Thomasina*, has been a *desideratum* of historians of the Thomistic School or even of medievalists specialised in scholastic theology and philosophy in general.[1] In spite of that, after Decker's monumental *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*,[2] which offered a panoramic view of the Dominican texts that came into being around 1300, and among them also of the *Lectura Thomasina*, relatively few works have been devoted to it.[3] All of the authors writing about William's *Sentences Commentary* share the same view of the

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[1] The first author who drew attention to the *Lectura Thomasina* and put the emphasis on its importance for understanding the evolution of the Thomistic School in the late Middle Ages was Martin Grabmann (see his "Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino († 1336) und seine *Lectura Thomasina*," *Mittelalterlisches Geistesleben*, vol. 2, München: M. Hübner, 1936, p. 559–576. The significance of the *Lectura Thomasina* has recently been stressed by R. Cessario, *A Short History of Thomism*, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003, p. 55: "William Peter Godino (d. 1336) stands out as one who exemplifies the best tradition of medieval Thomism, as demonstrated by his widely used *Lectura Thomasina*."

[2] B. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42/1), Münster: Aschendorff, 1967.

[3] A year before Decker's book L. Ullrich published *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P.*, (Erfurter theologische Studien, 20), Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1966. Later W. Goris and M. Pickavé wrote two articles: "Die *Lectura Thomasina* des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260–1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte," *Roma Magistra Mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E Boyle à l'occasion de son 75e anniversaire*, edited by J. Hamesse, (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 10/3), Louvain-La--Neuve: Fédération des Instituts d'Etudes Médiévales, 1998, p. 83–109; eidem, "Der Streit um

studied text: on the one hand, they perceive its importance in the development of the early Thomistic school; on the other, they notice its dependence on the earlier works, especially on John Quidort's commentary. The two observations do not necessarily contradict each other but they produce a kind of a riddle.

Hence, my study has two purposes: first, to present a fragment of the unedited text, which involves an analysis of the sources in which it is preserved; second, to show its contents and sources that should help to throw some light on the place William occupies in the development of the Thomistic School.

1. Manuscript sources of William's *Commentary*

Goris and Pickavé list 10 manuscripts containing the *Lectura Thomasina*, 9 of which preserve Distinction 2 of Book I:

- Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B III 6, ff. 3vb–4rb [Ba][4]
- Bologna, Biblioteca Communale dell'Archiginnasio, A 986, f. 4ra–vb [Bo]
- Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 505, ff. 7rb–8vb [E][5]
- Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, 475, f. 3ra–va [G][6]
- Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, 281, f. 4rb–5ra [K][7]

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die *species intelligibilis* und eine *quaestio* aus dem anonymen Sentezenkommentar in ms. Brügge, Stadsbibliothek 491," *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, edited by J. Aertsen, K. Emery Jr, A. Speer, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 8), Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, p. 125–177. The first of them is a kind of prolegomena to the future edition of the *Lectura Thomasina*: it summarizes the history of earlier research on it, lists the manuscripts and presents some conjectures on their affinity; finally, it restates its relations to John Quidort's and the Bruges anonymous commentaries. The second shows the place of William's work in the series of texts dealing with the theory of *species intelligibilis* written around 1300. In the same way, the role played by the *Lectura Thomasina* in the discussion on the nature of theology was reconstructed in M. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis*, (Archa Verbi. Subsidia, 2), Münster: Aschendorff, 2010, see Chapter 5: "The Dominican Predecessors of James and Hervaeus," p. 255–272.

[4] G. Mayer, M. Burkhardt, *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel. Beschreibendes Verzeichnis. Abteilung B: Theologische Pergamenthandschriften*, vol. 1, Basel: Verlag der Universitätsbibliothek, 1960, p. 215–218.

[5] H. Fischer, *Dei lateinische Papierhandschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Erlangen*, Erlangen: Universitätsbibliothek, 1936, p. 109.

[6] A. Kern, *Die Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Graz*, Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1924, p. 275.

[7] F. Lackner, A. Haidinger, M. Haltrich, *Katalog der Handschriften des Augustiner Chorherrenschrift Klosterneuburg, Teil 3: Cod. 201–300*, (Österreichische Akademie der Wis-

- Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, f. 4ra–vb [N]
- Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Lat. 3039, ff. 5va–6ra [Pa][8]
- Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile Santa Caterina, 44, ff. 4va–5rb [Pi][9]
- Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 1590, f. 3vb–4rb [W]

The tenth codex is Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, theol. lat. fol. 557, which starts from Distinction 8 of Book I [Be].

The majority of the listed manuscripts (save for Bo and E) stems from the first half of the 14th century, Bo and E are dated to the 15th century. Ba,[10] Bo,[11] G[12] and N[13] originally belonged to libraries of Dominican convents, and Biblioteca Catariniania is based on a former Dominican library. Besides, T. Gałuszka points out that the manuscript that now belongs to the Biblioteka Jagiellońska in Krakow (shelfmark 1583) and contains fragments of the *Lectura Thomasina* also originates from the Library of the Krakow Dominican convent.[14] More-over, Be, E and K belonged or belong to convent libraries (Be — Benedict Monastery, Petersberg in Erfurt, E — Cistercian Monastery in Heilsbronn). From these facts it follows that William's *Commentary* was copied most in-tensely soon after its composition and was addressed to and diffused among the convent libraries, a half of which was Dominican. Both observations come as no surprise and apply to other texts of the same *genre* and from the same *milieu*.[15]

Goris and Pickavé also formulated some conjectural remarks on the affinity of the versions of the *Lectura Thomasina* preserved in the manuscripts.[16] First,

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senschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 434), Vienne: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2012, p. 250.

[8] *Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue generale des manuscrits latins*, vol. 4: *Ms. 3014–4277*, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1958, p. 38–39.

[9] T. De Robertis, *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofisci nelle biblioteche italiane*, vol. 1: *Firenze, Pisa, Poppi, Rimini, Trieste*, Firenze: Olschki, 1980, p. 31–32.

[10] G. Mayer, M. Burkhardt, *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel*, p. 218.

[11] See note on f. 1r: "Hoc scriptum pertinet ad librariam S. Dominici de Bononia."

[12] A. Kern, *Die Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Graz*, p. 275.

[13] The information given by the research stuff of the department of manuscripts of the library.

[14] T. Gałuszka, "W przededniu powstania studium generale. Nowe badania nad czterna-stowiecznym zachowanym księgozbiorem dominikanów krakowskich," *Przegląd Tomistyczny*, vol. 16 (2010), p. 25–42, see p. 31–33.

[15] See e.g. J.-P. Muller, "Introduction," in Jean de Paris (Quidort) O.P., *Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation. Livre I*, edited by J.-P. Muller, (Studia Anselmiana, 47), Romae: Pontificium Institutum S. Anselmi, 1961, p. xi–xxii.

[16] W. Goris, M. Pickavé, "Die *Lectura Thomasina* des Guilelmus Petri de Godino," p. 92–95; eidem, "Der Streit um die *species intelligibilis*," p. 160–161.

according to them, on the basis of the comparison of the 5 fragments stemming from the Prologue and each of the books, the 10 manuscripts can be divided into two groups: 1) BoKPaPi and 2) BaBeEGNW; furthermore, three pairs of the second group show stronger affinity: Ba and Be, E and G, and N and W.

Goris–Pickavé's grouping of the codices is generally confirmed by my analysis of the copies of the edited fragment. The only significant change regards the ascription of Ba to the second group. This fact can be easily explained by the character of Ba, since this codex was composed of separate units copied from different sources. E.g. Book I consists of three units:

1) Ff. 1–6 — Distinctions 1–7 copied by the first hand (B) on separate added charts.

2) Ff. 7–27vb — Distinctions 8–47: the text written by another hand (A) ends *ex abrupto* and then is resumed by B. Besides, the unit leaves out Distinction 27, which was subsequently added after the last distinction by B; this unit has its own pagination starting with 1 and the beginning is marked by an initial usually starting the book or the whole work.

3) Ff. 27vb–30v — Distinctions 47, 48 and 27, *tabula quaestionum libri I et II*.

To complete the picture, it should be added that Book II starts *ex abrupto* on f. 31 with several last phrases of Distinction 4 copied by yet another hand, different from the first and the second. Besides, *tabula quaestionum* was copied from another manuscript and not taken directly from the text of Ba as it puts Distinction 27 in its correct place and contains distinctions missing from the beginning of Book II.

The structure of the text enables us to reconstruct the history of the production of the part of the codex containing Book I: the second unit was its core that was completed by adding its beginning and end together with one missing distinction from its middle part and *tabula quaestionum*. Hence, it can be inferred that scribe B possessed another copy of the *Lectura* from which he copied the missing fragments together with *tabula quaestionum*. Then, still another hand (C) added on margins *loca paralella* in Thomas Aquinas' works.

The Berlin manuscript, a putative cognate of Ba, also starts from Distinction 8, with the initial at the beginning, which suggests that both manuscripts had a common model different from the one used by scribe B while completing Book I. Thus, it is obvious that different units of Ba show affinities with different manuscripts.

The differences between groups BaBoKPaPi and EGNW are illustrated by the following examples:

BaBoKPaPi	EGNW
om.	scilicet
intelligitur	intelligimus
adhuc isto modo	isto modo adhuc
intuitive	modo intuitivo
viatorum	viatoris
vestigium invenitur	invenitur vestigium
cognitionem confusam	confusam cognitionem
pars ista	ista pars
est aliis	est
Sed personae	Personae autem
om.	etiam
est causa	est
ex	ab
Trinitatis personarum	Trinitatis
hoc	istud
haberi per hoc	per hoc haberi
vel per	et
potest fieri dupliciter	dupliciter potest fieri

The list of variants is exhaustive, i.e. it shows all the places in which the two groups differ from each other, consequently it contains also some cases of small significance. Moreover, three additional arguments favouring the distinction into the two above groups can be formulated. First, there exists no other distinction between larger groups that could be exemplified with so many instances. The proportion is 18 to 79 which is the number of all places in which at least two manuscripts have a common variant distinguishing them from the remaining ones. Second, the prevailing majority of common variants shared by 2 or 3 manuscripts remain within the established groups, e.g. BaKPi — 6, BoPa — 5, ENW — 3, EG — 7, NW — 6. Third, there are also many variants present in 4 manuscripts from the first group (5 cases). All three remarks are documented in the philological apparatus below the edition.

Goris and Pickavé formulated some statements concerning the quality of single manuscripts based on the analysis of the fragments from Book III, Distinction 24, which they edited as parallel texts in their edition of corresponding question from the Brugge manuscript.[17] After comparing the variants of the fragment of William's text that dealt with Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet*, they

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[17] W. Goris, M. Pickavé, "Der Streit um die *species intelligibilis*," p. 161–162.

came to the conclusion that variants of BoKPaPi can be evaluated as mistakes if compared to Henry's text, whereas the second group cites the original more correctly. Furthermore, they contend that variants found in BaBeE are useless in constituting the accurate texts. Finally, they based their edition on G, N and W that conserves two versions of the edited fragment.

Following Goris–Pickavé's argumentation one could compare the variants from two groups with John Quidort's text which was extensively used by William. Such a comparative analysis, however, does not bring unambiguous results. William usually does not quote John's *Commentary* literally, he often paraphrases it, hence it is not clear if a particular divergence from the original is due to carelessness of the scribe or if it follows from the deliberate reformulation of the text. There are also some places where one group has a variant from the version acknowledged by Muller as correct and reproduced in the edition, and the other put in the version noted by him in the philological apparatus.

Instead, I propose evaluating single manuscripts in themselves. For this stage of the study of the manuscript tradition of the *Lectura*, I propose two criteria: 1) number of bigger and easily identifiable mistakes, as homeoteleuta, sentence-omissions and several words iterations, 2) total number of variants characteristic only of one manuscript, regardless of their putative correctness or incorrectness. The results are shown in the following tables:

	Ba	Bo	E	G	K	N	Pa	Pi	W
hom., omissions, iter.	2	3	2	1	1	2	0	2	1

Table 1

	Ba	Bo	E	G	K	N	Pa	Pi	W
individual variants	87	26	39	11	36	30	34	20	14[18]

Table 2

As an explanation of what Table 1 refers to, I quote two passages that possess their counterparts also in Quidort's commentary:

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[18] The text in W was carefully revised and annotated in the form of marginal glosses and superscriptions made by another hand. In the edited fragment, I have identified 12 such interventions. Hence, the quality of W without them would be medium (14 + 12 individual variants), mostly single word omissions and one longer in: "Tertio modo aliquid repraesentat aliud repraesentatione non omnino distincta, nec omnino confusa, sicut illa quae…": "distincta nec omnino confuse" was added in the margin. It seems probable that these corrections were introduced on the basis of another manuscript of quite good quality because they fully agree with the text in the remaining codices.

John Quidort, p. 43, 18–21	BoKPaPiW	BaEGN
Si primo modo, sic dico quod Deus cognoscibilis est a creatura etiam positive, quia effectus aptus natus est ducere in cognitionem suae causae, an est vel quia est. Creatura autem est effectus et similitudo ipsius Dei. Et ideo per creaturam possumus manuduci in cognitionem Dei *quia est*.	Si primo modo, dico quod Deus est cognoscibilis a creatura etiam positive, quia effectus natus est ducere in cognitionem suae causae *quia est*. Creatura autem omnis est effectus Dei et similitudo ipsius, ergo etc.	Si primo modo, dico quod Deus est cognoscibilis a creatura etiam positive, quia effectus natus est ducere in cognitionem suae causae *quia est*. Creatura autem omnis est effectus Dei et similitudo ipsius, ergo etc. Ergo possumus per creaturam manuduci in cognitionem Dei *quia est*.

As one can see, BoKPaPiW omit the last sentence of the quoted paragraph. I do not count, however, this omission as a mistake (consequently it has not been taken into consideration in the table) because I am not sure what the reason was: either it was indeed an omission, or it was a result of deliberate reworking of Quidort's texts — abbreviation of the digression in the principal thread of reasoning — that was later introduced (or reintroduced) into the text.

John Quidort, p. 44, 34–38	BaBoKPaPi	EGNW
Si autem accipiamus secundo modo, utrum sit cognoscibilis cognitione positiva quid est quod significat res, sic adhuc subdistinguo, quia hoc potest esse vel intuitive, scilicet per simplicem apprehensionem ipsius, sicut colore mihi opposito intuitive per simplicem apprehensionem cognosco quid est color, aut enuntiative...	Si autem {autem] vero K vero cognitione quid est BoPa} quid significat res {cognitione ... res] secundo modo inquantum quid significat quid est Ba}, sic adhuc subdistinguo, quia hoc potest esse intuitive, scilicet per simplicem apprehensionem, sicut de colore mihi opposito intuitive per simplicem apprehensionem cognosco quid est color, aut enuntiative...	Sed quid significet res? Sic adhuc subdistinguo, quia hoc potest esse {Sed ... esse] *om*. E} intuitive, scilicet per simplicem apprehensionem cognosco quid est color, aut enuntiative...

The second group presents a remarkably shorter text. First, it abbreviates the first phrase of Quidort's text and transforms its syntax; consequently the text extant in this group is more difficult to follow, nonetheless this version can be classified as *lectio difficilior*. The manuscripts from the first group preserve different versions: KPi similar to that of the second group (instead of *Sed quid* they read *Si autem/vero*, which is closer to Quidort's text), whereas BoPa and Ba try to make this fragment clearer and somehow reconstruct Quidort's original, Bo and Pa successfully, while Ba unsuccessfully. Second, I classify the lack of the phrase *sicut de* etc. as a typical homeoteleuton, which, however, does not destroy totally the sense of the passage, although it makes it more difficult to follow.

In Table 2, I decided not to differentiate between correct and incorrect variants, not to enter the discussion whether single omission or any alteration should be classified as a modification introduced intentionally by the scribe, as an unconscious spelling mistake or as an expression of his mediocre skills in understanding the copied text. Nonetheless, the number of rather incorrect than acceptable variants increases proportionally to the total number of individual readings. Generally, I assume that the number of individual readings says something about the distance of a single manuscript from the model: the more numerous the individual readings are, the farther the version is from the original. Though, I acknowledge that the argument is weak because it is possible that one codex, differing from the remaining ones more than the others, could preserve a version closest to the original. Yet, none of the manuscripts seems to convey such a significantly better version.

In general, the quality measured according to the data presented in Table 1 agrees with the results illustrated by Table 2. Thus, Ba and Bo, E and N belong to the worse class as regards both the number of individual variants and bigger faults (over 30 and at least 2), G and W to the better one, while the position of K and Pi is medium. The exception from this rule is Pa that is the best as regards the mistakes but at the same time displays many individual readings. This fact can be explained by the fact that Pa presents the revised text, which in many places corrects and modifies the original, however, it does not seem to be the second version emendated by William himself or by an editor appointed by him. I suppose it to be so since it seems highly improbable that such a version would differ mostly in terms of wording and offer changes classified usually as *lectiones faciliores*. The most suggestive example is the following fragment:

Quidort, p. 44, 51–65	Pa	BaBoEGKPi	NW
Sed secundo modo, scilicet lumine	Si secundo modo, scilicet per lumen	Si secundo modo, scilicet per lumen	Si secundo modo, scilicet per lumen

supernaturali, lumine gloriae, aut hoc est lumine habituato, aut lumine transitorio. Si lumine transitorio, sic de Deo in raptu potest cognoscere homo *quid est*. Unde sic cognovit Paulus in raptu et Moyses sic cognovit. Si lumine gloriae habituato, sic de Deo *quid est* solum cognoscunt beati.	gloriae et supernaturale, tunc aut hoc est lumine habituato, aut lumine transitorio. Primo modo quid est Deus solum beati cognoscunt, secundo modo in raptu potest homo cognoscere de Deo *quid est*, ut Paulus.	gloriae et supernaturale, aut hoc est lumine habituato, aut lumine transitorio. Secundo {Secundo] Hoc BoKPi Hoc secundo Ba} modo in raptu potest homo cognoscere de Deo *quid est*, sicut Paulus et Moyses. Sed primo modo quid est Deus cognoscunt solum beati.	gloriae et supernaturale, aut hoc est lumine habituato, aut lumine transitorio. Secundo modo in raptu potest homo cognoscere de Deo *quid est*, sicut Paulus et Moyses. Sed primo modo quid est Deus cognoscunt solum beati.

The fragment is modelled on Quidort's text that was paraphrased and shortened by William. Most importantly, William replaced longer phrases *si lumine transitorio* and *si lumine gloriae habituato* with *secundo* and *primo* (which is testified by the majority of manuscripts). But the fact that *secundo* preceded *primo* was regarded as inelegant by the scribe of Pa who intended to produce a correct and easily readable text, so he decided to invert the sequence of entire sentences. The same problem was solved in simpler way by the scribe who produced a common source of N and W: he acknowledged that the sequence was a mistake of a copyist and corrected it by replacing *secundo* by *primo* and *vice versa*. This way, however, he spoiled the text. Accordingly, W emends the text by swapping *habituato* and *transitorio* in the first sentence.

Besides, Pa often adds some phrases to make a text univocal and easier to understand:

Quidort, p. 49, 21–23	Pa	remaining manuscripts
In hoc autem est differentia inter imaginem et vestigium, quia vestigium ducit in cognitionem illius, cuius est, non distinctam…	Vestigium autem et imago differunt in hoc, quia vestigium ducit in cognitionem illius, cuius est, non distinctam…	Differunt autem in hoc, quia vestigium ducit in cognitionem illius, cuius est, non distinctam…

Similarly as in the case described above, William abbreviates Quidort's texts. But the scribe of Pa prefers to make the subject of the sentence explicit where it

was tacitly assumed by William. In the same vein, Pa begins all the articles with the same phrase "Quantum ad …," while the rest of manuscripts uses "Circa…" in the beginnings of Articles 1 and 3.

Last but not least, Pa proposes different numbering of distinctions. According to Pa, question on the cognoscibility of God belongs to Distinction 3, whereas in the remaining manuscripts it is ascribed to Distinction 2. The distinctions in this part of the *Lectura* are marked in two ways. First, at the beginning of the text there are incipits of the distinctions: accordingly, BaBoEGKN-PiW begin the distinction with "Hoc itaque,"[19] whereas Pa has "Apostolus namque."[20] The incipit is followed by the phrase: "Circa istam distinctionem…" in BaBoEGKNW, but Pi reads: "Circa 2 distinctionem…" and Pa has "Circa 3 distinctionem…." Second, the numbering of distinctions is marked on margins, usually by another, later hand. Thus, in BaKNPi the beginning of the distinction is marked by: "d. 2," while in BoGW we can read "d. 3." The second manner of numbering, indeed, does not agree with the incipit "Hoc itaque," which is why the second hand in G emends it by deleting the original incipit and putting on margin the incipit of Distinction 3: "Apostolus namque." Instead, to keep the consistency of the structure of the commentary, the same hand earlier puts on the margin "Hoc itaque" in the place where Question 2 of Distinction 1 begins: "Secundo quaeritur principaliter utrum in Deo sit pluralitas attributorum." In the same place Pa has: "Hoc igitur pia ac vera fide etc. Circa distinctionem 2 quaeritur primo utrum in Deo sit pluralitas attributorum."

Surely, the ascription of the question on the knowlability of God to Distinction 2 was intended by William, as testified by the majority of manuscripts. Yet such a distribution of questions in the distinctions was unusual: e.g. John Quidort puts it into Distinction 3, while James of Metz omits it, and at the same time he classifies the question on the plurality of the divine attributes to Distinction 2,[21] Hervaeus Natalis deals with the knowability of God in Distinction 3.[22] Moreover, the ascription of the question on knowability of God to Distinction 3 agrees with the contents of Peter Lombard's text. Therefore, the skillful and inventive scribe of Pa and annotator of G corrected William's distribution of questions to make it closer to the tradition of commenting on the *Sentences*.

Finally, it seems to me that Pa contains a text of a good quality but not relevant for an editor of the *Lectura*. Hence, taking into consideration that, save for Pa, the quality of manuscripts that belong to the first group is worse than those

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[19] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, I, d. 2, c. 1 (p. 61, 12).
[20] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, I, d. 3, c. 1 (p. 68, 21–22).
[21] See, e.g. its version conserved in G: f. 108ra; see also Tabula quaestionum, f. 102rb.
[22] Hervaeus Natalis, *In quattuor Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, Venetiis 1505, ff. 13rb sqq.

from the second, I have decided to base my edition principally on the second group (EGNW). Nonetheless, in the philological apparatus I reproduce also variants characteristic of the manuscripts from the first group to illustrate the putative character of my considerations and to show the character, extension and intensity of the differentiation of the source material. I skip the variants present in only one manuscript and various synonyms, such as *igitur — ergo*, *illa — ista* that can be hardly distinguished in the manuscripts.

I have introduced classic Latin orthography and punctuation making it easier to follow the text. I use the usual editorial signs and abbreviations: <…> for the words inserted by the editor, *add. — addit, addunt, om. — omittit, omittunt, inver. — invertit, invertunt, hom. — homeoteleuton*.

2. Sources and doctrines

As perhaps could be expected, taking into consideration the labelling of William of Godin as the most faithful Thomist, the *Lectura Thomasina* restates substantial theses formulated by Aquinas,[23] as John Quidort did a few years earlier. Let us, however, take a closer look at the mechanism of reception and transformation of Thomas' teaching that took place in William's *Sentences Commentary*.

First, let us compare the headings of questions and articles in corresponding parts of Aquinas', Quidort's and William's commentaries:

Aquinas, *Sent.* I, d. 3	Quidort, *Sent.* I, d. 3	William, *Lect.* I, d. 2
Q. 1, A. 1: Utrum Deus possit cognosci ab intellectu creato	Q. 1: Utrum Deus a creatura sit cognoscibilis	Q. un.: Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura A. 1: Quomodo Deus cognoscatur a creatura
A. 2: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum		
A. 3: Utrum Deus possit cognosci ab homine per creaturas		

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[23] In this part of my study I do not intend to present a detailed analysis of the doctrines, or rather the doctrine, espoused by Thomas, John and William. I am going to limit myself only to elements relevant in establishing their mutual relations. The problem of human knowledge of God and its boundaries in regard to the Trinity was a subject of many studies, especially in the Thomistic tradition. See e.g. a recent study by J.M. McDermott, "Is the Blessed Trinity Naturally Knowable. St. Thomas on Reason, Faith, Nature, Grace, and Person," *Gregorianum*, vol. 93/1 (2012), p. 113–149.

A. 4: Utrum philosophi naturali cognitione cognoverint Trinitatem ex creaturis	Q. 2: Utrum philosophi per rationem naturalem sumptam ex creaturis potuerunt devenire in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personarum distinctionem	A. 3: Utrum in distinctam cognitionem Trinitatis personarum per rationem naturalem venire possimus
Q. 2, A. 1: Utrum similitudo Dei in creaturis possit dici vestigium A. 2: Utrum partes vestigii sint tres vel tantum duae	Q. 3: Utrum in creaturis inveniatur vestigium Trinitatis	A. 2: Quomodo creatura ipsum repraesentet per modum vestigii et quomodo per modum imaginis
A. 3: Utrum in omni creatura sit vestigium	Q. 4: Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in omni creatura	
Q. 3, A. un.: Utrum tantum mens sit subiectum imaginis	Q. 5: Utrum homo sit imago Dei	

The first part of Distinction 3 is followed in Thomas and John by the second concerning the powers of the soul, whereas in the *Lectura* the same topic comes as the subsequent distinction, i.e. Distinction 3.

Two things in the table above are striking at first glance. 1) The structure of the analysis becomes simpler and simpler: John reduces the amount and particularity of questions dealt with by Thomas, and William simplifies the discussion even further. 2) William inverts the sequence of questions.

Ad 1. Thomas, on the one hand, perceives Distinction 3 as an opportunity to present his most characteristic theses concerning the knowability of God — i.e. the possibility of cognition of God by the created reason and through creatures or taking creatures as its starting point. Creatures are condition *sine qua non* of the knowability of God, consequently God's existence is not self-evident, but at the same time the nature of creatures excludes the possibility of knowing the Trinity through creatures by means of natural reason. On the other hand, Aquinas' considerations are intended also, or even above all, as a presentation of Peter Lombard's text. Therefore, Thomas cannot deny the two theses that constitute the core of Lombard's position: that there is a *vestigium* of God in creatures, which is able to bring some confused cognition of the Trinity, and that there is one creature, namely the human soul, that ascends to the higher level of resemblance to the Trinity, i.e. can be called *imago*. Distinction 3 of the *Sentences* begins with proofs of the possibility of knowing God by means of creatures and through the natural reason. Peter then restricts this possibility to the cognition

of God in his unity but says immediately that there is a *vestigium Trinitatis* in creatures and its *imago* in the soul of man, the nature and the limited character of which is explained exhaustively in Augustine's *On the Trinity* quoted extensively by Peter.[24]

The simplification of the structure of the distinction proposed by John consists in cutting out the proof of the self-evidence of God's existence, as this element does not seem to be directly connected with the commented text. Besides, John makes the analysis of the notion of *vestigium* more concise, although in terms of the doctrinal contents both thinkers present the same ideas.

The process of the simplification of the structure continues in the *Lectura*, where considerations on self-evidence of God are omitted and the material on *vesitigium* and *imago* is comprised in one article. It must be noted, however, that all the topics Thomas and John dealt with are present in William's question, although they do not constitute its distinct parts but only paragraphs. Thus, Article 2 in the *Lectura* ends with considerations on the omnipresence of *vestigium* in creatures and the place of *imago* in the human soul. The last element plays an important role in Aquinas and Quidort since it connects the two parts of the distinction, leading the reader from the considerations on the knowability of God to the analysis of the powers of the soul. In the *Lectura* this role is no longer played by the analysis of the human soul as *imago* because the psychological part constitutes a separate distinction, namely Distinction 3.

Ad 2. William inverts the sequence of questions to put the solution of the problem of the knowability of the Trinity at the end of the distinction. In my view, it was a deliberate decision intended to argue that the analysis of God's knowability culminates in the thesis that the Trinity cannot be known by the natural reason. Hence, the clarification of the notions of *vestigium* and *imago* and the distinction between them, which constitute the core of Lombard's reflection, are transformed into prolegomena to the solution of the main problem. Such structuring of the distinction violates the structure of Peter's text but stresses the logic of reasoning hidden in the text. The analysis of *vestigium* and *imago* are clearly subordinated to the refutation of the possibility of knowing the Trinity through the natural reason, which is, in my view, the principal purpose intended by all three *Sentences* commentaries discussed here.

After the above remarks about the evolution of the structure of the distinction, some attention should be directed towards the textual sources of the *Lectura*. First of all it must be admitted that almost 80% of William's text is borrowed from Quidort's *Commentary*.

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[24] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, I, d. 3, c. 1–4 (pp. 68–74).

William takes over Quidort's Question 1 in its entirety: he adopts its arguments for and against together with the answers to them as the principal arguments of his question, and transforms John's *corpus quaestionis* into his Article 1. Next, William's Article 2 repeats the first part of the *corpus* of Quidort's Question 3, namely the distinction between *vestigium* and *imago* and the subsequent paragraph claiming that one can ascribe to God three kinds of "things": 1) essential attributes (as Creator) that are confused from the point of view of the Trinity, 2) relations or persons that are distinct, and 3) the appropriated essential attributes (as power, wisdom, goodness) the nature of which is medium — partially distinct and partially confused. Then John, like Aquinas earlier, enumerates the parts of *vestigium* — this motif is absent from the *Lectura*. Article 2 ends with the considerations about the presence of *vestigium* in all creatures and the place in which *imago* is located in the human being. In this part of the discussion, William abandons his principal model and uses abbreviated and reworded *corpora* of two questions from Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*.[25]

William's Article 3 is again modelled on Quidort, as the *Lectura* adopts the central part of Question 2: the polemic against those who[26] argue that it is possible to know the Trinity through creatures and the final conclusion stating that if any philosopher knew something about the Trinity, it was because of the Bible or some other form of revelation. Between these two elements William inserts his own argument contending that although through the natural reason we are able to know that there is a thing with divine nature (this is so because every creature is related to God as an effect to its cause, so if there is an effect, there must also be its cause), we are unable to know how many *supposita* exist. This is so because *supposita* cannot be distinguished from one another by means of what is common to them, and causality is equally common to all of them. This reasoning seems to be the only original element of the studied fragment of the *Lectura* since I have not managed to find its counterpart in any earlier work.

The last element to which I would like to draw attention while analysing Distinction 2 of the *Lectura Thomasina*, are marginal notes in manuscripts Ba and G revealing the *loca paralella* in Thomas' works. These notes were introduced by the users of the manuscripts, after the manuscripts had been copied. They are independent from one another, so they do not possess any common model, though the practice of adding such notes to the *Lectura Thomasina* was relatively popular. Apart from Ba and G, similar notes have been added to the whole text also in Be, and a few references to Thomas are extant in W as well. Both of the

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[25] Thomas de Aquino, *ST*, I, q. 93, a. 6 et 7.

[26] I suppose that Quidort and William mean the authors quoted by Aquinas, not any of their contemporaries. For the arguments see *Super I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 13; *ST*, I, q. 32, a. 1.

glossators refer to two Aquinas' works, i.e. to *Summa theologiae* and *De veritate*, but they quote different fragments. Generally, both of the glossators give references to fragments that treat the same or very similar problems but not necessarily adduce exact quotations from Aquinas. Thus, the glossators give also references to Aquinas to the fragments taken directly from Quidort. By contrast, the glossator of G managed, *nolens volens*, to discover the exact source of the second part of William's Article 2, that does not derive from Quidort and is based directly on the *Summa theologiae*.

3. Concluding remarks

Clearly, the *Lectura* treats Lombard's *Sentences* more freely than the commentaries of Aquinas and Quidort do. Thus, the *Lectura* instantiates the general tendency in evolution of the literary genre of *Sentences* commentaries. The medieval commentators of the *Sentences*, while lecturing on the *Sentences*, developed their own ideas and put forward their own projects of theological synthesis. Hence, now we should describe the direction in which William tends in departing from Lombard's text. Again, William's aim is obvious: his purpose is to emphasize the theses he thought to be genuinely Thomistic. He does this, first, by reducing interpretive function of the *Commentary*: he omits considerations concerning uncertainties in understanding Augustine's teaching on *vestigium* and *imago*. Second, William transforms and unifies the structure of reasoning in the distinction, as to demonstrate that its core and summit is Aquinas' thesis that the Trinity cannot be known through creatures.

William accomplishes his goal by taking a commentary on the *Sentences* which stems from Thomas' teaching as a starting point, i.e. John of Quidort's *Commentary*. In fact, William takes over elements that fully satisfy his concept of the Thomistic *Sentences* commentary and feels free to remove those he thinks unnecessary, instead incorporating paraphrases of the original text of Aquinas — this text being, however, not the *Scriptum super Sententias*, but the *Summa theologiae*. This is characteristic but not surprising when one takes into consideration the main purpose of the *Lectura*. The *Summa* fits William's intention of presenting a theological synthesis better. Moreover, the mode of operating adopted in the *Lectura* was approved by its medieval readers, at least by its glossators who also preferred to look for the corresponding fragments in later synthetic Aquinas' works, such as *De veritate* and the *Summa*.

< Guillelmus Petri Godinus >

< Quaestiones in primum librum Sententiarum >

< Distinctio 2 >

Hoc itaque etc. Circa istam distinctionem quaeritur

5   Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura

Et videtur quod non, quia cognoscibilis ad cognoscens debet esse proportio. Sed
Dei ad creaturam nulla est proportio, ideo etc.

<2.> Praeterea, Boethius *De consolatione* dicit: omne cognoscens iudicat de
eo, quod cognoscit. Sed secundum Augustinum omne iudicans est superius eo,
10   de quo iudicat. Deo autem nihil est superius, ideo etc.

Contra. Damascenus dicit quod Deus non derelinquit nos in omnimoda
ignorantia sui.

Respondeo. Circa istam quaestionem sunt tria videnda: primo quomodo Deus
cognoscatur a creatura, secundo quomodo creatura ipsum repraesentet per mo-
15   dum vestigii et quomodo per modum imaginis, tertio utrum in distinctam
cognitionem Trinitatis personarum per rationem naturalem venire possimus.

< Articulus 1 >

Circa primum articulum, sciendum quod Deum cognosci a creatura potest acci-
pi dupliciter, quia aut cognitione privativa, aut positiva. Si privativa, sic cognos-
20   ci potest et cognoscitur removendo ab ipso imperfectiones, quae reperiuntur in
creaturis, ut dicit Dionysius, 4 capitulo *De divinis nominibus* et Algazel in *Me-*

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6 Et] *om.* BoPi   **13** tria videnda] *inver.* ENW   **14** creatura[1]] creaturis ENW   **16** pos-
simus] possumus KNW   **19** aut[2]] cognitione *add.* BoPaPi   **21** ut] secundum quod
NW

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4 Hoc itaque] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, I, d. 2, cap. 1 (p. 61, 12).   **8–9** Boethius... co-
gnoscit] Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, V, 4, 39 (ed. Moreschini, p. 150, 114–151, 115).
9–10 secundum Augustinum... iudicat] Augustinus Hipponensis, *De libero arbitrio*, II, 5, 12
(CSEL 74, 49, 1sqq.).   **11–12** Damascenus dicit... sui] Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide ortho-
doxa*, I, 1, 2 (ed. Buytaert, p. 12, 21).   **21** dicit Dionysius] Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita,
De divinis nominibus, 4, 7 (Dionysiaca, t. 1, p. 178sqq.).   **21–22** Algazel... dicit] Algazel,
Metaphysica, Pars I, tr. 2, 1 (ed. Muckle, p. 52, 14–16).

6–12 Et videtur... sui] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, arg. 1–2 et sc. (ed. Muller, p. 43,
2–8).   **18–53** Circa primum... cognoscunt beati] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, corp.
(ed. Muller, p. 43, 9 – 44, 56).

taphysica sua, tractatu II, ubi dicit, quod Deus a nobis cognoscitur, scilicet quia non est corpus, quia iam dependeret ex partibus; item, quia non est accidens, quia sic dependeret a subiecto.

Si loquamur de cognitione positiva, hoc est adhuc dupliciter: aut hoc est cognitione *quia est*, aut cognoscendo de Deo *quid est*. Si primo modo, dico quod Deus est cognoscibilis a creatura etiam positive, quia effectus natus est ducere in cognitionem suae causae *quia est*. Creatura autem omnis est effectus Dei et similitudo ipsius, ergo etc. Ergo possumus per creaturam manuduci in cognitionem Dei *quia est*. Si secundo modo, adhuc subdistinguo, quia hoc potest esse dupliciter: uno modo scilicet cognoscendo de Deo quid dicitur per nomen, aut cognoscendo quid est res. Possumus enim de aliquo cognoscere quid est, quod dicitur per nomen, de quo non possumus cognoscere quid est, quod significat res; sicut de chimaera cognoscimus quid dicitur per nomen, de qua non possumus cognoscere quid est res, quia chimaera nihil est.

Si ergo | accipiamus primo modo utrum Deus sit a nobis cognoscibilis cognitione positiva quid est, quod dicitur per nomen, dico quod sic, quia per hoc nomen 'Deus' intelligimus, quo maius cogitari non potest. Sed quid significet res? Sic adhuc subdistinguo, quia hoc potest esse intuitive, scilicet per simplicem apprehensionem, sicut de colore mihi opposito intuitive per simplicem apprehensionem cognosco quid est color, aut enuntiative, sicut dicendo: 'Homo est animal, Sor est homo' et huiusmodi. Sic isto secundo modo adhuc est cognoscibilis. Enuntiamus enim de ipso: 'Deus est bonus', 'Deus est sapiens' et huiusmodi. Sic tamen non perfecte cognoscitur quid est Deus, quia nec bonitas, nec sapientia, nec aliquid huiusmodi haurit totam perfectionem ipsius Dei — et isto modo cognoscere est imperfecte cognoscere. Si autem modo intuitivo, seu obiective, aut hoc est lumine naturali, aut supernaturali, scilicet lumine gloriae. Si primo modo, dico quod ad talem intuitum vel in simplicem apprehensionem pertingere non possumus lumine naturali, quia hoc non est condicio viatoris. Si secundo modo, scilicet per lumen gloriae et supernaturale, aut hoc est lumine

(marginal numbers: 25, 30, 35, 50)

(marginal: 3rb)

23 quia^2] quod EKPaPi   **24** sic] iam KBa   **25** Si] Nota in G: Prima pars, q. 4, art. 3.
27 effectus] aptus *add.* BaBoKPa   **28** omnis] *om.* ENW   **28** est... Dei] effectus Dei est BaBoEKNW   **29–30** Ergo... est] *om.* BoKPaPiW   **31** modo scilicet] *inver.* ENW   **31** scilicet] *om.* BaBoKPaPi   **36** a... cognoscibilis] cognoscibilis a nobis *inver.* KPaPi   **37** quia] *om.* EG   **38** intelligimus] intelligitur BaBoKPaPi   **38** Sed... significet] Si vero quid significat K Si autem quid significat Pi Si vero cognitione quid est quod significat BoPa Si autem secundo modo inquantum quid significat quid est Ba   **39–41** Sic... apprehensionem] *om.* EGW *hom.*
39 Sic] *om.* BaKPi   **39** esse] vel *add.* BoKPi   **42** isto... adhuc] adhuc isto modo BaBoKPaPi   **42** secundo] *om.* BoKPaPiW   **43–44** et huiusmodi] *om.* EG   **45** et] ideo *add.* BaKNPaPiW   **46** modo intuitivo] intuitive BaBoK PaPi   **49** viatoris] viatorum BaKPaPi
50 supernaturale] tunc *add.* BoPa   **50** est] *om.* KPi

23–24 non est... subiecto] Algazel, *Metaphysica*, Pars I, tr. 2, 1 (ed. Muckle, p. 52, 8–10).

habituato, aut lumine transitorio. Secundo modo in raptu potest homo cognoscere de Deo *quid est*, sicut Paulus et Moyses. Sed primo modo quid est Deus solum cognoscunt beati.

< Articulus 2 >

55 Quantum ad secundum principale, sciendum quod per quamdam adaptationem in cognitionem Dei et Trinitatis personarum devenimus, scilicet per vestigium et imaginem. Differunt autem in hoc, quia vestigium ducit in cognitionem illius, cuius est, non distinctam, sed confusam; sicut per impressionem pedis in pulvere, quod vocatur vestigium, venimus in cognitionem confusam hominis. Dicimus 60 enim quod fuit homo, qui impressit, non autem cognoscimus per hoc quod fuerit talis vel talis figurae. Imago autem ducit in cognitionem magis distinctam. Unde intelligendum quod in creaturis videmus, quod aliquid repraesentat aliud tripliciter. Uno modo repraesentatione omnino confusa, ut quae conveniunt in ratione generis, sicut vermis generatus de Petro repraesentat Petrum confuse, 65 quia conveniunt solum in ratione animalis. Alio modo aliquid repraesentat aliud repraesentatione omnino distincta, sicut imago Petri resultans in speculo — per talem enim cognoscitur et distinguitur Petrus a Paulo. Tertio modo aliquid repraesentat aliud repraesentatione non omnino distincta nec omnino confusa, sicut illa, quae repraesentat quantum ad esse speciei, sicut impressio pedis in 70 pulvere — per hoc enim cognoscitur quod fuit homo, qui impressit, non tamen scitur utrum fuisset Ioannes vel Otto. Illud ergo, quod repraesentat omnino ita confuse sicut primo modo, non potest dici similitudo vel vestigium alicuius vel imago. Non enim potest dici quod vermis sit vestigium vel imago Petri. Quod autem repraesentat omnino distincte, imago appellatur, sicut est effigies beati 75 Nicolai sculpta in lapide, quae dicitur eius imago — per eam enim cognoscitur et ab aliis distinguitur. Sed quod medio modo repraesentat, sicut impressio pedis in pulvere, proprie vestigium appellatur.

Modo in divinis sunt tria, sicut in humanis, et hoc secundum nostrum modum intelligendi: quaedam enim sunt omnino confusa, ut essentialia non ap- 80 propriata, sicut creator, gubernator et huiusmodi; quaedam omnino distincta, ut relationes distinguentes et personae distinctae, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quaedam medio modo se habentia inter omnino confusa et om-

51 Secundo] Hoc BaKPi Primo NW   **52** primo] secundo NW   **55** Quantum] Nota in marg. Ba: Prima Pars, q. 14, art. 1; G: Prima Pars, q. 93, ar. 1 et aliis sequentibus.   **58** pulvere] pulverem BaBoKNPa   **60** autem] quia BoKW   **60–61** fuerit] fuit EKW   **62** intelligendum] est *add.* BoKPaPi   **62** quod[2]] *om.* KPi   **65** aliud] aliquid BaG   **67** cognoscitur... distinguitur] distinguitur et cognoscitur BoKPaPi   **71** Otto] Petrus BaKPi Paulus N Sor Pa Thomas W   **78–79** nostrum modum] *inver.* NW

57–90 Differunt... Spritus Sancti] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, corp. (ed. Muller, p. 49, 21 – 50, 60).

nino distincta, sicut communia essentialia appropriata, ut potentia, sapientia et
bonitas. Illud ergo erit vestigium Trinitatis, quod eam repraesentat secundum
communia essentialia appropriata. Hoc autem convenit creaturis, quia ex hoc
quod una creatura est principium alterius, ostenditur Pater, qui a nullo est, sed
est principium deitatis. Ex hoc autem quod creatura aliam producit per modum
exemplaris, sicut artificiatum procedit ab artifice, innotescit persona Filii, quae
est ars omnium in mente divina existentium. Ex hoc autem quod creatura ad
aliud est ordinabilis, innotescit persona Spritus Sancti. Per istum autem mo-
dum invenitur vestigium tantum in perfectis creaturis, quae possunt sibi simile
generare.

Si autem accipiamus vestigium secundum modum, speciem et ordinem, sic
ratio vestigii est in omnibus creaturis. Modus enim rei est perfectio et potentia
rei limitata, per quam devenimus in cognitionem perfectionis huius, quae est
potentia, quae supereminenter est in Deo et appropriatur Patri. Species autem
rei est forma eius, a qua accipitur eius quidditas, quae se obicit intellectui, per
quam intelligimus sapientiam in Deo, quae appropriatur Filio. Ordo autem rei
non est nisi inclinatio eius ad bonum suum, per quam intelligimus bonitatem,
quae appropriatur Spiritui Sancto. Et ita devenimus per vestigium in confu-
sam cognitionem Trinitatis, ut dictum est. Imago vero, quia ducit in cognitio-
nem rei magis distinctam quam vestigium, ideo imago Dei solum invenitur in
rationalibus creaturis, quae maxime ad similitudinem Dei attingunt.

Sed ubi sit ponenda imago Dei in homine? Dicendum quod in mente, triplici
de causa. Primo quia per hanc differt homo a brutis, in quibus non est imago.
Secundo quia ista pars dignior est in homine. Tertio quia per actum illius partis,
scilicet intelligere et amare, attingit homo maxime ad Dei similitudinem, quia
bruta tantum conveniunt cum Deo in esse et vivere.

Est tamen advertendum quod imago principaliter est ponenda in actibus.
Cuius ratio est, quia ibi est ponenda, ubi maxime repraesentantur divinae per-
sonae. Personae autem distinguuntur secundum processum verbi a dicente et
amoris ab utroque. Verbum autem sine actuali cognitione esse non potest.

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84 bonitas] et huiusmodi *add.* BoPa   **90** aliud] aliam EGPa   **90** innotescit... Sancti] perso-
na Spiritus Sancti innotescit *inver.* NW   **91** invenitur vestigium] *inver.* BaBoKPaPi   **91** tan-
tum] *om.* EG   **97** eius] *om.* EG   **100–101** confusam cognitionem] *inver.* BaBoKPaPi
104 Sed] Nota in marg. G: Prima pars, q. 93, ar. 6; De ver., q. 10, ar. 7.   **105** differt homo]
inver. EG   **106** ista pars] *inver.* BaBoKPaPi   **106** est] aliis *add.* BaBoKPaPi   **107** maxime...
similitudinem] ad Dei similitudinem maxime EG   **109** Est] Nota in marg. Ba: Prima Pars,
q. 14, ar. 6; Quaestio de ver., q. 10, ar. 7.   **109** imago] primo et *add.* BaKPi   **109** principaliter
est ponenda] est ponenda principaliter *inver.* NW   **109** est ponenda] *inver.* BaPi   **110** quia]
om. BaKPi   **110** est ponenda] *inver.* BaKPi   **111** Personae autem] Sed personae BaBoKPaPi

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93–103 Si autem... Dei attingunt] Thomas de Aquino, *STh*, I, q. 93, 6, corp.   **104–117**
Dicendum... illis imago] Thomas de Aquino, *STh*, I, q. 93, 7, corp.

Unde etiam si Pater ad unum momentum cessaret | ab intelligendo, nec Fi- 3va
lius, nec Spiritus Sanctus essent. Et propter hoc imago principaliter attenditur
115 secundum actus, prout ex notitia verbum formamus interius et ex hoc in amo-
rem prorumpimus. Et quia actus virtualiter sunt in habitibus et potentiis, ideo
secundario est in illis imago.

Nec obstat quod actus transeunt et non manent, quia manent in suis princi-
piis, licet aliqui dicant quod anima semper intelligat, quod falsum est, nisi intel-
120 ligatur 'habitualiter', ut patet XIV *De Trinitate*. Et sic est homo ad imaginem
Dei factus quod possit intelligere et amare Deum, ut ibidem dicitur.

< Articulus 3 >

Circa tertium articulum principalem — scilicet utrum per rationem naturalem
sumptam ex creaturis in distinctam cognitionem Trinitatis personarum perveni-
125 re possimus — est sciendum quod quidam sunt, qui volunt dicere quod contingit
devenire in cognitionem Trinitatis quoad propria per creaturam, non cognitione
quae sit ab effectu, inquantum scilicet effectus ducit in cognitionem suae causae,
quia quilibet effectus communis est tribus personis, sed cognitione, quae est qua-
si a simili, ut sicut in anima sunt illa tria: mens, notitia et amor ita se habentia
130 quod unum oritur ex alio et distinguitur et refertur ad alia, ita in essentia divina
una sunt tria supposita, quorum unum oritur ab alio et distinguitur et refertur ad
aliud. Unde dicunt quod imago perfecte cognita ut imago ducit in cognitionem
Trinitatis per propria. Si ergo anima consideretur ut res quaedam absoluta, tunc
non ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis per propria. Sed si consideretur non ut res
135 quaedam absoluta, sed inquantum imago, tunc ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis
per propria.

Sed istud non sufficit. Licet enim ista tria — mens, notitia et amor — in
anima ducant in cognitionem mentis, notitiae et amoris in Deo, non tamen

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113 etiam] *om.* BaKPaPi   **113** ad… momentum] ab uno momento EG   **119** falsum est]
inver. BoK   **119–120** intelligatur] intelligeretur BoK   **121** Dei] *om.* EW   **123** Circa] Nota
in marg. Ba: Prima Pars, q. 12, ar. 12 et 32; Quaestio de ver., q. 10, ar. 13; G: Prima pars, q. 12, ar.
12, item, q. 32, ar. 1, De ver., materia 10, ar. 13.   **124–125** in… possimus] pervenire possimus
in distinctam cognitionem Trinitatis personarum *inver.* BoPa   **125** volunt] voluerunt NW
126 devenire] pervenire BaBo   **126** Trinitatis] personarum *add.* BoPa   **128** est[2]] causa
add. BaBoKPaPi   **131** ab] ex BaBoKPaPi   **133** Trinitatis] personarum *add.* BaBoPaKPi
137 istud] hoc BaBoKPaPi   **137–138** in anima] *om.* BaPi

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120 patet… *De Trinitate*] Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 6, 9 (CCSL 50A, 432,
56–57).   **120–121** Et sic… Deum] Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 4, 6 (CCSL
50A, 428, 8sqq.).

118–121 Nec… ibidem dicitur] Thomas de Aquino, *STh*, I, q. 93, 7, arg. 4 et ad 4.   **125–144**
quidam… eadem natura] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, corp. (ed. Muller, p. 46, 24 –
47, 43).

ducunt in cognitionem istorum ut differentium. Non enim oportet, si differunt in creatura, quod propter hoc differant in Deo creatore. 140

Praeterea, dato quod ducant in cognitionem istorum ut differentium, non tamen ut differentium secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, quia hoc est omnino supra naturam et rationem plura supposita realiter distincta esse in una et eadem natura.

Ideo dicendum quod per rationem naturalem possumus scire et cognoscere 145 quod oportet quod in natura divina sit aliquod suppositum, sed non quod sint tria supposita vel tres personae, quia cum omnis creatura se habeat ad divinam naturam ut effectus eius, divina natura se habet ad eam ut causa agens. Sed sicut effectus est de necessitate alicuius suppositi, ita actio omnis agentis oportet quod sit naturaliter alicuius suppositi, ergo necesse est in divina natura esse ali- 150 quod suppositum. Sed quod non possit per hoc haberi quod sint tria supposita, patet, quia per illud, in quo aliqua communiter conveniunt, per illud inter se non differunt nec determinate habent distingui. Sed omnia supposita divina conveniunt in ratione causalitatis, quia omnia aequaliter sunt causa creaturarum, ergo per hoc non differunt nec habent distingui. Si ergo aliqui philosophi noverunt 155 aliquid de Trinitate personarum vel etiam aliquis alius quoad propria, hoc fuit per doctrinam, scilicet per libros Veteris vel Novi Testamenti, vel per fidem, vel per divinam revelationem et inspirationem, non per propriam industriam.

Ad argumenta ergo pro quaestione dicendum.

Ad primum quod duplex est proportio: una commensurationis et talis non est 160 nisi inter finita, quia quantumcumque parvum aliquotiens sumptum adaequat vel excedit quantumcumque magnum, dummodo sit finitum; alia est proportio cuiusdam imitationis vel similitudinis vel ordinis et talis bene est inter nos et Deum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium de re dupliciter potest fieri: vel dis- 165 cernendo utrum res sit vel non sit, vel definiendo utrum ita esse debeat vel non. Primo modo intellectus iudicat de qualibet re. Et tale iudicium non est alicuius auctoritatis, sed solum secundo modo. Et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed per illam, sicut iudex non iudicat de lege, sed per illam, ut dicit Augustinus *De vera religione*.

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139 differunt] differant BaKN   **143** supra] contra EW   **148** divina] autem *add.* BoPa **148** se habet] *inver.* KPiWN   **151** per... haberi] haberi per hoc *inver.* BaBoKPaPi   **158** et] vel per BaBoKPaPi   **161** quantumcumque] quodcumque BoPi   **165** dupliciter... fieri] potest fieri dupliciter BaBoKPaPi   **166** res] ita BaEPa ita *add.* BoKPi   **167** qualibet re] *inver.* BaKPi

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155–158 Si ergo... industriam] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, corp. (ed. Muller, p. 48, 73–76).   **160–164** Ad primum... Deum] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, ad 1 (ed. Muller, p. 45, 60–66).   **165–169** Ad secundum... religione] Ioannes Quidort, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, ad 2 (ed. Muller, p. 45, 73–78).   **169** dicit Augustinus] Augustinus Hipponensis, *De vera religione*, 30, 56 (CCSL 32, 223, 46sqq.).

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WILLIAM OF GODIN
ON THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD.
A CRITICAL EDITION AND STUDY
OF HIS *COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES*
(BOOK I, DISTINCTION 2)

Summary

William's *Commentary on the Sentences*, sometimes called the *Lectura Thomasina*, was perceived in the Middle Ages as faithful and adequate exposition of Thomas Aquinas' theology, hence a closer look at the contents of this previously unedited text has been postulated by medievalists, especially those interested in the Thomistic tradition. This study first characterizes the manuscripts containing the *Lectura*, then analyses the dependence of William's work on John Quidort's *Commentary* and Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, before finally providing a critical edition of Distinction 2 from Book I. 80% of the text of the *Lectura* is based on Quidort's earlier *Commentary* and its doctrinal contents follow the solutions proposed by St Aquinas.

KEYWORDS: Thomas Aquinas; John Quidort; William of Godin; First Thomistic School; Knowability of the Trinity

SŁOWA KLUCZE: Tomasz z Akwinu; Jan Quidort; Wilhelm Godino; pierwsza szkoła tomistyczna; poznawalność Trójcy